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In Chile, the south-central Andean region has recently emerged in the national geographies of 
energy as one harbouring a huge potential for new modalities of hydropower generation. Small 
hydropower projects at different stages of development now proliferate on most of the region’s 
watersheds. This process has given rise to an equal proliferation of territorial struggles that 
circulate at different scales, from the strictly local, to the national. The socio-historical and 
cultural relations in which Andean waterscapes are embedded thus appear as being at the 
centre of the current dynamics of enclosure and struggle through which the energy frontier is 
unfolding in Chile. 
This thesis presents an ethnographic investigation of the struggles emergent from the 
clashing layers of value, meaning, and practice in which these landscapes are implicated. In 
particular, it analyses the conflict-ridden relation between the shifting geographies of extraction 
and rent expressed in the expansion of hydropower infrastructure—and enabled by the 
commodification of water rights—and the forms of value, commonality, and difference 
emergent from the historical and socio-territorial constitution of Mapuche and campesino 
communities in the locality of Huife, and the ways in which these are entangled with the local 
lands and waterscapes. 
To approach this, the thesis will develop a theoretical argument exploring the ecological 
dimensions of Marx’s theory of value, with particular attention paid to the category of use-value 
and the notion of social form. It will then analyse the recent transformations of the energy 
frontier and the political economic processes behind its dynamics. In doing do, the thesis 
explores in detail the different social fields in which local rivers and territorialities are implicated, 
detailing how these produce the vernacular values that mediate socio-ecological reproduction 
at the local level—social fields and values from which oppositional forces draw their momentum, 
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Crisis is perhaps the word that best describes the times in which this dissertation was written, 
and certainly the cultural momentum animating much of the discursive and academic field it 
navigates—ie. that of the political ecology of a planet being transformed beyond recognition by 
the compulsions of globalised capital. Here I speak of ‘crisis’ not as a clearly politically and 
analytically contained aspect of reality, but rather as a sort of pervading cultural atmosphere 
mediating society’s relation to both its ecological conditions and its sense of future. A condition 
in which the mounting consequences of the history of capitalist modernity overflow their 
distinct ‘economic’, ‘political’, ‘environmental’, or ‘social’ characters, and go on to saturate 
society’s horizons, assembled on the sort of monstrous scales reserved for eschatological myth. 
‘Crisis’ as a condition in which the sense of futurity that must always underpin the reproduction 
of the any given social order, the cultural experience of future plausibility (let alone promise) 
that legitimate the way things stand, erodes at a rate as alarming as that suffered by the web of 
life that continue to sustain us. If the turn of century was defined by the commonplace maxim, 
attributed to Frederic Jameson, that ‘it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of 
capitalism’, these days what demands a heroic feat of the imagination is the thought of the long-
term continuation of the capitalist world-system as we have hitherto known it—that is, as a 
system driven by the vertiginous compounding of growth upon growth, the sustaining of which 
presently translates into the practice of literally moving mountains and/or throwing millions into 
debt peonage just to make way for increasingly elusive spaces of profitability. And even then, 
this imagined capitalist future is one that only those equipped with the thickest of ideological 
spectacles could manage to convey in any genre other than the dystopian. Indeed, even for 
those at the helm of the global capitalist bureaucracy, like head of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, 
the destabilised climate system that capitalism has bequeathed upon us makes up for a future 
which, in her estimation, is “quite frankly, scary” (Lagarde 2015:64).  
This condition, in which the horizons of capitalist modernity become increasingly 
unstable, can easily reduce us to the position of rabbits caught in the headlights of looming 
catastrophe. Yet it is fundamental that we recognise these images of the future for what they 
are: aspects of the present, real potentials and stories, the roots of which must be traced to the 
political forces that rule over a situation that has ceased to produce future visions of itself that 
can simultaneously command generalised credibility and desirability—in other words, to a 
protracted organic crisis of liberal capitalist hegemony rooted in its unfolding as part of natural 
history (Wainwright & Mann 2018). As Wainwright and Mann (2018:14) have recently written: 
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“Only an analysis of the political forces that produce the potentiality of collapse, and the ways 
in which those forces might themselves be transformed by that potentiality, will lead to an 
understanding of emerging ‘relations of force’”. 
These transformations are indeed underway, and these relations of force taking shape. 
This thesis will examine an instance of this ongoing process, as expressed in the shifting 
geographies of energy in Chile and the field of struggles these shifts delineate. I will focus in 
particularly on its vernacular oppositional forces, logics, and values, and the way these take part 
in the evolving and multiscalar ‘relations of force’ that will in the end come to shape the concrete 
unfolding of whatever the future holds. 
It is important in this sense to underscore the fact that there is no such thing as a 
‘universal’ ecological crisis and nor are there universal strategies to deal with it, as the case 
presented in this study will show. What ‘adaptation’ means on a transforming planet is and will 
continue to be a battlefield. Our understanding of the ongoing planetary transformations must 
consider how these, and their concomitant strategies of adaptation, look very different 
depending on the standpoint and the social logics and forms of value these transformations 
articulate with. A political decision is then posited at the outset: from whose concerns and values 
are we going to regard this historical problem? Whose concerns are to be addressed when 
thinking about how to navigate the coming storm, whose utopia will lead the way? Those posited 
by the imperative of sustaining the very relations that have brought the storm about? Or those 
of whom have been, once and again throughout the history of capitalism, displaced, cast aside, 
in processes so often draped in the honourable robes of the ‘common good’? So far, there is no 
clear nor unified utopia on the latter side, only fragments—but fragments that express the 
complicated, contradictory, and real dreams that will continue to compel socio-ecological 
reproduction onwards. The political composition of these fragments is a crucial task in our 
current times, one to which militant inquiry should contribute.  
 
The ecological crisis through capital 
How does the ecological crisis appear from the standpoint of the capitalist world-system? Jason 
Moore (2015) argues that for capital, the ecological crisis of this century appears above all as a 
crisis of ‘underproduction’ of the basic elements for accumulation. For Moore, cycles of 
accumulation over the longue durée are structurally underpinned by the historical production 
of an ‘ecological surplus’—ie. the political and technical capacities for free or cheap 
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appropriation of human and extra-human work/energy on a scale proportional to the aggregate 
mass of capital to be valorised. The greater the mass of capital, the greater the amounts of 
unpaid work/energy it must command to turn over a profit. This structural socio-ecological 
determination of the logic of valorisation is what lies behind the geographic strategy of the 
frontier this dissertation deals with: as Moore writes, “not only does capitalism have frontiers; 
it is a frontier civilization” (Moore 2014). The epochal problem faced by capital in the twenty 
first century is, in Moore’s estimation, the fact that frontiers on the scale required to set off a 
new historical cycle of accumulation are simply not there, and their production, although 
perhaps conceivable, seems highly unlikely. 
In this sense, in a context in which ecological surpluses underpinning world 
accumulation continue to dwindle relative to the mass of capital to valorise, the global 
geographies of ground-rent play an increasingly important structural role as fields of valorisation 
and financial flows (Bartra 2006): as raw materials appreciate, previously hopelessly 
unprofitable corners of the planet appear as untapped sites of new potential rents. For those 
regions such as Chile and most of South America, whose role in the international division of 
labour is that of producers of raw materials for the world market, this condition has entailed far-
reaching implications. These are expressed in the various political struggles and antagonism that 
have characterised the region over the past few decades, linked to what Maristella Svampa 
(2012) has called the ‘commodity consensus’ and the extractive economy that delineates the 
field in which regional hegemonic disputes play out. For the Mexican agrarian scholar Armando 
Bartra (2006) the increased relative importance of the geographies of ground-rent for 
accumulation under conditions of ecological crisis is thus expressed in the concrete form of new 
rounds of primitive accumulation—or accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003)—, in the 
toxic saturation of ever more landscapes, and in the general inflicting of overbearing pressures 
upon socio-ecological reproduction in the places extractive operations are deployed. In other 
words, the frontier appears as generalised geographic condition, unfolding through what the 
Zapatistas have called a “renewed war of conquest” on territories that, if in past geographies of 
capital had been cast aside as spaces of oblivion, now appear as spaces pregnant with potential 
capitalist wealth (Comisión Sexta 2018)1. This sort of ecological ‘runaway effect’ within the logic 
                                               
1 “Here we use the simile of the native peoples because for a long time, in the previous stage of 
capitalist development, the native peoples were forgotten. Before we used the example of the 
indigenous infants who were called “the unborn” because they came into the world and left it without 
anyone ever noticing. Those “unborn” lived here in these areas, in these very mountains for example, 
which at that time didn’t interest anyone. The good lands (the “flatlands” we call them) were occupied 
by plantations, by large landowners who expelled the indigenous to the mountains. Now it turns out 
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of accumulation itself—in which ecological crises compel an intensification, rather than a 
moderation, of capital’s voracity—can perhaps be most clearly exemplified by the ongoing 
geopolitical scramble for the spaces of profitability that the prospect of an ice-free Arctic offers 
for none other than the fossil capital that is warming the planet. 
These structural tendencies in the way ecological crises unfold through the logic of 
accumulation only delineate a general field of contradictions in which a range of elite political-
ecological projects, linked to different sectors of capital, are currently in dispute. So far, 
particularly in relation to climate change and energy, ruling elites have appeared to respond to 
the situation in two general modalities: that of pursuing the liberal utopia of ‘green capitalist 
growth’, and that of the (rising) quasi-nihilistic reaction represented by the likes of Donald 
Trump and Jair Bolsonaro. The former project, which until recently seemed to enjoy a relatively 
solid hegemony, attempts to reassemble the basic components of the liberal capitalist order—
markets, private property, the nation-state, the citizen—in such a way as to address what is 
normally understood to be “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen” (Stern et al. 
2006), a feat that would require the consolidation of novel forms of planetary sovereignty (see 
Wainwright & Mann 2018). It attempts to not only break the historical trajectory towards a 
warming planet, but indeed to make this break profitable. Nevertheless, after decades of 
conferences, market innovations, and political declamations of good will, this attempt at 
reassembling the terms of the capitalist order—overdetermined as it is by the structural 
dynamics described above—has alarmingly little to show for. Against the intensifying backdrop 
of international scientific bodies’ wailing alarms, emissions have kept their inexorable rise, as 
the increase of investment in renewable energy is outpaced by growth in demand, 81% of which 
remains covered by fossil fuels—a share that has remained stable over the past three decades 
(IEA 2018b). The effects of this consistent failure of the neoliberal centre to bring ‘green growth’ 
into being compound politically in the form of a narrowing space for the sort of incrementalist 
political action that underpins the stability of neoliberal hegemony. The political implications of 
the scientific consensus these elites ostensibly respect grow radical by the day, and thus harder 
to be articulated through the modalities of political action afforded by neoliberal hegemony2—
something expressed rather bluntly in the IPCC’s latest report (IPCC 2018) in which it is stated 
                                               
that these mountains are full of wealth, commodities that capital now wants and so there is nowhere 
for the native peoples to go”.  
2 The very latest example of the catastrophic inadequacy of neoliberal prescriptions to combat climate 
change—and their potential to develop into a full-blown crisis of hegemony—is of course that of the 
gilets jaunes movement, sparked by the fuel tax introduced by Emmanuel Macron’s government in the 
context of their climate policies; which, as is the case to all neoliberal responses to capitalist crises, 
would have had the working classes shoulder the costs of mitigation.  
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that “rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society” are necessary to 
retain some measure of climate stability. In this context, it is worth asking what, if any, will be 
the role played by the neoliberal centre’s hitherto hegemonic framing of climate politics over 
the coming decades. One is to expect serious modifications in this field, perhaps ominously 
foreshadowed by the recent tendency of sectors of capital to simply ride the wave of reaction 
and altogether throw the ‘green capitalist’ utopia overboard.  
The recent shifts in Chilean energy frontiers that this dissertation examines are part of 
this multi-scalar process of contested adaptation of world accumulation to an uncertain future, 
and perhaps an exemplary instance of the ‘green growth’ ideology as a material force in action. 
Indeed, this has been a process hailed by former US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz as a “global 
example of the road to energy transition” (Moniz 2018:11), celebrated by Al Gore as an 
“inspiration”3, and is explicitly framed by the Chilean administration responsible for it as part of 
an effort to achieve a green(er) growth. However, little attention has been placed on the political 
economic motivations that have compelled these transformations, and, above all, to the 
struggles that continue to shape where and how it takes place. To understand this latter aspect, 
we must attend to the concrete stories through which this process reshapes human lives, and 
socio-ecological spaces. 
 
The ecological crises through its human stories 
[Use-value] is an implicit conception that sustains the entire 
edifice of the critique of political economy. 
Bolívar Echeverría, ‘Use-value’: Ontology and semiotics 
The way in which these planetary transformations happen through the totality of the capitalist 
world-system can have a way of skewing our understanding and fixing our attention on a scale 
in which human stories—the cultural sites in which these transformations ultimately find their 
substantive meaning—become drowned under the weight of what Arundhati Roy (1999) once 
called the “Fascist Maths” of global capital’s energy voracity.  
Indeed, as I will explain further below, much of the motivation behind this dissertation 
has to do with how the processes it studies fit within my own story and experience of the 
massive ecological transformations that have, in the space of three decades, changed the face 
                                               
3 See Gore’s recent documentary “An Inconvenient Sequel” (Cohen & Shenk 2017). 
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of the region in which this study takes place. I distinctly recall as a child wondering at the 
seemingly infinite diversity and sheer quantity of insects that cluttered the outside of my room’s 
windows at night, and at the colourful variety of grasshoppers that jumped out of the way as 
one stepped across the fields near my family’s house in the Liucura River valley, some miles 
downriver of where my fieldwork took place. I also recall occasionally running into the then 
already rare native fishes that populated the Liucura River. Last time I was there, for this thesis 
fieldwork, and after some years of not being in the area, I was alarmed and deeply unsettled to 
see almost no grasshoppers in the very same fields, nor anywhere near the same amount of 
insects bumping outside lit windows. I was also very surprised to see shoals of literally hundreds 
of giant Chinook salmon travelling up the river to lay their eggs, no other fish in sight. These 
species I had never seen, and as I learned, had started showing up just a few years back. Escaped 
from the chemically-saturated salmon farms that have proliferated throughout the southern 
parts of the country during the neoliberal period, this species has gone on to colonise river basins 
across the country, this one included (Correa & Gross 2008). Although by definition anecdotal, 
these sort of stories are by no means isolated—far from it. They reflect processes being reported 
on a world-scale—like mass arthropod extinction, and generalised defaunation (see Hallmann 
et al. 2017; Lister & Garcia 2018)—the rapidity and scale of which have no precedent on human 
temporal scales, and whose consequences are yet to be seen. I can only speculate as to what 
kind of local ecological transformations these facts express, or what sort of effects they will have. 
I can say however, that these transformations take place in a world to which I can only relate 
through thick layers of affect and value; a value relation which, in the midst of the capitalist 
storm, becomes inextricably tied to a generalised and proportional sense of loss4. A sense of loss 
that, as Naomi Klein (2015) reminds us, increasingly mediates our general social and cultural 
relation to nature.  
The point of this is to illustrate that processes such as mass extinction, climatic 
destabilisation, commodification, the uncertainty of future socio-ecological conditions, are 
always necessarily anchored in concrete human experience, and acquire their definite meanings 
in relation to particular cultural contexts and the emergent vernacular values that symbolically 
and practically mediate socio-ecological relations. This field of meaning and practice is 
fundamental to understand the struggles through which ongoing transformations in energy 
                                               
4 This relation between positivity (‘values’) and negativity (loss) is important. The ‘values’ that mediate 
our relation to nature are multiple by definition, but the possibility of their political unity is premised on 
the universal character of their negation by the rule of capital. See Holloway 2011. 
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geographies are taking place, and the contested meaning and paths of ‘adaptation’ more 
generally. Understanding this realm is one of the main areas of concern of this thesis.   
Nevertheless, these fields of meaning and value that mediate the qualitative relation to 
nature do not exist in a vacuum, they exist through their subsumption under the rule of a globally 
articulated capitalist value regime. In this sense, and as will be explored in detail in this study’s 
theoretical framework (Chapter 2), the reality that this dissertation approaches must be 
understood as the always conflictual geography of the value/use-value dialectic that structures 
the socio-ecological constitution of the capitalist world. In the case of Chilean energy 
geographies, this contradiction dialectically unfolds as a geography of struggle, in which 
landscapes are torn between the operations of extractive valorisation, and the multiple 
geographies of a use-value dimension that produce socio-ecological spaces as places of 
meaning, identity, history, and futurity. This does not mean that these latter elements are 
guaranteed to be spontaneously oppositional—indeed they provide the always unstable cultural 
grounds for the articulation of both domination and resistance. Nevertheless, these are the 
grounds for any possible political composition of antagonism around particular demands, 
organisational forms, or identities.  
 
Justification, aims, and research questions 
These are the geographies of struggle that this thesis seeks to understand. In the context 
of the rapid and intensifying tranformations that currently characterise the energy frontier in 
Chile, this thesis aims to contribute to a clearer understanding of the widespread conflictivity 
through which this frontier unfolds, the clashing social logics and conceptions of the world that 
dispute these spaces, and the kinds of openings and contradictions that emerge in the process. 
Given the nature of the Chilean ‘energy transtion’—characterised by the deployment novel 
forms of post-political governance over a field of hierarchies and antagonisms the structure of 
which remains firmly in place, and indeed in command of official conceptions of energy futures 
(see Chapter 3)—the subject matter of this thesis holds general relevance for other national 
contexts in which energy transformations are hegemonized by the adaptative interests of the 
capitalist class; ie., where energy futures remain constrained by the imperatives of expanded 
accumulation, and where changes in energy infrastructure do not so much reflect 
transformations in dominant social relations, as they do strategies for their continued 
reproduction.  
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Making sense of these contested geographies thus calls for an understanding of the 
different and overlapping social arenas in which the different values mediating the relation to 
nature emerge, arenas in which socio-ecological practices negotiate their meanings. This 
requires both the exploration of the regime of value that drives the current shifting geographies 
of energy—that of a globally defined law of value politically articulated at the national scale 
through the neoliberalisation process—and the multiple social arenas of value and meaning that 
mediate local territorialities and their reproduction. In this sense this thesis will also seek to 
contribute and develop a novel approach to the understanding of the vernacular forms of value 
and meaning that mediate the relation to nature at the frontier, the ways in which they 
negotiate and dispute their place in these transformations, and how they become politically 
mobilized in the context of a shifting energy frontier. 
The main general questions this study asks are: what are the social relations that lie 
behind the recent shifts of the energy frontier in Chile, and what kind of relations are these shifts 
producing on these spaces? What are the values and geographies that constitute themselves as 
resistance to these changes? What sort of social relations are these values imbricated with? How 
do these different forms of value articulate and/or clash, and how are they expressed in local 
relations to the landscape? What kind of light might these movements and struggles shed upon 
current debates over ‘energy transitions’?  
These questions are then developed through more specific ones, which will be 
addressed through the different chapters of this thesis: How do local values relate to historical 
consciousness? How does this relate to the landscape, and how is it mobilised in the present 
conjuncture? What are the main characteristics of local livelihood strategies, social axes of 
differentiation, and identities? How do they relate to local history and geography, and how does 
the Llancalil hydropower project articulate with these aspects? How has the process of enclosure 
and commodification of the waterscape5 been locally experienced, and how does it relate to 
vernacular relations to water? What are the main actors involved in the present conflict, and 
what sort of contradictions does the community face during the process of articulating their 
opposition?  
 
                                               
5 The term ‘waterscape’, or water landscape, is a concept that will be used often throughout this thesis 
and refers to the springs, rivers, and other flows and bodies of water that exist in the area of study, and 
is understood as co-constituted through its relationship to human communities, their reproduction, and 
forms of power. See Swyngedouw 2015. 
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Context and area of study 
The area this study is concerned with is located in the Andean mountain valleys—places known 
in Chile as ‘the cordillera’—of the Araucanía region, in south-central Chile. This region is at the 
heart of the greater Wallmapu, the ancestral homeland of the Mapuche people that once 
expanded across what today is Chile and Argentina, and was incorporated into both nation-
states after military campaigns of occupation that took place during the last third of the 19th 
century (see Chapter 4). The cordillera in this region also appears as one of the strategic areas 
of hydropower potential in the Chilean Energy Ministry’s Long Term Strategic Planning 
document originally published in 2017 (see Figure 1 and Chapter 3). These two geographical 
layers that converge in the cordillera—that of being a repository of historical memory and 
identity for the Mapuche people, and one of the strategic areas of potential energy generation 
identified by state planning—constitute one of the main sources of the contemporary conflicts 
and struggles that characterise the region. The history and political conditions that propel the 
contested expansion of this frontier will be seen in more detail in Chapter 3.  
The area of study roughly corresponds to the territory represented at the municipal level 
by the “Neighbours’ Council Nº 10”6. This is an area loosely known locally as ‘Huife’, which 
encompasses the mountain valleys that make up the Liucura river’s headwaters. This river is part 
of the Trancura river sub-basin that feeds the nearby Villarrica lake, from which the Toltén river 
then flows. Throughout its path towards the Pacific Ocean, the Toltén receives most of the water 
in the southern half of the Araucanía region, known as the Cautín province. The area of study 
encompasses the localities around the rivers and streams that converge in the Liucura river; 
these are lower and upper Huife, Llancalil, and Papal. Upper Huife and Lancalil both designate 
the two up-river valleys through which the Liucura and Llancalil river flow, respectively. These 
converge into a single river and valley in lower Huife, which is overlooked by the few scattered 
houses on the foothills on the south side of the valley, an area known as Papal. These valleys are 
located in the easternmost part of the Municipality of Pucón, in turn located on the south-
eastern limits of the Araucanía region, in south-central Chile, and roughly 100 km south-east of 
the regional capital, Temuco.  
                                               
6 Junta de Vecinos Nº 10 de Huife. In Chile, Neighbours’ Councils are one of the main institutions that 
mediate at the municipal level the relations between local communities and the state. 
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Figure 1. Map of ‘Renewable Energy Potentials” as defined by Energy Ministry (Ministerio de Energía 
2018). It accurately represents the contemporary energy frontier in Chile. The blue areas are the sub-
basins that hold particularly significant hydropower potential. All of these are located in the south-
central region of the country, and most on the Wallmapu, the ancestral Mapuche homeland. 
Source: Ministerio de Energía, PELP, 2018:39 
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Figure 2. Google Earth image outlining the area in which most of my fieldwork took place, 
showing its main localities and, highlighted in red, the approximate area where the projected 
“Llancalil” hydropower plant would be built. December 2018. 
 
 
Figure 3. Google Earth image showing the area of study in its immediate regional context, and 





Figure 4. Picture of the Huife Valley, taken by the author from Papal, facing north-east. April 2016. 
The expansion of the hydropower frontier into this part of the cordillera is relatively 
recent. Melipeuco, the Municipality immediately north of Pucón, has had projects at different 
stages of development for several years now, of which three are already operational, three are 
under construction, and one more is still under evaluation (see SEREMI-Araucanía 2017). Pucón 
and Curarrehue—the adjacent municipality in the cordillera—had remained relatively isolated 
from these developments. Nevertheless, over the last few years, and expressing the broader 
shifts occurring in energy policy and politics in the country, a new proliferation of run-of-the-
river projects (centrales de pasada, as they are known in Chile) and energy-related water rights 
claims has occurred, not only in these municipalities, but indeed north and south of the 
cordillera, across the areas highlighted in the map shown in Figure 1. Since around 2014 the 
hydropower frontier has effectively begun encroaching upon this area more strongly, generating 
great uncertainty and conflict among those who inhabit these territories. Indeed, the case of the 
Añihuerraqui project in Curarrehue (point 5 in the Figure 5) has been especially notorious, as it 
directly affects Mapuche ceremonial grounds, and the results of the consultation process with 
the affected community were disregarded (Castro Garrido et al. 2016). The case of Huife and 
the Llancalil project has received relatively less attention, as it has not yet been approved.  
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Figure 5. Map showing hydropower projects currently under assessment in the Toltén basin. Number 3 
corresponds to the Llancalil project in the Huife area. Source: Ministerio de Energía 2016:110 
Huife 
The affected community is in the case of Huife quite diverse, in the sense that it is made up of 
families from Chilean, Mapuche, and German origins, with many families incorporating some or 
all of these different elements in their identities. Somewhere around 30 families live in the area 
of study, although, as explained in more detail in Chapter 5, this is a difficult number to pin down 
due to the fact that many families tend to inhabit the territory intermittently, especially those 
of the younger generations which live and work in nearby towns. The importance of the tourist 
economy is also a factor, as it gives an important seasonal rhythm to work and economic activity 
in general in the valley. For these reasons, most, though not all, of the permanent residents are 
now the members of the older generations. This process of ageing in the resident population 
has intensified as the Municipality has tended to close small rural schools and concentrate them 
in the more densely populated rural areas. The few children that live permanently in the area 
must travel to Pichares to attend school.  
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As I will explain in Chapter 5, the tourist economy of the Municipality has also ensured 
a growing presence of people from urban middle-class origins, who have bought land in the area, 
inhabiting it seasonally. For the most part, these are lands that have been bought as 
vacation/leisure plots, although in the lower parts of the valley there are increasing numbers of 
more business-oriented land acquisitions, normally revolving around services for tourists, and 
real estate investment (see Chapter 5).  
There are three Mapuche communities7 in the area. One is the Millaqueo Millahual 
community in Lower Huife, with whom I worked more closely. This community occupies the 
north bank of the Liucura River, and is made up of the extended Millaqueo family. It has also 
been at the forefront of the opposition to the hydropower project. Immediately down river 
there is the Nahuelan Neculan community. Both of these communities—each consisting of one 
extended family—were registered as such in the early 2000s and were originally to be 
constituted as one community, but finally decided to do it separately. 
The other community has its lands in Llancalil, and arrived relatively recently. This is the 
“Cariman Sánchez y Gonzalo Marín” community, which in 2012 had acquired lands on the 
Llancalil valley through the mediation of the CONADI8 land fund. The community is made up of 
74 families originally from Huilo, Freire province, in the coastal part of the region. Before 
acquiring these lands, the community had been involved in a very complex conflict in which the 
CONADI had given their ancestral lands to another Mapuche community, giving way to a series 
of inter-community conflicts, and land seizures. As a way to solve the conflict, the CONADI 
bought land in the Llancalil valley for the community. Although no members of the community 
live permanently in Llancalil, the place was being visited frequently by community leaders and 
members while I was there. They had the plan of developing treks for tourists, and during the 
summer I was there they were building two cabins with that purpose in mind. This community’s 
lands are located very close upriver to where the water would be extracted for the project, and 
its leaders, who had many regional connections and much experience, were playing an 
important role in the opposition during the time I was there.  
In fieldwork, I focused my attention and interviews on permanent residents, or those 
that lived nearby. This was, of course, down to practical reasons, but also because I wanted to 
                                               
7 ‘Community’ is in this case functions mainly, though not only, as a legal/political form of mediation 
between the state and those the state recognises as Mapuche. See Chapter 5. 
8 The CONADI, or National Corporation for Indigenous Development, created in 1993, following the 
Indigenous Law of the same year, as the main state agency in charge of indigenous issues in Chile, 
among it resolving land claims, as in this case.  
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understand the historical background in relation to which these lands acquire their local values, 
and meanings, as these historical layers of the valleys were very visibly mobilised in local 
discourses of opposition. This mostly meant talking with the lower Huife Mapuche families, the 
Chilean campesino families, and the descendants from German settler families still living in the 
area or nearby. Although I talked with the other groups described above, most of my arguments 
throughout this dissertation are based upon my interviews with this sector of the local residents.  
 
The Llancalil hydropower project9 
The Llancalil project has gone through various phases. In the Liucura valley I was told there had 
been talk of a project a few years back, in Lefincul, some miles downriver from Huife, but did 
not get admitted for assessment. After this, there was the first try by Inversiones Huife Ltd—the 
company behind the project—to submit for approval a first version of the current project, under 
the name ‘Central Hidroelectrica Llancalil’. This project was not accepted for assessment, so it 
was redesigned and submitted as ‘Central Hidroeléctrica Llancalil (Reingreso)’. This second 
proposal was the version of the project that was being assessed at the time of my fieldwork. 
After two rounds of observations, this second version of the project was ultimately withdrawn 
by the company on July 2017, only to reintroduce a new project now called ‘Pequeña Central 
Hidroeléctrica Llancalil’ on April 2018. The latter is the project currently undergoing assessment, 
and is in all relevant aspects identical to the previous ones, but with an apparently improved 
‘Environmental Impact Statement’ [DIA, Declaración de Impacto Ambiental]10. 
The Llancalil project is a run-of-the-river hydropower plant; this is, a plant that does not 
imply a large reservoir, but instead redirects part of the river flow into tunnels, leads it towards 
the generation turbines, and then releases it back into the river course. In this case, the project 
would draw water from the Liucura River in Upper Huife, and the Llancalil River in Llancalil, and 
then redirect those waters for 3.3 and 1.2 kilometres respectively towards a machine room 
where the generation turbines will be installed. From there, the water would be released back 
into the Liucura River, approximately around the point where both valleys and rivers join, in the 
                                               
9 This section draws on information from the project’s DIA (Inversiones Huife Ltda. 2018), available at 
http://seia.sea.gob.cl. 
10 According to Chilean Environmental legislation (Law 19300), the DIA is the company’s statement on 
the potential social and environmental impacts of a project, and it has to show that the project complies 
with the regulations specified in the Environmental Law. If it does not, or if its impacts are more serious, 
it would have to submit an EIA, or an Environmental Impact Study, which has to be more thorough, and 
must also specify compensation measures to address the impacts. 
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upstream limits of lower Huife. The project would generate 6.9 MW of electricity for the national 
grid. 
 
Figure 6. Map taken from the project’s DIA (2018), showing in yellow the project’s infrastructure (and in 
white the points at which water would be captured), in red the public road, and in blue the rivers. 
The project amounts to an investment of 23 million US dollars, undertaken by Huife 
Inversiones ltda. In the webpage associated with the second version of the project11, Huife 
Inversiones was described as an association between Wasserkraft Inversiones EIRL y Notus 
Energías Chile Ltda., both holding a 50 % share. The latter is a German company specialising in 
wind energy in Europe, but with recent investments in Latin America, particularly in Chile and 
Mexico.  Wasserkraft, on the other hand is a company owned by an engineer of Swiss origins 
resident in Chile, who has previously been involved in the development of similar hydropower 
plants in the south-central region.   
 
Methodology  
My choice of this area and subject of study is not random, nor does it merely reflect a purely 
academic interest. Quite the contrary. As I mentioned before, my relationship to the Liucura 
River and its valleys stretches back to my early childhood, when each year I seasonally visited 
                                               
11 http://www.hidrollancalil.cl 
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land owned by my grandparents near the area of Pichares, some miles downriver from Huife. 
Many years have passed since, and yet much of what I consider formative in my early years took 
place by the Liucura River, its cold waters, and the life that this river nurtures and sustains. I am 
in this regard directly, if also very partially and intermittently, implicated in the complicated web 
of relations of class, race, and affect that constitute the human ecology of this river. In this sense, 
the critical intent that motivates the research presented here, far from stemming from a 
methodological detachment—from which a positivist understanding of knowledge might 
consider that reality could be assessed more truthfully—arises precisely from my implication in 
the dialectics at play in the movement of this socio-ecology: it is part of an ongoing critical-
practical engagement not only with the processes behind the deployment of hydropower 
infrastructure upon this river, but also with my own position within the social structure that 
reproduces itself through these valley’s ecologies.  
In other words, this study departs from a Marxian conception of materialism: not from 
a reified understanding of reality as a simple object of cognition—and the concomitant idealist 
conception of knowledge this entails—but as an objective process the constitution (and 
cognition) of which is inextricably bound up with subjective human practice12. In so far as human 
practice is by definition meaningful and value-laden, there cannot be such a thing as a value-
neutral social reality (see Chapter 2), nor a value-neutral cognitive engagement with it. In other 
words, we cannot approach reality as if the knowledge we produce is not directly implicated its 
stakes. As Nicholas De Genova puts it in relation to the study of migration:  
“[w]e are ‘of’ these connections because there is no ‘outside’ or analytical position beyond 
them. There is no neutral ground. The momentum of the struggle itself compels us, one way 
or the other, to ‘take a side’. ... [The] researcher is a part of the field of struggle and a 
participant therein.” (De Genova 2013:252).  
This study thus makes no claim to ‘neutrality’, or detachment from the value-struggles it 
analyses. This not only because there is no such thing as a value-neutral standpoint in a socio-
                                               
12 I am here paraphrasing Marx’s famous first thesis on Feuerbach (Marx 2002) :  
“The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, 
reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as 
sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the 
active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous 
activity as such. 
Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive 
human activity itself as objective activity. …  Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary”, 




ecological world that is constituted through value-laden social practice and its concomitant 
struggles (De Angelis 2007; see Chapter 2), but also because striving for this mythical 
positionality is a pretence that can only act as a paralyzing methodological dart for critical and 
dialectical thought. This is, for that form of thought that not simply attends to how the social 
reality it is part of is—ie. positive knowledge of reality as reified ‘object of contemplation’—but 
that, recognising reality as dialectical process, recognises itself as part of the practical and 
cognitive process of negation through which reality moves beyond itself (Holloway 2010a; 
Holloway 2010b). Thought, this is, that understands itself as “practical-critical activity” 
implicated in the constitution of the very world it is reflecting upon (cf. Loftus 2015).  
In addition to its grounding on these philosophical foundations, the implicated and/or 
militant nature of this study was indeed a fundamental condition of possibility for its 
undertaking. As is commonly the case with many communities in the energy frontier—a context 
commonly characterised by steepely assymetrical power relations—people in Huife had a very 
clear understanding of what claims to ‘neutrality’ meant in the context they were facing, and 
thus had ample reason to mistrust inquisitive outsiders claiming such a position. By the time I 
showed up, the consultancy firm hired by the company behind the project had already carried 
out their studies on the potential social impacts of their project, concluding, unsurprisingly, that 
there would be none of significance. This had understandably made many local people upset, as 
in their minds they had made it very clear to the consultant anthropologists that they felt 
otherwise, and that they did not want the project on their river under any circumstances. As Luis 
Hernán, the leader of the Millaqueo Millahual community in lower Huife, told me when we were 
introduced in early summer of 2016 by a common acquaintance living in Pichares, one of their 
concerns was the lack of independent technical information regarding the potential social 
impact of the project on the communities in the area, which accurately represented local 
perspectives on the issue. So, after explaining what were my own feelings about the project, and 
that my research was to be focused precisely on understanding the communities’ perspectives 
and valuations of it, he offered to aid me in my research, and introduce me and my research to 
people in the area, on the condition that at the end I would write up a report for the community 
which they could then use to back up their opposition in the process of environmental 
assessment, and anywhere else such a document might be useful13. In this sense, one of the 
methodological premises of this study is the recognition that its inquiry is a part of the struggle 
                                               
13 I would write this report over the first few months I was back in London after my fieldwork. It was 
presented by the community to the SEA afterwards. One of the other things Luis and others told me was 
that they were also interested in having a written documentation of the historical memory of the older 
members of their community. This was also one of the objectives of the report.  
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it seeks to approach. These conditions also allowed for and required the application of 
participatory and co-research methods, in which participants had a more active role in the 
construction of data and some of the research questions for the report. This data has then been 
adapted to the specific questions this dissertation pursues.   
The fieldwork for this study was undertaken between the months of January and May 
2016. During January and February—the summer season in an area with an important tourist 
economy, and thus the busiest for local residents—I began building the main contacts in the 
locality, started doing some initial semi-structured interviews, acquainted myself with the 
broader regional politics of hydropower through participant observation in meetings and actions 
in nearby areas, and conducted most of the archival research in the region itself, such as 
consulting the Property Registry on water rights. Towards the end of February I began the more 
intense part of the fieldwork, which extended into May. This phase consisted of the application 
of the following methods: 
1. Participant observation in everyday life in the area, meetings of local organisations, 
mobilisations in opposition to the project, an open meeting with the hydropower 
company and government authorities, among other everyday and/or extraordinary 
activities. Among other things, this method allowed me to get a clearer sense of ‘the 
everyday’ in the area, the local values attached to the territory, and how the potential 
hydropower project articulated with the multiple dimensions of this. It also allowed me 
to get a deeper understanding of the discourse and practice of socio-ecological struggles 
in the region, the sort of groups involved in them, and how local values related to these. 
2. Semi-structured interviews/dialogues. These were done with area residents, family 
groups, local organisation leaders, and key persons with specific knowledge about some 
aspect of interest, such as history, a specific economic activity, or the relation to the 
hydropower company. I carried out 30 of these interviews in total. These dialogues 
covered a wide range of themes—from the area’s history, to its current situation and 
future perspectives, and their personal perspectives on the hydropower project. They 
allowed me to inquire deeper into what emerged during the fieldworlk as relevant 
aspects of the local reality. These conversations would normally follow the interviewee’s 
interests as well as mine, which sometimes gave me the oportunity to make unexpected 
connections and pursue new directions of inquiry.   
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3. Focus group dialogue on the history of the community and its territory with elders from 
the “Comunidad Indígena Millaqueo Millahual”. Seven members of the community took 
part in this dialogue and myself as facilitator. The dialogue was a space in which the 
memory about the origins and evolution of the territory was shared, discussed, and 
interrogated, as were the valuations that in light of this discussion participants made 
about the future of the community, and the projected hydropower plant.  
4. Workshop on livelihood strategies and participatory mapping in lower Huife. Five 
residents of lower Huife and two facilitators took part in this exercise, which discussed 
in depth the human and environmental qualities of the territory. For this the group 
made a diagram of the main economic activities of the communities, and collectively 
drew a map which highlighted what the participants considered to be the main social 
and environmental characteristics of their territory. Lastly, in the light of the previous 
exercises, a collective discussion and analysis was made of possible futures for the 
community, and of the potential impacts that the hydropower project might have in 
their communities, and the region more generally.  
5. Guided transects across the areas where the project was to be built. Three of these 
walks were undertaken, all guided by Nestor Salazar, who lives in Papal, is part of the 
Neighbours’ Council, and has had an active role in the opposition to the project. In these 
transects Nestor explained to me in situ the environmental and social characteristics of 
the areas in question, the historical evolution of the territory and how this was 
expressed in the landscape, and the main concrete concerns people had about the 
project’s impacts upon the area.  
6. Photographic record of the area of study, the communities that inhabit it, and the areas 
directly affected by the project.  
The data emergent from these techniques was then analysed and integrated through the 
triangulation and contrast between each source, and with bibliographical and archival material, 
in order to address the research questions described above. Semi-structured and focus group 
interviews, as well as the workshop, were audio recorded, and then analysed through thematic 
coding. In the case of the materials such as the map and diagrams, these were used for the 
report, and in the interests of clarity appear in the present study mostly paraphrased, in the 
analysis in Chapter 5 and throughout the dissertation.  
29 
Some of the data presented in this dissertation is partially anonymised, particularly that 
presented in Chapter 7. All of the participants were of course fully aware of the aims and 
conditions of this study, and implicit consent to the use of their identities was always clear. 
Nevertheless, due to the changes in regulation regarding data management that occured after 
my fieldwork, pseudonyms will be used in those cases where I did not get explicit consent to use 
names.    
It is important to say here that if I learned anything during the months I spent doing the 
fieldwork for this dissertation, it is that such a relatively short amount of time can only hope to 
scratch the surface of the very complex histories that have shaped these valleys, their cultural 
meanings, and the political relations that continue to produce these communities and their 
ecologies. My hope is, however, that through these tools I have at least been able to discern the 
main contours of what the current conflict is about, the imaginaries and histories it mobilises, 
and the vernacular horizons of meaning and value that give rise to the oppositional forces faced 
by the shifting geographies of hydro(social)power.   
In addition to this, and in relation to this last aspect, the current shifts in the energy 
geographies in Chile—instantiated by the Llancalil project—are still an ongoing and relatively 
recent process, which started around 2014, at the beginning of Michelle Bachelet’s second, non-
consecutive, term. This means that the so-called ‘energy transition’ in Chile has yet to receive 
substantial academic attention and analysis, something to which this dissertation aims to 
contribute. The characterisation of these geographies, developed in Chapter 3, thus implied 
research on a great amount of non-academic material, such as industry and government reports 
and studies, local press coverage, and importantly, participant observation in movements and 
regional networks of opposition during my time in the field. I participated in open meetings and 
demonstrations in other places in the region, such as Temuco and Curarrehue, and talked to 
many people involved in these organisations. These conversations and experiences have also 






Figure 7. Participatory mapping in lower Huife. April 2016. 
 





Figure 9. Collective discussion on livelihoods and local economic activities. Workshop in lower Huife. 
April 2016. 
 
Figure 10. Collective discussion on values and perceived threats of the territory. Workshop in lower 




One of the key categories woven throughout this study’s analysis is that of ‘value’, and the 
different chapters will explore the social arenas in which the different layers14 of value at play in 
Huife’s human ecology are constituted, as well as the ways in which they articulate and/or clash. 
In Chapter 2 I will present the theoretical framework of this dissertation, developing this concept 
and its relation to political ecology in detail. My argument develops a socio-ecological reading 
of Marx’s value theory, critically drawing from Neil Smith’s thesis on the ‘production of nature’, 
but moving beyond some of its difficulties by placing my attention on the critical theoretical 
importance of the category of use-value. For the latter I draw on a combined reading of the work 
of Ecuadorian philosopher Bolivar Echeverría, and anthropological theories of value rooted in 
Marx’s, in particular the work of Terence Turner and David Graeber. The chapter argues for an 
understanding of capitalist ecologies—ie. socio-ecological orders subsumed under the process 
of capitalist valorisation—as constituted by a complex articulation of multiple geographically 
unfolding layers of meaning and practice—a multiplicity of values that mediate the social 
relation to nature—, which nevertheless the logic of valorisation structures in the antagonistic 
dialectics grasped by the opposition of value and use-value.   
Chapter 3 goes on to explore the political ecology of hydropower in Chile, and 
historically situates this in the coordinates of the cycles of decomposition-recomposition of 
social antagonisms that has characterised the neoliberal period. The chapter argues that behind 
the recent shifts in energy policies and geographies, lies a long process of class recomposition 
internally related to the particular form of extractive accumulation that has characterised the 
neoliberalisation process. This constitutes the general context for the ensuing ethnographic 
chapters: the expanding geographies of energy production as an aspect of the national 
geographical articulation of a law of value of global content, but national form. 
Chapter 4 presents an ethnographic account of the socio-territorial constitution of the 
human community of Huife, and the way in which this history is written into the valleys’ 
landscapes. Beyond trying to establish an ostensibly ‘objective’ account of past events—a 
pursuit for which I think oral histories are nonetheless crucial—this chapter aims above all of to 
explore local histories as a crucial component in the general frame of meaning and values in 
                                               
14 In this thesis I will often use the metaphor of the ‘layer’ to convey the multiple and overlapping forms 
of value and meaning—and the scales and relations they entail—that mediate the production of Huife 
as a contested frontier space.  
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which the projected infrastructural intervention acquires its local political significance and 
direction, and from which oppositional forces draw their local momentum.  
In Chapter 5 I explore the main contemporary contours of the communities in the area, 
placing my emphasis on the elements that during the course of the current conflict have 
emerged as significant. In particular, I develop the importance of the geographies of the semi-
proletarian condition that characterise most local families—with its specific combination of 
urban and rural spaces—, those of the tourist economy, and those implied in the condition of 
indigeneity and the shifting ways in which these communities identify, both among themselves 
and vis-a-vis national society.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the process of commodification of water rights, which is the crucial 
legal and institutional condition of possibility for the expansion of the hydropower frontier. It 
analyses the way in which the process of commodification and enclosure articulates with 
vernacular hydro-social relations emergent from the historical and socio-territorial constitution 
of the communities present in these mountain valleys. Through an examination of the conflicts 
and struggles introduced by this process, and to how it relates to the reconfiguration of the 
state’s capacities for socio-ecological control, the chapter attempts to elaborate on what E.P. 
Thompson famously called the ‘moral economy’, as a perpetually shifting field in which the 
struggle over the form-determination of social reproduction and ecological relations is waged.    
Chapter 7 explores the different aspects of the ways in which all of the arenas of value 
explored in the previous chapters converge in the present conflict, through a detailed analysis 
of an open meeting organised by the Neighbours’ Council, between the company, government 
representatives, and the community. This meeting provided an unusually clear window into 
several crucial aspects of the contradictions within the community in approaching the conflict, 
the terms in which knowledge was mobilised by the hydropower company, and the 
complications faced by the shifting forms of governmentality deployed by the state at the energy 







2. Value, (use) values, and the contested production of 
nature: on social form, life-process, and struggle. 
 
Talk about value—about worth, about significance, about preciousness—abounds at the energy 
frontier. Whether the transformations brought about by the frontier movement are productive 
or destructive, whether they will create wealth or whether they will inflict misery—all of these 
controversies constitute a political field in which what is ultimately at stake are the forms of 
value that define the very meaning of these dichotomies, the conceptions of the desirable that 
mediate our relation to nature, and each other. Indeed, even a cursory glance at contemporary 
landscapes of capital accumulation is bound to run into the term at every step. Value is the core 
category at the centre of the alienated ‘bad infinity’ of financial markets—the socio-ecological 
content of which acquire increasingly ‘monstrous’ characteristics (Arboleda 2017)—; it appears 
at the at centre of the Sisyphean efforts of the world’s technocratic cadres to ‘get the prices 
right’ and somehow spare capitalism from impending ecological catastrophe; and it is mobilized 
in the oppositional insistence—commonly found in the sort of frontier spaces this study is 
concerned with—that ‘pricing’ itself constitutes the main problem, as it inflicts a barbaric 
devaluation of relations and elements of life which hold forms of value that are by definition 
unquantifiable (Martinez-Alier 2009; cf. De Angelis 2007). Interweaving meaning, importance, 
and social practice in subtle and complicated ways, value, in its several different semantic 
registers, appears in this sense to point to a core aspect of human ecologies: to the cultural 
mediations that materially structure our socio-ecological world, and constitute the conflicting 
layers of significance and practice that make up its historicity. 
In this sense, there has been a recent resurgence in the interest for the ecological 
significance of Marx’s value theory (see Huber 2016; Kenney-Lazar & Kay 2017; Kay & Kenney-
Lazar 2017). This current reengagement of political ecology with value theory can only be 
welcomed: as Huber (2016) notes, relative to the proliferation of empirical studies on the 
‘valuation of nature’, engagements with the theoretical grounds on which the concept is 
mobilised remain conspicuously rare. Such debates show, at the very least, the generative 
potential of renewing discussions of Marx’s core concept. They also show, however, how the 
broad semantic reach of the term, and the seldom explicit exposition of the theoretical 
underpinnings of its use, can easily lend itself to confusion; as the concept is pushed in every 
direction, one often gets an inevitable sense of fading conceptual clarity. I think that at the root 
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of this lie two questions: 1. the different, and not always explicit, ways in which Marx’s theory 
of value is understood to hold ecological significance, and 2. the question of whether the 
different registers of the word ‘value’—as measure, as economic form-determination, as moral-
cultural category—point towards a common conceptual ground, or if they simply denote an 
unfortunate semantic overreach of the word. The answers to both of these questions have 
important implications for the development of a more nuanced understanding of capitalism’s 
profoundly contradictory and destructive socio-ecological constitution, and for possible ways of 
thinking about the grounds for its necessary overturning.  
In this chapter I want to connect hitherto geographically and disciplinary distant strands 
of literature to develop elements of a value-theoretical framework that might hopefully shed 
new light on the issues that this dissertation examines. As is the case with the field of political 
ecology in general (Loftus 2017), a broadening of the disciplinary and geographical scope of 
these debates can infuse much needed new perspectives. In addition, the ideas developed here 
touch on two current concerns within Marxist political ecology more broadly: on the one hand, 
current controversies about the validity (or lack of) of the Nature/Society distinction within 
Marxist ecological thought (eg. Foster 2016; Moore 2017a), and on the other, the need for 
greater ethnographic traction within this tradition. As Ekers and Loftus (Ekers & Loftus 2012) 
point out, what is needed is a more textured account of the concrete practical, ecological, and 
symbolic density of the landscapes in which capital is reproduced and resisted. As I will argue in 
this chapter, the latter holds particular importance, as it is in this field where the contradiction 
between the concrete life-process and its economic form-determinations is reflected with 
greater clarity, a contradiction that should be seen as the basis of Marx’s value-theoretical 
approach (Saito 2017). 
In this sense, many of the persisting charges against the relevance of Marx’s theory of 
value for ecological thought emphasise the importance of non-economic forms of value for the 
constitution of concrete human ecologies, which the purportedly economistic and utilitarian 
notion of ‘use-value’ cannot grasp (eg. Gudynas 2017). In reducing Marx’s notion of use-value 
to that of a flat utilitarianism, these approaches fail to grasp use-value’s role in Marx’s 
fundamental critique of economic forms (Echeverría 2014; cf. Bonefeld 2014). Taking my cue 
from anthropological theories of value rooted in Marx, in this chapter I will argue that the core 
insights implicit in Marx’s theory not only shed light on these non-economic forms of value, but 
can indeed provide firmer materialist grounds for interpreting their ecological presence. 
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I start by considering in what way Marx’s value theory can be considered to be 
inherently ecological, a question only intermittently developed within ecological thought. For 
this, I will go back to what I consider to be the core contribution of Neil Smith’s thesis on the 
“production of nature”: the positing of value as a category of socio-ecological constitution. 
However, I argue that it is in the failure to more clearly grasp Marx’s categories as ones of 
antagonism and contradiction that Smith’s formulation risks a constructivism (passed to 
different degrees on to the strand of Marxist ecological thought it inaugurated) that is unable to 
grasp the theoretical, historical, geographical, and ecological significance of the irreducible 
contradiction between form-determinations and concrete metabolism. This metabolism 
presents an irreducible autonomy, which cannot however be considered to be ‘external’ to the 
fetishized forms of capitalist society, but rather internally constitutive of their contradictory 
existence as ecological projects. Finally, to approach the different layers of meaning and practice 
that make up concrete landscapes, I will reconsider the dialectical counterpart to Marx’s 
category of value, that of use-value, through the ideas of the Ecuadorian philosopher Bolívar 
Echeverría, and advance further on use-value’s concrete determinations through 
anthropological theories of value rooted in Marx, in particular the work of Terence Turner and 
David Graeber. Understanding value(s) as socio-semiotic process of mediation between human 
action and its sociality, these theories, integrated with the revised notion of the production of 
nature I propose, provide a route to a more textured account of the contested production of the 
actually existing landscapes of capitalism, which this dissertation will explore in the following 
chapters.  
 
Value and Neil Smith’s thesis on “the production of nature” 
For Marx, the category of ‘value’ grasped the core of capitalist modernity in its most essential 
terms—it designated that which made capitalist domination so historically distinct (Postone 
1993). In its Marxian reading, ‘value’ is an historically specific form taken by human material 
relations of interdependence and mutual constitution—“social life-process” (Marx 1990:173)—
one in which relations between people constitute themselves in the alienated, fetishised, and 
self-expanding form of economic objectivity (Bonefeld 2014). As a theory about a historically 
specific form taken by the social character of the metabolic relation to nature (ie. labour) (Marx 
1990:174), Marx’s theory of value has always been by implication a theory of the specificity of 
socio-ecological relations under capitalism.  
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Formulated in this way, the fact that Marx’s theory of value has fundamental ecological 
implications may seem self-evident. And yet these implications have only been intermittently 
explored at depth within the Marxist tradition15. One of the first to explicitly take this direction 
was Neil Smith, through his thesis on the ‘production of nature’ (Smith 2008 [1984]). Smith’s 
contribution was greatly influential, as it opened up a distinct branch of Marxist ecological 
thought, one with particular influence within geography. In the three decades since its original 
formulation, much has been written on the merits and pitfalls of Smith’s thesis. Reviewing this 
literature is beyond the scope of this chapter. My purpose in going back to Smith is instead to 
recover his underappreciated, but nonetheless crucial contribution regarding the ecological 
significance of Marx’s value theory, and try to develop this idea in a somewhat different 
direction, one that can avoid some of the crucial weaknesses running through much of the 
particular strain of Marxist ecological thought that Smith’s work inaugurated. 
Smith considered that the notion of ‘nature’ as an external domain, fundamentally 
independent and clearly distinguishable from human activity, was an ideological form rooted in 
the particular material experience of the bourgeoisie (2008:28). This dualist conception of 
society and nature renders the latter in principle independent from social relations and labour. 
‘Nature’, through an historical process of “aggressive externalization” (Smith 2009:24), is thus 
rendered a domain defined by subjectless objectivity—nothing less than the ontological 
underpinning of primitive accumulation. As such, for Smith the ideological notion of ‘Nature’ 
abstracted the central role of labour in the historical process of what he called the production of 
nature. Smith, following Marx (1990:283), argued that the labour process is a transformative 
moment of both its human and non-human elements, and that therefore so-called ‘natural 
conditions’ are not only a premise, but also a product of society’s metabolic history. Nature is 
thus produced. The traditional Marxist equation of nature with the realm of use-value is thus 
for Smith severely misguided. Insofar as the capitalist labour process is subsumed under the 
imperatives of valorisation, value should be conceptualized as an ecological force in its own 
right. In Smith’s own words: 
[I]t is the abstract logic that attaches to the creation and accumulation of social value which 
determines the relation with nature under capitalism. Thus the movement from the 
abstract to the concrete (…) is the perpetual translation actually achieved in the relation 
with nature under capitalism; abstract determinations at the level of value are continually 
                                               
15Among recent examples that explicitly deal with this at length, if somewhat different in orientation, 
are the work of Jason W. Moore (eg. 2015) and Kohei Saito (2017).  
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translated into concrete social activity in the relation with nature. (Smith, 2008:70, emphasis 
added.) 
Within capitalism, ‘first nature’—defined by Smith as the concrete effect of the labour process 
and the realm of use-values—is subordinated to the ‘second nature’ of the abstract value 
relation, under the imperative of profit as the ultimate systemic telos. For Smith, due to the 
“ability of capital to produce the material world in its own image (…) the production of first 
nature from within and as part of second nature makes the production of nature, not first or 
second nature in themselves, the dominant reality” (Smith 2008:83).  
Smith thus posits the category of value as one of socio-ecological constitution: under 
capitalism the material constitution of a growing field of ecological relations is thoroughly 
implicated in the reproduction of value relations; value effectively functions as a constitutive 
environment-making force in the capitalist landscape through the real subsumption of the 
labour process. Moreover, it can be further said that the capitalist law of value is premised upon 
a particular set of spatial and environmental relations: ie. the enclosure of the commons, the 
separation of people from land, and the concomitant creation of the conditions for the private 
exploitation and appropriation of social labour through the wage relation. Rather than merely 
having environmental ‘effects’, the emergence and persistence of the capitalist law of value is 
contingent on the ongoing production of a particular sort of landscape (cf. Moore 2015). 
 
Abstract determinations and concrete metabolism: the production of nature as 
struggle 
Smith was at pains to stress the difference of his conception of production of nature from that 
of the ‘domination of nature’ emergent from the Frankfurt School (eg. Schmidt 2014), by 
signalling the “ways in which social production can create accidental, unintended and even 
counter-effective results vis-à-vis nature”: instead, his thesis “makes no pretence to the control 
of nature” (Smith 2009:24). Yet the theoretical basis provided by Smith allows for no way of 
understanding these unruly, yet conspicuous, moments of capitalist ecologies other than as the 
spasmodic consequence, however unintended, of a logic of valorisation constituted as the 
central organising principle in nature itself (Smith 2008:91). This quite literal capitalo-centrism 
ignores the fundamental theoretical importance of the condition of irreducibility that defines 
any realist conception of nature, as an internal determination of the contradictory socio-
ecological development of the value-form.   
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Let me illustrate this point with an example from the region this dissertation is 
concerned with. At first glance, Smith’s argument can be exemplified by a quick look at the pine 
and eucalyptus plantations that have expanded exponentially upon the valleys in the south-
central regions of Chile. These plantations exploded under the Pinochet regime (1973-90), so 
that, in little over a decade, more than one million hectares—the property of which remains 
heavily concentrated—had been forested, many in the very same lands peasant and indigenous 
organizations had occupied during the Land Reform under the government of Salvador Allende 
(Klubock 2014). This social and ecological transformation was consubstantial to the radical 
reconfiguration, rescaling, and deepening of value relations, as the round of primitive 
accumulation in the form of counter land reform, political prosecution, and corporate subsidies 
combined with rural proletarianisation and radical ecological simplification through genetic 
homogeneity to allow for competitive accumulation on the world market (Klubock 2014; see 
Chapter 4). Today, over two and a half million hectares are covered by pine and eucalyptus 
monocultures (Aylwin et al. 2013). This is no less than the ecological instantiation and 
reproduction of a globally defined law of value—the ‘production of nature’, writ large.  
But, as it turns out, things are rather more complicated than what is allowed by Smith’s 
formulation, which in dismissing the traditional distinction between first and second nature too 
quickly slips into an apparent blurring of that between materiality and abstraction (Smith 
2008:83)—a distinction crucial to Marx’s critical project, and to the dialectical movement of 
contradiction implied in his theory of value16 (Saito 2017). The vast armies of genetically 
homogeneous trees lined up with mathematical precision do powerfully convey the notion of 
capital producing “the material world in its own image” (Smith 2008:83); but any notion of this 
being an image of the closed formal logic of the value-form is quickly dispelled upon a closer 
look at the region’s convulsive political ecology.  
The regions upon which these plantations are inflicted are the most heavily militarised 
landscapes in Chile: armoured police convoys escort the operations of forestry corporations, as 
routinely as they raid increasingly militant Mapuche indigenous communities (Beaudry 2009). 
Indeed, the landscape harbours a living and restless memory of successive waves of 
dispossession of Mapuche lands, consubstantial to the historical constitution of successive 
forms of accumulation. As a consequence, the consolidation of the forestry industry has been 
counterposed by the recomposition of indigenous struggles for the recuperation of ancestral 
                                               
16 This is, the dual and contradictory character of wealth in capitalist societies: ‘natural properties’ 
holding particular significance in relation to human needs (use value and ‘material wealth’), and its 
capitalist social form (value) (Marx 1990). 
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land; a political project inextricably linked to the regeneration of local biodiversity as its 
ecological substratum and in direct confrontation to forestry capital (Klubock 2014; González-
Hidalgo et al. 2013). The ensuing distribution of, for instance, native forests and the landscapes 
of the peasant economy can hardly be seen to express a closed, self-moving logic of 
valorisation—“the perpetual translation” of which is “actually achieved in the relation with 
nature” (Smith 2008:70)—, but rather the ecological sedimentation of layers upon layers of 
histories of resistance and adaptation, an ever-evolving battlefield where the stakes of the 
struggle rest precisely on the fact that this “actual achievement” is never fully settled, but 
necessarily produces the conditions of its own negation. This is an important point, for it signals 
the fundamental non-identity between the value-form and its content, one that not only 
accounts for the real historical movement of socio-ecologies articulated by capital, but that also 
fundamentally undermines any ‘constructivist’ direction in which the idea of the production of 
nature might be taken.  
This non-identity is also clearly expressed in those contradictions of the plantation 
ecology grounded on natural tendencies. These are perhaps most dramatically illustrated in the 
increasingly destructive seasonal wildfires, water stress, and rising toxicity due to intense 
pesticide use (Frêne & Núñez 2010; Little et al. 2009; González et al. 2011). Rooted in conditions 
such as the pyrophytic characteristics of eucalyptus species, or in the phenology of, say, Sirex 
noctilio—a species of woodwasp that inflicts on the industry millions in losses—these factors 
originate from inherited traits and forms of reproduction that in effect militate against the 
compulsions of valorisation, constitute its concrete determinations, and trace their lineage to 
an irreducibly autonomous nature. And at the same time—and I think this is a point missed by 
many of the critics of monist approaches—it is crucial to understand that these conditions 
cannot be considered to be external to the reified categories of capital: not only the presence of 
Sirex noctilio in these latitudes cannot be explained without reference to the Chilean process of 
neoliberalisation, but, crucially, this relative autonomy of natural metabolism is internally 
constitutive of the inherently contradictory and crisis-ridden existence of value as social form of 
metabolic relations.  
“All the magic and necromancy” (Marx 1990:169) of the reified concepts of movement 
of the Chilean forestry industry—above all, profitability—being as they are necessarily grounded 
in the constant reorganization of the material life-process under the abstract determinations of 
the law of value, are the “social hieroglyphs” of an inherently open dialectical movement of non-
identity (cf. Holloway 1995). The ecological instantiation of the value-form is consubstantial to 
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these histories of composition, decomposition, and recomposition, all tenaciously grounded in 
the contradictions and particular geographies of the Chilean neoliberal landscape. Pace Smith, 
concrete ecologies cannot be derived from the economic form-determinations of value, as these 
can only be instantiated through the unfolding of an irreducible contradiction between abstract 
economic forms and the concrete metabolism through which they are constituted. This is, I 
suggest, the central contradiction that characterizes historically existing capitalist ecologies—
one that Marx’s theory of value is particularly well suited to grasp.  
In this sense, I think that it is in the failure to more clearly grasp Marx’s categories as 
categories of contradiction and antagonism that the idea of the ‘production of nature’ has so 
frequently overlapped with non-dualist theorizations of a more postmodern bent (eg. Castree 
2002). This has left a notion otherwise crucially opening up the ecological dimensions of Marx’s 
theory of value vulnerable to charges of simple constructivism (eg. Malm 2018); a theory that 
ultimately affirms in ideal form that which is constantly being negated in practice. If, as Adorno 
held (Adorno 2004), dialectics imply “a consistent sense of non-identity”, it is precisely this 
dialectical movement that risks being effaced in many monist theorisations of society and 
nature, which thus become unable to grasp the real movement of socio-ecological reproduction 
under capitalism.  
 
Form and Content, Nature and Society 
In the 2017 Deutscher Memorial Prize Lecture at the Historical Materialism Conference in 
London, in the context of an exposition on the ecologies of marronage, Andreas Malm drew 
attention to how, as successive generations of ecological Marxists rightly and effectively 
unpacked the reactionary underpinnings of classical concepts of ‘wilderness’, we have 
unwittingly arrived at a position where we have difficulty seeing the theoretical and historical 
significance of that which, to varying degrees, hold the qualities of being untamed, unsubsumed, 
still out of the complete control of the grinding machine of capital. Understood in this register, 
wilderness, Malm suggested, might have a place in the anticapitalist politics of a strained planet, 
one which Marxist ecological thought ignores at its own peril. The argument developed here 
points in a similar direction to the concerns expressed by Malm: the crucial theoretical, political, 
and historical importance of the way in which material socio-ecological reproduction stands in 
a non-identical relation to its capitalist forms, albeit in a way not external to the latter, but 
internally constitutive of their contradictory historical unfolding.  
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The constitutive irreducibility that Malm suggests nature can evoke so powerfully is, I 
think, the fundamental point of departure for critical thought, or more precisely, thought that is 
concerned with crisis. John Holloway formulates this as thinking “the world from our misfitting” 
(Holloway 2010:9), from the ways in which our social life-process is not only constituted through 
the reified forms of capital, but against and beyond them: a ubiquitous misfitting that gives 
capitalist society its immanent self-antagonistic and crisis-prone movement. In this sense, 
departing from the non-identity of form and content implies understanding capitalism not from 
domination, but “from the perspective of its crisis, its contradictions, its weaknesses…” 
(Holloway 2010:9). From this starting point, “the only way in which we can understand the 
capitalist forms of social relations (and, at their centre, abstract labour) is as forms swollen with 
their own negation, forms that do not contain their content, but from which their content 
constantly overflows” (Holloway 2010:188).    
From this point of view, the opening question in a recent essay by Noel Castree (Castree 
2015:279) on the production of nature appears rather puzzling: “In a world where corporations 
create new life-forms and may soon geo-engineer the skies, does what we call ‘nature’ any 
longer possess autonomy and agency?” As we have seen, even in the most brutal landscapes of 
subsumption, such as the ones described in the previous section, it is the fact that nature cannot 
be contained by the abstract determinations of the law of value that accounts for the self-
negating (and self-destructive) dynamism of plantation socio-ecology—and indeed of the 
capitalist mode of production in general. With its endemic proliferation of pests and wildfires, 
and the dynamic persistence of cultural meanings and values embedded in the landscape that 
cannot be represented under the capitalist value regime as anything other losses, the relentless 
drive towards the real subsumption of nature exemplified in these southern latitudes cannot be 
conceived as anything less than a battlefield.  
In light of this, however, it is equally evident that the metaphor of ‘wilderness’ remains 
inadequate: it operates on a distinction—the presence/absence of an abstract humanity—that 
has only marginal meaning for a contradiction structured around the non-identity between the 
general life-process and its dominant social form. As useful as the distinction between society 
and nature may be for a number of analytical purposes, locating the contradictions behind 
environmental destruction at this level risks, among other things, obscuring the ways in which 
social irreducibility to the imperatives of accumulation is intertwined with that of nature—an 
issue that remains an indispensable field of militant inquiry. In this sense, while a good deal of 
monist theorisations do risk ignoring the crucial dialectics of nonidentity between form and 
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content inherent in Marx’s value theory, such a distinction cannot be adequately grasped by 
that between nature and society, for capital moves in history and geography through waging 
war on both.  
Let me illustrate this claim. As highlighted earlier, this dialectic between the material 
life-process and its economic form-determinations underpins Marx’s theory of value, and it can 
be seen to resurface strongly in his theory of differential rent (Marx 1991). Ecological 
variability—eg. different qualities of the soil, climate, etc.—runs necessarily counter to the 
homogenizing tendencies of the law of value—eg. the equalisation of profit rates—as goods 
rendered equivalent in the market incorporate differential costs rooted in the inherently diverse 
ecological conditions in which agricultural production is embedded. When demand is such that 
harvests produced under less productive lands need to be incorporated, these ‘distort’ the 
regulating market price, which then generates permanent ‘surplus profits’ or a differential rent 
for those producing on the best lands. Needless to say, this immanent resistance of nature to 
the homogenizing compulsion of capitalist markets has had a determinant importance for the 
historical development of rural societies under capitalism. For the Mexican agrarian scholar 
Armando Bartra (Bartra 2006), differential rent constituted the structural basis for the 
persistence of the peasantry in dependent capitalist countries (Latin America in particular) as 
states attempted to muffle this rent through the reliance for cheap food on a class of producers 
whose ties to the land—associated both to cultural and subsistence conditions—made them 
able to sustain production below the average rate of profit, or even at the point of simple 
reproduction. In other words, for Bartra, the resistance that ecological variability necessarily 
poses to the operation of the law of value was one of the main conditions for the reproduction 
of non-capitalist relations to the land in the Latin American countryside during the better part 
of the twentieth century.  
To be sure, this strategy for securing cheap food (and lowering wages) at a national level 
went largely out the window in the neoliberal period, as production for national consumption 
was replaced by cheap food imports, and the lion’s share of state subsidies went towards agro-
export capitalist production (Rubio 2001). Nonetheless, the underlying contradictions have 
appeared in even more explosive forms as millions of people moved from being part of a 
structurally exploited class of agricultural producers to becoming a marginalized rural 
population whose ways of life—and with it the historical and symbolic density of the land—
appears hopelessly anachronistic from the perspective of a globally rearticulated law of value 
(Rubio 2001). This accumulation regime recasts a reconfigured, and particularly brutal, 
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geography of rent in the form of, inter alia, intensified and expanded ‘extractivist’ investments, 
which have become a characteristic feature of Latin American rural landscapes and political 
struggles, in neoliberal and ‘postneoliberal’ countries alike (Svampa 2012; Gudynas 2012; 
Webber 2017). This renewed geography of rent, in its different periods, has provided the 
backdrop for the development of some of the most important popular movements in Latin 
America, such as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), the Brazilian Landless Peasant 
Movement (MST), or the Ecuadorian indigenous movement (eg. CONAIE), all of which have 
made world-historical ripples in the geographies of anticapitalist struggle (Rubio 2001). 
Even in this context, capitalism’s struggle with its natural foundations continues to 
impose in many places the reproduction of a relative exteriority within the agrarian landscapes 
of capitalism itself: that is, the reproduction, even if fragmented and pauperized, of diversity in 
both social and agroecological terms, in the shadows of the decrees of the world market. As 
Bartra (2006:25) notes, capitalist fantasies of a completely subsumed nature notwithstanding, 
the irreducible autonomy of the latter makes itself felt in the rhythms it imposes on agricultural 
production, which seasonally concentrates the demand for labour on sowing and harvest 
periods. Seasonal labourers must however eat year-round, and thus peasant production 
continues to be reproduced as a constitutive feature of the landscape. To quote Bartra: 
[I]n the end, what allows the specialized agribusiness entrepreneur to pay only for the work 
days required is a diversification of crops that runs on the account of the employee and her 
family. This is illustrated by the capitalist plantations in the coastal valleys [in Mexico], which 
are only economically viable thanks to the peasant milpas17 in the mountains. This is to say, 
that, finally, productive diversification enters through the backdoor, associated in this case 
to the combination of two different immanent economic rationalities. (2006:25, my 
translation). 
 
The ‘vernacular’ and world-ecological totalization 
This idea of capitalism having to necessarily posit a relative exteriority—a field of non-
commodified practices, which, although not directly constitutive of value, constitute 
nonetheless its conditions of possibility—has a long history within the Marxist tradition, one 
which perhaps has been nowhere more central than in social reproduction theory and Marxist 
                                               
17 Milpa is the main traditional agroecosystem in Mesoamerica, based on the association of maize, 
beans, and squash.  
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feminism more generally18. Developing this insight systematically within ecological thought is in 
my view one of the greatest merits of Jason Moore’s work (eg. 2015; 2017b). Moore’s model 
hinges on a dialectic of exploitation and appropriation inherent to capital’s law of value. The 
establishment of socially necessary labour time as a measure of value—abstract labour—implies 
what Moore calls the historical production of an ‘abstract social nature’: the cultural and political 
mechanisms of legibility (Scott 1998) and control that capitalist power imposes upon the socio-
ecological matrix upon which accumulation expands (Moore 2015; 2017b). For Moore, the rate 
of productivity of wage labour depends upon this ability to appropriate unpaid human (eg. 
domestic labour) and extra-human (eg. soil, water flow, old-growth forests, etc.) work: the law 
of value is the law of ‘Cheap Nature’. From this point of view, and in relation to the issues dealt 
with in this dissertation, one could understand the emergence modern conception of ‘energy’19 
as part of the historical development of the dialectics between abstract labour and ‘abstract 
social nature’. As Lohmann and Hildyard (Lohmann & Hildyard 2013; 2014) have argued, the 
expansion of the modern conception of energy is intimately linked to the expansion of the 
commodification of labour: both constitute symmetrical (real) abstractions through which a 
complex web of processes and relations have become structured around the condition of 
commensurability.  
Nevertheless, as compelling as Moore’s account of capital’s world-ecological logic is, 
from the perspective I am developing here his model remains one-sided: it offers no theoretical 
grounds for the articulation of the concrete and contradictory movement of socio-ecologies in 
any other terms than those of capitalist domination—ie. the brutal law of ‘cheap nature’ as 
capital’s form of world-ecological totalization. However, as I have argued, if we consider the 
material life-process and its capitalist forms (forms encompassing both those of abstract labour 
and ‘abstract social nature’) as a non-identical unity besieged by misfitting, the critical question 
                                               
18 See Bhattacharya 2017 for a recent collection of essays developing this crucial insight from a wide 
variety of angles.  
19 Physicist Richard Feynman (Feynman 1969:316-317) observed that at its most fundamental, the 
concept of ‘energy’ signals the mathematical fact of a magnitude which remains constant amidst any 
change underwent by a system. This is, energy is an abstraction—‘‘not a description of a mechanism, or 
anything concrete’’. This mathematical abstraction allows to quantitatively describe relations, processes, 
and transformations which, in turn, can be more substantially defined. This is what Feynman had in mind 
when he criticised the approach taken by a first grade science book which to the question ‘What makes 
this windable toy dog move?’, answered ‘Energy makes it move!’:  
“It would be equally well to say that ‘God makes it move,’ or ‘spirit makes it move,’ or ‘movability makes 
it move.’ (In fact, one could equally well say ‘energy makes it stop.’) (…) We might say when something 
can move that it has energy in it, but not what makes it move is energy. This is a very subtle difference. 
(…) Perhaps I can make the difference a little clearer this way: If you ask a child what makes the toy dog 
move, you should think about what an ordinary human being would answer. The answer is that you wound 
up the spring; it tries to unwind and pushes the gear around.”  
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and point of departure would be that of how the negation—the law of value/cheap nature—is 
itself negated in concrete reproduction and its emergent values, in and against its alienated 
world-ecological totalization in capital. The dialectic offered by Moore is that of the internal 
relations between capitalist forms of domination—sphere of capitalization and sphere of 
appropriation—but not that of the non-identity between both of these abstract forms and the 
concrete life-processes that constitute them. This is what I think has left Moore’s model, despite 
his intentions, open to be read as a ‘hyper-constructivist’ position (eg. Foster 2016), in a manner 
similar to Smith’s, as it confines its account of socioecological reproduction to the form it 
assumes from the standpoint of capital’s world-ecological totalisation: the value-form and its 
cheap nature pedestal.  
A seldom recognized distinction made by Ivan Illich might help to clarify this point. Illich 
(Illich 1980) distinguished between what he termed ‘shadow work’—those unpaid forms of 
activity that only exist as the necessary complement of commodity production, and that are 
inextricable from it—and what he called ‘the vernacular’. In its classical Latin usage, the word 
denoted “sustenance derived from reciprocity patterns embedded in every aspect of life, as 
distinguished from sustenance that comes from exchange or from vertical distribution” (Illich 
1980:85), a meaning later transported to language to signal the non-formal rootedness of the 
latter in the speaker's own relational grounds and everyday usage, as opposed to its formal 
abstraction and codification as part of the constitution of state power. For Illich the word allows 
for greater precision and depth than that afforded by terms such as ‘subsistence’, which too 
often is taken as ‘bare minimum material conditions for life’ and reinforces economistic 
understandings of social practice. In contrast, the ‘vernacular’ encompasses a crucial dimension 
of human existence and practice—present in practices and forms of knowledge as diverse as 
music, childbirth, architecture, notions of reasonableness, preparation of food, the shaping of 
language and other forms of embodied competence, etc.—that is oriented to an embodied and 
contextually defined telos. Illich was emphatic about the importance of the distinction that this 
word allowed within what is normally understood as ‘social reproduction’. For Illich the 
fundamental opposition posed by modern society was not that between wage labour and its 
complementary ‘shadow work’, but between this binary—the dual form of capitalist 
domination—and the vernacular, everyday embodied relations of mutual constitution, which 
although fragmentary and arguably receding, constitute a “mode of being, doing, and making” 
irreducible to abstract formalization and quantification, one productive of its own immanent 
teloi.  
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Illich’s notion of the vernacular nevertheless encounters its limits in the extent to which 
it posits this realm of human practice as ‘external’ to capitalist modernity and its historical 
development. Instead, here I want to push Illich’s notion further: the ‘vernacular’ does not 
necessarily designate different kinds of practice—i.e. modes of being external to capitalist 
modernity—, but more fundamentally, different dimensions of practice within capitalist society. 
Operating within Marx’s dialectic of the concrete and abstract dimensions of capitalist labour, 
the vernacular, embodied orientation towards a contextually defined telos should be seen as 
internal to every form of labour, even if it appears only in its negated form—inter alia, as class 
struggle (cf. Cleaver 1992).  
More specifically, under capitalist relations of production the labour process is a site 
where contradicting teloi co-exist: from the point of view of the valorisation process wages 
appears as a cost, while for its constitutive powers—ie. the labourers—it appears as their access 
to the means of subsistence, ie. the sustainment and enhancement of their life-worlds. In the 
constitutive moments of capital’s valorisation, the material acts involved thus appear as sites of 
conflicting valuations (cf. Marx 1990:ch.10; cf. De Angelis 2007). Regardless of the imposition of 
abstract determinations, or rather precisely because of them, at the level of concrete practice, 
the labour process is beset by innumerable acts that from the point of view of capital’s 
valorisation processes constitute instances of ‘indiscipline’ or resistance which cannot be 
ignored when approaching the material constitution of the landscape, nor the particular forms 
taken by accumulation strategies (cf. Scott 1985). This does not mean that these acts are 
necessarily consciously articulated as ‘resistance’, rather, they appear as such from the point of 
view of the accumulation process and its imperatives of abstraction, legibility, fetishization, and 
expansion. 
As an internal moment of capitalist society, the ‘vernacular’ should not be understood 
as an ahistorical category; on the contrary, it is an immanent critical one rooted in the 
contradiction between the life-process and its social form; a contradiction that can be seen 
condensed in Marx’s analysis of the commodity as fractured by its existence as value and use-
value. And as the basis for use-value, the concrete historical instantiations of the vernacular 
dimensions of life are inextricable from the historical development of the social form of capital: 
capitalism produces its own forms of vernacular practices, values, and consciousness. Moreover, 
although there are of course properties that are specific to human practices (which will concern 
the rest of this paper), at the most general level of abstraction ‘the vernacular’ can be seen to 
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implicate the practically infinite layers of autopoietic activity that make up the biosphere, which 
cannot but persevere, at the most basic level, in their autonomy. 
If, as Moore holds, following Federici, “it is precisely the symbolic erasure, the 
invisibilization, of care work that has been the necessary condition of capitalist development” 
(Moore 2017c:330), the question becomes how do we think against this invisibilisation, how do 
we think from that which is being invisibilised? More pertinently to the subject of study in this 
dissertation, think for example of a river: as abstract social nature it might appear as ‘energy’, 
as ‘hydropower potential’, as cartography, as quantifiable magnitudes of various kinds (eg. 
Ministerio de Energía 2018); as value it might appear in the form of the potential rents generated 
by the establishment of a hydropower project. But what is being negated in these specific forms? 
The river as a life-process, drenched in the symbolic and historical density of its human relations, 
and the infinite complexity of the non-human layers of activity that make up its ecology. If the 
task of articulating a revolutionary politics for a different conception of the values mediating our 
mutual constitution is not to fall into idealist utopianism, we must attend to their immanent 
grounds in our actually existing life-process, the ways in which they inhabit and sustain it, albeit 
in the fragmented, incoherent, and contradictory way imposed by the dialectics of capital’s law 
of value and the reified and alienated realm of economic objectivity it establishes. The specific 
practices and meanings at play in the historical density of the landscape, the ways and extent to 
which the material life-process poses immanent resistances to the requirements of the social 
form of value, should in this sense be at the forefront of the analysis. As Ekers and Loftus put it, 
taking their cue from Gramsci, it is necessary to reclaim “a sense of the concrete determinations 
of human practice in different historical moments and in different geographical situations” 
(2012:15, cf. Loftus 2012). In rooting our politics and our critique of the political ecology of 
capitalist development in the affective, embodied, everyday practical engagement with nature 
we might constitute the grounds for the oppositional reenchantment of nature that Neil Smith, 
writing over a decade after his original thesis, thought to be a still unfulfilled task for the left 
(Smith 1998).  
To approach this in terms of value theory, in this next section I will reconsider that which 
the Ecuadorian philosopher Bolivar Echeverría considered to be the “implicit conception that 
sustains the entire edifice of the critique of political economy” (Echeverría 2014:24): the 
category of use-value.  
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Use-value, production, and anthropological theories of value 
Once we move into social relations not directly mediated by the value-form—say, for instance, 
the relations and practices that reproduce the milpa system alluded to earlier—, Marx’s theory 
of value leaves us with the notion of ‘use-value’ as the concept mediating human action vis-à-
vis nature. On a first approximation, this poses no problem: outside of the accumulation process 
the engagement with nature no longer obeys the determinations of capital’s law of value based 
on socially necessary labour time in a direct manner, but rather responds to whatever is 
collectively defined as constituting social ‘needs’. However, this doesn’t really tell us anything in 
particular, as what makes these needs specifically human is that they are irreducible to some 
unmediated instance of ‘natural’ requirements, but only exist through a movement of 
transnaturalisation (Echeverría 2014) into cultural forms that are infinitely variable across time 
and space. The notion of ‘use’, in short, is necessarily defined in relation to a particular telos; it 
is implicated in social and moral universes in relation to which any notion of ‘utility’ acquires 
meaning20 (Echeverría 2014; cf. Sahlins 2013). However, for Marx’s purposes of building a 
critique of political economy, the point of the concept is the identification of a dialectical tension 
within the commodity form: it distinguishes between the needs defined by the expansive 
accumulation process and the needs of concrete human subjects, aspects which under capitalist 
social relations develop as contradiction. Use-value thus fundamentally functions as a category 
of contrast, one whose dialectical relation to value as a measure of socially necessary labour 
time makes way for Marx’s critique of political economy. As Echeverría pointed out (2014), 
although crucial, use-value is a category left comparatively undeveloped within Marx’s work. It 
thus open up the question of that dimension of the life-process negated in capitalist economic 
forms, but cannot answer it without further elaboration.  
To move in this direction it is necessary to interrogate the notion of ‘production’ from 
the point of view of use-value. Echeverría reminds us that to “produce is to objectify, to inscribe 
in the form of the product a transformative intention addressed to the subject itself” (2014:29). 
In this sense, from the point of view of use-value the social production of objectivity is a 
subordinated moment in a process ultimately aimed at the production of a particular form of 
(social) subject (cf. Graeber 2007:95). For Echeverría, it is the capacity of the social subject to 
give form to its constitutive relations of interdependence that defines its subjecthood 
[sujetidad], a movement through which “its identity and the differential identity of its members” 
                                               
20 This point relates directly to the concept of the ‘moral economy’, explored below, and in Chapter 6: it 
describes the necessary entaglement of human practices in universes of meaning and value, in an 
uneasy relation to exchange value as a purely abstract quantitative dimension.  
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is constituted (Echeverría 2014:27), and through which a structural social telos is founded. 
Production, from the point of view of use-value, can only ultimately be the semiotic and material 
production of particular kinds of persons, and, more precisely, the relations that constitute them 
and through which they acquire, and confer, meaning and value.  
Arguing in a similar direction against the ‘naive materialism’ of certain classical strands 
of Marxist anthropology, anthropologist David Graeber (2007) calls attention to Marx’s 
comments in his ethnographic notebooks, where he points out that 
Among the ancients, we discover no single enquiry as to which form of landed property … 
creates maximum wealth. Wealth does not appear as the aim of production … The enquiry 
is always about what kind of property creates the best citizens. …  
Thus the ancient conception, in which man [sic] always appears (in however narrowly 
national, religious, or political a definition) as the aim of production, seems very much more 
exalted than the modern world, in which production is the aim of man [sic] and wealth the 
aim of production. (Marx 1965:84)  
Marx here notes the particularity of modern society, the brutal inversion inflicted by 
capitalistically constituted production onto the social life-process: that “in which production is 
the aim of man [sic] and wealth the aim of production”. The objective dimension of the social 
life-process—which consolidates as the discrete sphere we know today, i.e. the economy, with 
the generalization of the commodity-form as social nexus, and its autonomisation as capital—
constitutes itself as an ‘automatic subject’, in relation to which the social life-process becomes 
structurally devalued as a mere means, caught in the unending treadmill of valorisation (Postone 
1993). In this context, from the perspective of Echeverría use-value appears as an immanent 
critical concept, one that “shatters” this horizon of modern thought (Echeverría 2014:24), and 
allows for the articulation of a critical discourse which sheds light on the way the concrete 
organization of social reproduction that capitalist modernity effects is torn in a perennial 
struggle of the ‘spectral’ inversion of the value-form to subsume the ‘socio-natural form’21 of 
social reproduction signalled by the concept of use-value (Echeverría 2011:283). The central 
                                               
21 For Echeverría the term ‘natural form’ “does not make reference to a ‘substance’ or ‘human nature’ 
of metaphysical validity, against which the ‘value form’ would be ‘in sin’; nor to the rootedness of the 
human in Nature’s normativity, in relation to which the ‘value form’ would be a mere artifice lacking any 
basis. It refers exclusively to the fact that that which is human, being in essence ‘artificial’, non-natural, 
that is, contingent, self-founded, must always constitute its forms in an act … of ‘trans-naturalisation’, 
act that makes them forms constituted on the basis of proto-forms located in nature, the same which, 
‘determinately negated’, remain as its substance.” (Echeverría 2011:281, my translation). 
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political struggle posited by capitalist modernity is, for Echeverría, one over the form-
determination of the life process (Sáenz De Sicilia & Brito Rojas 2014).   
Echeverría’s approximation to use-value remains pitched at a very high level of 
abstraction and formalisation. Its concerns, however, overlap in interesting ways with a different 
tradition of scholarship within anthropology that has developed a Marxian inspired approach to 
the question of value (see Graeber 2001). The ethnographic focus of this latter body of work 
develops this dimension at more concrete levels of analysis. The pioneering author here is the 
late Terence Turner, who in his work with the Kayapó in central Brazil took the comparative 
analysis of production in a quite different direction from that developed by previous Marxian 
anthropology. Turner argued that “the definition of what counts as ‘production’ in any society 
is ethnographically inseparable from how it defines the need (or needs) that serve as the focus 
(or foci) of its productive activities” (Turner 2008:45). In capitalism, the alienated productive 
actions of social subjects are systematically pinned against each other in the form of market 
competition of individual capitals, which in turn produces the systemic compulsion for the ever-
expanding valorisation. This ultimate systemic need 
… is on a different level from the more mundane needs for material subsistence and services 
satisfied by the commodities produced by capitalist firms. Rather, it is the structural 
necessity whose satisfaction constitutes the aim of all the productive activities comprising 
the capitalist system as a whole. It thus (an important point here for anthropological 
purposes) reflexively becomes the criterion for defining which activities count as ‘productive’ 
and therefore as creating value in a capitalist economy. (Turner 2008:45, my emphasis.) 
Turner here is historicizing what is deemed to be the object of production in relation to which 
what is considered to be productive activity is defined in any given system of social action. In 
the case of the Kayapó, Turner argues,  
… social production, in the absence of markets and production of commodities for exchange 
(ie, of ‘economies’), is concerned above all with the production of social persons and 
relations, and the social values attaching to them. The production of subsistence goods and 
services, while important, appears as an ancillary aspect of the process of (re-)producing 
social persons and the families and extended family relations that serve as the organizing 
framework of this process, rather than a distinct, separately institutionalized domain of 
production and exchange: that is, not as an ‘economy’. (Turner 2003:11)  
Turner here departs from the mainstream of Marxist anthropology, whose analysis of non-
capitalist societies remained rooted in a notion of ‘modes of production’ more often than not 
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read in varyingly narrow economistic terms. In contrast, Turner’s analysis draws on Marx’s 
theory of value, a theory which for Turner provides an immensely powerful form of materialist 
symbolic analysis. The ‘values’ that reflexively define what sorts of activities are considered to 
be ‘productive’ in any given society constitute the symbolic mediations through which individual 
actions are oriented, and meaningfully integrated into an interdependent totality of practices. 
Value is the way in which individual actions acquire social meaning (Graeber 2001). Turner 
shows the main categories of social value among the Kayapó to be “beauty” and “power”; 
aspects of the identity of persons that are produced by the Kayapó system of social production, 
realised by particular persons in particular ritual settings, and to which its own mechanisms of 
exploitation are articulated (Turner 1984; Turner 2003; Turner 2004). Value(s) in this sense 
delineate and structure social worlds which are understood “not just as a collection of persons 
and things but rather as a project of mutual creation, as something collectively made and 
remade” (Graeber 2013:222). Turner’s conception of value (linked to his anti-economistic yet 
materialist conception of production) in this sense functions in a manner analogous to that 
which Echeverría called ‘social telos’: it gives a definite form to society’s relations of 
interdependence, and in turn constitutes the symbolic mediations through which individual 
actions acquire their social meaning and orientation. From this point of view, as David Graeber—
a former student of Turner who took up the latter’s largely unpublished project—points out, 
’cultures’ and ‘societies’ appear as projects for the pursuit of a particular forms of value (or, 
more commonly, a constellation of these); projects that by definition imply collective 
conceptions of both the meaning of human existence, and the nature of the world; ie. 
cosmologies (Graeber 2013).  
These ideas open up new dimensions to Smith’s thesis on the ‘production of nature’. In 
the words of Echeverría (2014:27): “the confrontation of the subject with nature... [is] an 
indirect confrontation, mediated by the confrontation of the subject with its own sociability.” 
Value is, in the sense developed by Turner, not only generative of cosmologies and conceptions 
of the world, but constituted by and generative of particular forms of social praxis, structuring 
the way metabolic relations are socio-symbolically mediated, and therefore, following Smith’s 




Value, moral economy, and the contested production of nature 
One of the relevant implications of Turner’s approach is that value as an economic, quantitative, 
category and ‘values’ as moral-cultural “conceptions of the desirable” are to be understood as 
different refractions of a common process through which human action is confronted with its 
own social universe of meaning (Graeber 2001:78). As Graeber highlights, from Turner’s project 
there emerges a conception of politics in which “[t]he ultimate stake … is not the struggle to 
appropriate value; it is the struggle to establish what value is” (Graeber 2001:88); ie. the 
determination of the meaning(s) of one’s life-activity. For Graeber, values necessarily delineate 
and instantiate the imaginary totalities in which they are realised, albeit to a necessarily partial 
and fragmentary extent. These are social fields that constantly overlap: “[i]n any real social 
situation, there are likely to be any number of such imaginary totalities at play, organized around 
different conceptions of value” (Graeber 2001:88), conceptions from which particular 
worldviews emerge, moral expectations are formed, and claims about reality are made. Much 
of daily life, from this point of view, consists in the struggle, articulation, or otherwise knitting 
together of these different fields (see De Angelis 2007). 
In the face of this view of society as a “thousand totalities”, as Graeber puts it, it is 
however necessary to remain aware of the importance of the dialectics of struggle signalled by 
the antagonism of value and use-value. For Graeber, contra conceptions of our age as one 
characterised by the contingency, multiplicity, and proliferation of values, our current situation 
should be understood as above all “one in which the most gigantic, totalizing, and all-
encompassingly universal system of evaluation known to human history came to be imposed on 
almost everything” (Graeber 2001:89). In this sense, the expansive movement of subsumption 
that characterises capitalism imposes upon multiplicity the dialectical dynamics of antagonistic 
binarization signalled by Marx’s categories of value and use-value. As I will explore with more 
detail and empirically on Chapter 6, it is through this process that this necessary field of moral 
and cultural values that mediate relations among people, and of people and nature, comes to 
be expressed as what EP Thompson (1971) called a ‘moral economy’ which presents multiple 
resistances to the abstract logic of market forces, exchange value, and the commodity form. As 
Thompson (1993) suggests, the complex and variegated web of values, customs, usages, and 
moral expectations that mediate social reproduction only emerge as a more or less explicit 
‘moral economy’ in contrast to the particular form of rationality entailed by the ‘free market’ 
and the commodity form.        
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In this sense, dialectics, rather than effacing multiplicity, is the awareness of the binary 
antagonism created by a totalising value system, and thus the negative character through which 
this multiplicity exists as a consequence of its subsumption (Holloway et al. 2009). The assertion 
of difference and multiplicity is not something that can be done theoretically—perhaps the 
ideological move of liberalism par excellence—, it must be resolved in (anticapitalist) practice. 
Here is where it is necessary to return to Echeverría. In his reading, from the point of 
view of Marx’s critique, capitalist modernity is 
ruled simultaneously by two structuring principles which are inherent to it; two coherences 
or rationalities in contradiction to each other: that of the mode or the ‘natural form’ of life 
and its world and that of the mode or the ‘value form’ … of the same. They are, in addition, 
two ‘logics’ in which the second, that of ‘value’, is permanently in process of dominating 
over the first, the ‘natural’, of ‘subsuming’ it. (Echeverría 2011:281, my translation) 
For Echeverría, although permanently asserting its dominance, the process of abstract 
valorisation remains necessarily parasitic: as a purely abstract, ‘spectral’ inversion it cannot posit 
its own qualitative content, it is dependent for its anchors of meaning on the use-value 
dimension of the social life-process that it subsumes—what from Graeber’s point of view is the 
field of ‘values’. The ensuing concrete form of the life-process thus expresses the struggle 
between these two dimensions. The crucial task facing an inquiry into the political ecology of 
capitalist development is to understand this conflictual articulation, the torn existence of 
capitalism as a world-ecological project. This dissertation will now look at how this contradiction 










3. Hydro(social)power and the energy frontier in Chile  
Utopias are necessary. But not only are they insufficient: they can, in some 
iterations, be part of the ideology of the system, the bad totality that 
organises us, warms the skies, and condemns millions to peonage on 
garbage scree.  
China Miéville, The Limits of Utopia 
 
In this chapter I will look at the core political-ecological elements at play in contemporary 
geographies of hydropower in Chile—the historical configuration of their crisis tendencies, and 
of the new geographical strategies of frontier-making that have arisen in response. For this I will 
analyse the historical evolution of hydropower in Chile, understood here in its double register: 
both as a technology for electricity generation, and as one of the metabolic pivots for the 
(re)production of particular social hierarchies, and of the struggles through which these unfold 
historically—ie. ‘hydrosocial’ power (see Swyngedouw 2015; cf. Lohmann & Hildyard 2014). In 
the case dealt with here, this means analysing the ways in which hydrosocial power, and the 
hydrosocial cycle22 more generally, became reconfigured in unprecedented ways through the 
neoliberalisation process that has shaped Chilean society over the last four decades. 
‘Neoliberalism’ is here approached, following Harvey (Harvey 2005), as an eminently political 
(and ecological) project, the aim of which was the reconstitution, in wholly new terms, of a class 
hegemony that had been plunged into an unprecedented crisis during the early seventies. This 
‘counterrevolution’—and the new articulation of financialisation, extraction, and rent that 
characterised it—brought about a complete reorganisation of the socio-ecological configuration 
of the country’s landscapes and the terms that mediated their integration into the capitalist 
world-system.  
However, and given the questions guiding this dissertation, what I attempt here is not 
only to explore the ways this process created a novel socio-ecological articulation of power, but 
also to approach this process from the other direction: how it laid the grounds for new political 
                                               
22 The ‘hydrosocial cycle’ is concept emerging from political ecology which attempts to grasp the 
processes through which the flow of water across a landscape and social relations co-produce each 
other. This departs from the more traditional, purely hydrological, conception of the ‘water cycle’ in 
fundamental ways. In the words of Linton and Budds (2014:170) “[T]he hydrologic cycle has become the 
dominant popular means of representing flows of water in the hydrosphere. The hydrosocial cycle, in 
contrast, attends to the social nature of these flows as well as the agential role played by water, while 
highlighting the dialectical and relational processes through which water and society interrelate”. 
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subjectivities and forms of resistance internally related to the particular form of capital 
accumulation that has characterised this period. In other words, I want to understand how the 
transformations brought about by the neoliberal period, and its internal crises, expressed a cycle 
of decomposition/recomposition of popular subjectivities, identities, struggles, and relations to 
nature. As I will show, attention to these dimensions is crucial to grasp the nature of the crises 
faced by hydropower in Chile, and the particular geographic fixes that the current frontier 
movements express.  
For this analysis I draw on two important general ideas. First, the insight from the 
Marxist autonomist tradition regarding the internal nature of the relation between the 
particular composition—technical, political, and social (Notes From Below 2018)—of the 
working class and historical patterns of accumulation. Second, and relatedly, the idea of class as 
a relational process, which means that class—ie. the general social powers of labour the 
alienation of which constitutes capital—is an inherently mutable category whose cultural forms, 
particular revindications, and organisational practices shift according to the regime of 
accumulation they confront. In E.P. Thompson’s words  
[T]he notion of class entails the notion of historical relationship. Like any other relationship, 
it is a fluency which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and 
anatomise its structure. (Thompson 1963:9) 
It is this historical process which I will place at the forefront of the analysis presented here, as I 
think it sheds fundamental light upon the geographical phenomenon of the ‘frontier space’ 
which lays at the root of the kind of struggles this dissertation engages with. 
 
The developmentalist state, electrification, and the hydro-social constitution of 
power.  
In contrast to most countries in the region, Chile lacks significant fossil fuel reserves within its 
territory. The country is characterised, however, by an abundance of surface waters, especially 
in its southern half, where a great number of rivers make their relatively short and steep way 
from the Andean range into the Pacific Ocean. These conditions have historically placed 
hydropower at the centre of Chilean electrical systems (IEA 2018a; Bauer 2009).  
The origins of hydroelectric power in Chile date back to 1897, when the country’s first 
plant opened in Chivilingo to power the coal mines in the Lota mining district. During the first 
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decades of the twentieth century, the process of electrification of the country was mostly 
propelled by foreign and national private companies; an uneven and fragmented process that 
after intensifying during the 1920s, came to a sudden halt with the Great Depression (ENDESA 
1993), which hit Chile particularly hard due to its links with the US economy. After years of 
economic and political turmoil, and as in other aspects of the national economy, this situation 
would eventually compel the state to take over the role of planning and development of the 
energy sector. Following the creation of the Corfo23 in 1939, in 1943 the government created its 
energy subsidiary, Endesa (National Electricity Company). Endesa was to take on the task of 
implementing an ambitious national electrification plan, which placed hydroelectric power at its 
basis (Rudnick & Palma 2018). During the decades that followed Endesa would lay the 
foundations of not only the Chilean electrical system, but with it, of a crucial infrastructural 
aspect of the broader project of geographical national integration, and of the consolidation of 
the state’s territorial and hydro-social power (cf. Swyngedouw 2015), through which the 
national-developmentalist mode of capitalist accumulation that characterised this period would 
be articulated.  
Due to the central role that the plan ascribed to hydropower in the electrification of the 
country, regional systems would be first delimited on the basis of hydrological criteria (Endesa 
1993). After a first stage in which Endesa developed these main regional electrical distribution 
and generation systems, those located in the central third of the country would in the late 1960s 
be integrated into the Central Interconnected System (SIC), which would supply 90% of the 
national population. The more isolated parts of the country, north and south, would remain 
under their own, largely thermoelectricity-based, systems (SING, SEA, and SEM). To generate 
energy for the SIC, Endesa developed numerous hydroelectric plants, dams, and reservoirs in 
the central and south-central parts of the country, which would later be complemented by coal 
and diesel-based thermoelectric plants. Hydropower, however, remained the basis of the 
system throughout this period: by the early 1960s thermoelectric capacity would only account 
for a third of that of hydropower in the SIC24 (Bauer 2009), a dominant role that after reaching 
a peak during the 1980s, would only reverse from the 1990s onwards. This process of state-
                                               
23 Corporación de Fomento a la Producción, [Production Development Corporation], is a government 
organisation, which during this period had the mandate of promoting and directing the industrial 
development of the country.  
24 Bauer (2009:612, note 97) reports that “By 1962 … the SIC had 12 hydro plants with a total capacity of 
549 MW, compared to two thermal plants with a total capacity of 155 MW”.  
58 
directed electrification would culminate in 1970, with the nationalisation of Chilectra, one of the 
main remaining private companies in the sector (Rudnick & Palma 2018). 
Given the extremely uneven hydrological characteristics of the national territory—
which consists in a gradual north-south transition between the extreme aridity of the northern 
regions to the humid southern parts of the country (see McPhee 2018)—, hydropower in Chile 
has always implied a rather lopsided geography, defined by the concentration of the population 
and industrial centres of energy consumption in the central third of the country, combined with 
a hydroelectric potential located mostly on peripheral areas of the southern half (Bauer 2009; 
see Ministerio de Energía 2015). In this context, as previously mentioned, the progressive 
hydropower-based electrification of the country at this stage implied a hierarchical geographical 
integration of the national territory through a grid system that transported electricity from a 
generating periphery to the consumption centres (Ibid.); integration that by the late 1960s was 
to be consolidated in the above mentioned establishment of the SIC (Endesa 1993).  
In this way, the process of hydro-social deployment of the developmentalist state 
established some of the basic parameters of one of the various geographical scales in relation 
to which places such as Huife would negotiate their role and place—or lack thereof—in the 
shifting project(s) of national development: the geographies of water as energy. Through this 
process of hydropower-based electrification a set of lasting internal relations between the 
state’s territorial power, this territory’s hydrological characteristics, and the core-periphery 
dynamics of electrical generation and consumption were established and consolidated. These 
are some of the central elements of a geography of uneven development that can still be clearly 
discerned in current territorial conflicts such as the one that concerns the present study—for 
example, in the notion of ‘development poles’ introduced by recent legislation that has explicitly 
foregrounded the potential for energy production as a decisive factor in the integration of vast 
regions into the national economy (Ministerio de Energía 2018). 
 
Energy, water, and the neoliberal counterrevolution  
Crisis of hegemony and the neoliberal counterrevolution 
This national-developmentalist phase would come to an abrupt and violent end in the early 
1970s. The radical transformations in the ways water and energy articulated with the national 
configuration of power that would ensue expressed an unprecedentedly deep and radical 
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counterrevolutionary process through which the embattled Chilean ruling classes, in alliance 
with the hemispheric imperial interests of the US, reconfigured Chilean capitalism in ways that 
foreshadowed several aspects of what was to come at the level of the capitalist world-system 
as a whole. To understand the meaning that this reconfigured hydrosocial cycle had on the 
national field of power relations, a brief overview of the political circumstances that the 
neoliberalisation process responded to is necessary.  
In 1970 Salvador Allende, heading the Popular Unity coalition (Unidad Popular, UP), won 
the presidential elections, opening the way for the ‘Chilean road to socialism’: a tumultuous, 
contradictory, inspiring, frustrating, and ultimately defeated political project that distinguished 
itself within the international geographies of contemporary socialist movements by its 
commitment to build socialism “within the framework of suffrage, through the use of current 
institutions, and in democracy, pluralism and freedom” (Garretón 1993:190). The UP 
government introduced a range of measures of lasting consequence; perhaps most crucially, the 
nationalisation of the mining industry25, and the effective abolition of the traditional latifundia 
that had weighed over the Chilean countryside for centuries (Chonchol 1976). During the brief 
three years that the UP was in power, the Chilean social, economic, and political order convulsed 
under the throes of an unprecedented and forceful irruption of a contradictory popular 
movement into social, economic, and political spaces hitherto reserved for, and managed in 
accordance with, the interests of an increasingly anachronistic ruling class. The process 
unleashed social forces the revolutionary effervescence of which the UP government found itself 
in a constant battle to contain; all the while it attempted to push its programme through the 
steadfast opposition and obstruction of conservative forces, allied with the insidious imperialist 
intervention and boycott from the US (Gaudichaud 2017). The tension between the bureaucratic 
rhythms of the Land Reform and the accumulated grievances and urgent needs of a galvanized 
peasantry seemed to systematically boil over into autonomously organized land occupations—
some of which resulted in violent clashes with landlords—, as in the cities the emboldened 
workers’ movement both pressured and supported the government through factory seizures 
that quickly scaled up to the autonomous coordination of production through the famous 
‘cordones industriales’ (Ibid.). Both instances reflected a process of “revolution from below” that 
created considerable stress within the UP coalition, as it juggled its simultaneous commitment 
to constitutional order and socialist transformation (Winn 2004). The process would push the 
                                               
25 Codelco, the state’s copper mining company, due to its strategic role in the state finances, was one of 
the few state enterprises that remained under public ownership after the sweeping privatization rounds 
that took place during the Pinochet regime. Mineral deposits, however, became wide open for foreign 
direct investments thereafter.  
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institutional structure of Chilean society to its political limits. This was expressed in a generalised 
political polarization of society which became further exacerbated by the economic dislocations 
brought about by the widespread social turbulence (Ibid.).  
As it turned out, the ‘Chilean road to socialism’ fatally overestimated the commitment 
that both the military and the ruling classes held towards their own constitutional order. On 
September 11th 1973, a military junta backed by conservative political forces, and with the 
support of US intelligence agencies, seized power: within days, the constitution, civil liberties, 
and political rights were suspended. Chile would be for the next 17 years under a military 
dictatorship that would combine political authoritarianism and state terror—exerted by the 
military—with an extreme form of economic liberalism, designed and implemented by a group 
of Chicago-trained economists which would constitute the technocratic-civil wing of the 
government: the so-called ‘Chicago boys’ (Gárate Chateau 2012; Winn 2004). 
At the metabolic basis of the economy, the neoliberal counterrevolution consisted of 
the subordination of landscapes to the almost unmediated determinations of the world market, 
which resulted in the reorientation of production from the import-substitution strategy (ISI) that 
had characterised the previous several decades, towards the (water intensive) industries of 
export-oriented agriculture and natural resource extraction, with mining at the forefront (Lara 
Cortés 2016). Of course, this transformation implied in the first place a complete overhaul of the 
agrarian structure in the Chilean countryside; an arena that, as previously mentioned, had been 
one of the critical sites of political dispute during the UP years. This overhaul was done through 
the deployment of the regime’s signature combination of the iron fist and the invisible hand: on 
the political side, forced disappearance, extrajudicial executions, exile, and imprisonment and 
torture in detention camps, were amongst the measures used to finish off the political and 
peasant organizations that had spearheaded the agrarian reform process, in addition to worker 
organisations and left-wing political parties more generally (see Comisión Chilena de Derechos 
Humanos 1999). On the economic side, drastic unilateral reduction or outright elimination of 
tariffs and protectionist policies, agrarian counter-reform, and privatization of state agro-
industrial enterprises were implemented (Kay 2002). The counter-reform gave part of the 
reformed land back to landlords, cooperatives were dissolved, and the remaining reformed land 
subdivided into family farms (Jarvis 1992). However, the agrarian structure that would ensue 
had little to do with the traditional pre-reform latifundios. Traditional production geared 
towards the domestic market rapidly deteriorated as internal demand fell due to sharp 
decreases in wages and increased unemployment owing to rapid deindustrialization (Kay 2002). 
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Coupled with competitive pressure from foreign subsidized production (US and Europe), the 
new conditions forced old landlords and peasants alike to sell land to more competitive, export-
oriented capitalist producers (Ibid.). All these conditions thoroughly transformed the technical 
and social relations of production in the countryside: labour was violently disciplined through 
military means, while capital was submitted to the rigours of an unbridled and rescaled market.  
The role of water and energy in the deployment of this political project is an issue that 
has been under-researched; somewhat strangely given both the above described metabolic 
characteristics of the neoliberal project—ie. those of a modernised rentier capitalism built upon 
natural resource extraction—and the attention that the chilean Water Code has otherwise 
received. Among the notable exceptions is the work of Jessica Budds (2013), which makes clear 
the crucial role that the process of commodification of water rights played in the consolidation 
of the sweeping neoliberal reform programme, on the formation of new set of power relations 
premised upon the radical reconfiguration of the economic basis of Chilean society, and the final 
consolidation of a new hegemonic bloc through the democratic transition process during the 
nineties. The issues dealt with in this study, however, demand us to approach this recomposition 
of class rule from the other side: how the commodification of the hydrosocial cycle reflected the 
process of political and technical decomposition of the country’s working classes—urban and 
rural—which would eventually set the terms for a long process of recomposition of new forms 
of antagonism and subjectivity, forms internal to the concrete socio-ecological unfolding of the 
neoliberal project. We will return to this issue further below, given that, as I will explain, it rests 
at the heart of the contemporary ‘energy crisis’ that lies behind the expansion of the 
hydropower frontier that this dissertation is concerned with. But first we must turn in more 
detail to the way in which the neoliberalisation process impacted the water-energy nexus—
which, as previously explained, had developed in the previous period as one of the main pivots 
of hydro-social power in Chile—and how the energy question in general has evolved during the 
neoliberal era towards the contemporary impasse.  
 
Water, energy, and neoliberalisation  
The legacy bequeathed to the Pinochet regime by the previous decades of state-directed 
electrification mainly consisted of the recently consolidated SIC, founded on hydropower, and 
vertically integrated and managed under the aegis of the state-owned Endesa. As it was the case 
with almost every other aspect of Chilean society, once the initial power scuffles over which 
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policy orientation the dictatorship would take were settled in favour of the agenda of radical 
neoliberalisation (Gárate Chateau 2012), the aim of the new regime would be to make this 
centralised system—born in the image and likeness of the developmentalist state the 
government was set to dismantle—dance to the tune of market dynamics; a feat that at the time 
had no international precedent (Endesa 1993; Büchi 1993; Budds 2009). Due to the 
preponderant role of hydropower in the electricity sector, which by the late 1980s would peak 
at over 80% of the country’s generating capacity (IEA 2018a), this process called for a radical 
intervention in the water-energy nexus, to be established in a new institutional order.   
One aspect of these transformations would be those introduced by the 1981 Water 
Code, to which I will turn in more depth in Chapter 6. Suffice to say here that the new code 
introduced freely tradable private property rights over water use separate from land (granted 
freely and in perpetuity to those that requested them); rights which, crucially, distinguished 
between consumptive and non-consumptive rights. The latter—which demanded the 
reincorporation of water back into the source—would be the legal form upon which hydropower 
pivoted; many times in tension with, if not at the expense of, the interests of those holding 
consumptive rights, and, even more acutely, of non-consumptive or in-stream non-commercial 
uses and relations to water, which find no adequate representation in the Water Code26 (Prieto 
& Bauer 2012). In the electricity sector, the neoliberal agenda would unfold in two phases: one 
of marketisation, and a subsequent one of privatisation (Bauer 2009). First, in 1982 the new 
Electricity Law was decreed, which aimed to restructure the sector in such a way as to introduce 
market dynamics into the system’s operation and development. This implied rolling back the 
vertical integration of the subsectors of generation, transmission, and distribution, in which, due 
to their respective technical characteristics, market principles would have to be applied 
differently27 (Ibid.). According to Bauer (2009), one of the things that characterises the Electricity 
Law’s relation to water is that within the regulatory and price-setting mechanisms it establishes 
for the generation subsector, water figures centrally as ‘stored energy’, mainly through the 
strategic role the reservoir system has in regulating supply. One of the consequences of this is 
that the price attributed to water-as-energy is defined by the opportunity costs it has, stored in 
reservoirs, in relation to alternative generation costs, which fluctuate with hydrological 
conditions. Thus, Bauer notes, “[t]he price of water, in other words, depends on the costs of 
energy and on hydrological estimates, but it does not reflect other demands or uses for water” 
                                               
26 These have been in fact further marginalised by the subsequent modifications introduced to the Code 
in 2005, which imposed a tax on non-use (ie. non-economically productive use) as a way of 
disincentivizing speculation. See Chapter 6.  
27 For a detailed account of Chile’s Electricity Law see Bauer 2009:615-626.  
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(2009:624). This implied an institutionally prescribed predominance of the water-energy nexus 
in relation to other aspects of the hydrosocial cycle; in practice, according to Bauer (2009), it is 
the Electricity Law that regulates watershed management in the country (cf. Prieto & Bauer 
2012).  
The bulk of the privatization phase took place during the last years of the Pinochet 
dictatorship, although it was only completed by the late 1990s. Once the restructuring of the 
sector along market lines was complete, state-owned Chilectra (and to a very limited extent 
Endesa) were partially subdivided into different companies which would operate within the 
different sub-sectors (generation, transmission, and distribution), and then be sold to private 
investors, the core of which corresponded to groups with close political (and even kinship) ties 
to the regime (Monckeberg 2015; Budds 2013). This was part of a wider process of privatization 
of state assets that reached into every sector of the economy, and, as Budds (2013) notes, 
cemented the post-dictatorial political influence of the technocratic cadres of the Pinochet 
regime through their direct control over the key sectors of the Chilean economy28 (see 
Monckeberg 2015).  
Although the vertical integration of the sector had been partially rolled back, the newly 
privatised companies still exerted an overbearing control over the different sub-sectors of the 
system, most notably Endesa, which after privatization, remained largely in control of most of 
the infrastructure and studies that had been produced by almost half a century of public 
investment, in addition to the company’s water rights, which at the time constituted the vast 
majority of the total non-consumptive rights in the country (Larraín 2010). If by the early nineties 
the main result of this first phase of the privatization process had been the transfer of the bulk 
of the country’s electrical infrastructure to mainly national groups and individuals politically 
aligned to the then departing regime (Budds 2013), this would change during the ensuing 
decade, as these groups would sell off the majority of these companies’ shares to transnational 
capital. In the case of Endesa, the majority of its shares were acquired in 1999 by Endesa-Spain 
S.A., and again sold years later to the Italian-owned ENEL (Larraín 2010).   
                                               
28 The extent of this influence would be attested by a series of corruption scandals in the past few years, 
were, for instance, SOQUIMICH, one of the country’s main mining conglomerates that upon privatisation 
had come under the control of Pinochet’s son-in-law, was revealed to have an extensive network of 
influence across the post-dictatorial political spectrum, articulated through illegal finance of campaigns, 
bribes, and other methods (Ramírez 2015). SOQUIMICH is by no means is an exception, but in all likelihood 
the tip of the iceberg of the informal networks that underpin the hegemonic bloc that was consolidated 
after Pinochet left power, the roots of which can be traced directly to the privatisation process.  
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By the turn of the century, it was abundantly clear that the process of neoliberalisation, 
in contrast to what was originally allegedly envisioned by its ideological architects—ie. getting 
the energy sector to function according to the ‘politically neutral’ logic of market competition 
(see Büchi 1993)—had led to an oligopolistic system in which three transnational companies 
held a firm grip on the generation sector as a whole. In 2009 (p. 142), the IEA reported that  
Thirty-five generation companies currently operate in the SIC. But the market is 
concentrated with almost 90% of the capacity belonging to three large holding companies: 
Endesa, AES Gener and Colbún. Endesa alone owns 50% of the SIC total installed capacity 
as well as 75% of water rights, while Colbún and AES Gener own another 40% of total 
installed capacity. Six generating companies currently operate in the SING. Again, the sector 
is concentrated: three companies (AES Gener, Gas Atacama and Suez/ CODELCO) own 
almost 95% of the SING total installed capacity.  
The changing geography of energy in the post-dictatorial period 
Beyond hydropower, one of the defining aspects of the post-dictatorship period was the rapid 
expansion of overall generation capacity—mirroring the fast rates in GDP growth that 
characterised this period—, an expansion that from the second half of the 1990s onwards 
became heavily reliant on fossil-fuel based thermal generation, in particular on new Argentinian 
gas imports, which upon arrival would cut electricity prices by as much as 50%, and shift almost 
all new investment into gas thermal plants (Fuentes et al. 2015). If by 1997 coal and oil based 
thermal generation had already reached just below 40% of the total (IEA 2009), as cheap natural 
gas began to flood the market, gas-based generation capacity grew even more rapidly, from 1% 
in 1997 to 33% in 2004 (Ibid.).  
 
 Figure 11. Electricity generation by source from 1973 to 2016, taken from IEA (2018:87). 
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This shift implied important transformations in the country’s energy geographies. As 
Andreas Malm has pointed out in his historical study on the origins of fossil capital (Malm 2016), 
fossil-based energy has particular characteristics that makes it especially amenable to the 
requirements of capital accumulation; namely, it provides a spatio-temporal flexibility that other 
energy sources lack. And hydropower surely presents major relative political and geographical 
challenges. As mentioned previously, hydropower in Chile is bound to the country’s very uneven 
distribution of water resources, and its hierarchical integration through large scale infrastructure 
and under the aegis of notions of national sovereignty that bear the weight of a remarkably 
violent history, and thus find uneven purchase across some of the country’s hydrologically rich 
areas. This is particularly true for the areas in which the most accessible hydropower potential 
is concentrated (Ministerio de Energía 2018), namely the south-central region, where state 
sovereignty was originally constituted through a genocidal campaign of military occupation and 
dispossession of indigenous lands—the memory of which still lingers in the region’s fraught 
social fabric, and its consequences evident in its characteristic forms of racial capitalism29 (Pulido 
2017) and its associated indigenous struggles for territorial and cultural reconstruction (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). I will return to these political aspects of hydropower in more detail below, 
and throughout this dissertation. Nevertheless, in the case of Chile, the geography of a fossil-
based generation system running on imports has proven to be no less problematic and 
uncertain. This was most acutely felt in 2004, when—after several years in which the sustained 
expansion of Argentinian natural gas in the energy mix had almost reached the point of 
dependency—, the Argentinian government, still battling with the the aftermath of the 
economic implosion the country had faced a few years earlier, took the decision of unilaterally 
restricting its exports to Chile in an effort to stabilise internal supply, creating an important 
trans-andean energy and diplomatic crisis (Huneeus 2007). As a consequence, according to the 
IEA (2018a:86), 
the natural gas supply in Chile decreased significantly in 2007 and its share in electricity 
generation dropped by 60%. To make things worse, Chile had a drought in 2007-08 in the 
central-south region, which reduced hydropower supply by 20%, or 6 TWh.  
One of the effects of this situation was the rapid growth in both coal and oil-based generation, 
which implied, between 2003 and 2008, an increase of 77% in CO2 emissions from electricity 
generation (IEA 2018a). By 2016, when the fieldwork for the present study was carried out, Chile 
had developed a generation system strongly based on fossil-fuels: 61% of the generation mix 
                                               
29 I.e. forms of capital accumulation which directly depend on the racial subordination of a particular 
group of people (Pulido 2017). 
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was fossil-based, 25% was hydropower, and the remaining was accounted mostly by biofuels 
and waste, complemented by a rapidly growing, but still minoritarian, share of wind and solar 
(ibid.). Coal had at this point become the largest single source of energy by far, accounting for 
41% of the total (ibid.).  
 
The Chilean energy crisis 
This situation has led to a protracted and politically resonant ‘energy crisis’ in Chile. After soaring 
at the peak of the gas crisis, and fluctuating strongly for a decade, up until 2016 electricity prices 
had not regained their pre-crisis levels (IEA 2018a), while at the same time investment in the 
sector stagnated. Although net electrical generation had increased dramatically since 1990, its 
growth rate had steadily fallen in the period between 1990 and 2010, and investment appeared 
to have increasing trouble keeping up with an ever growing demand fueled by the commodity 
boom (Corbo & Hurtado 2015). As the problem was dragged on from administration to 
administration, for Chilean elites it became increasingly clear that the electricity matrix was not 
fit for purpose, and talk about the ‘energy crisis’ the country faced began to make the rounds 
with increased frequency in mainstream media and political discourse. Reports were 
commissioned, think tanks mobilized, alarms raised, and fingers pointed from each side of the 
political spectrum. Perhaps most worryingly for the political elite, all of the most important 
organisations representing business interests at the national level repeatedly expressed their 
frustration in the media at the way high electricity prices were blunting the competitive edge of 
businesses operating in Chile30. Energy scholars Rudnick and Palma thus state that by 2014, 
when Michelle Bachelet took office for the second time, “there was a transversal national 
consensus on the fact that a crisis was being faced in the electrical development to provide for 
the needs of the Chilean economy” (2018:19, my translation).  
This crisis reached at the core of the political economy (and ecology) of the Chilean 
neoliberal project. Built as it is on the basis of the studious subordination of the country’s 
landscapes to the place accorded to them in the international division of labour31—in this case 
as a source of cheap raw materials; with mining, and copper in particular, at its centre—, the 
                                               
30 See for example the various statements expressed in a 2013 article published in La Tercera, one of the 
main national newspapers (Pérez-Cueto & Astudillo 2013).  
31 Chile is one of the countries with most trade agreements in force, currently counting at 26. See the 
website of Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales (Dirección General de Relaciones 
Económicas Internacionales n.d.). 
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Chilean political ecology, as that of much of the wider region, is deeply entangled with the trans-
pacific metabolism that has grown phenomenally during the twenty-first century around the 
Chinese industrial juggernaut (see Arboleda, Forthcoming). It is worth recalling that Chile is the 
main global copper producer, accounting for 27% of global supply, of which China consumes 
50% (Consejo Minero 2018). This world-historical metabolic shift towards an Asia-centred 
capitalist world-system has, if anything, reinforced the basic role raw material exports—ie. the 
structural role of ground-rent (Caligaris 2016)—in the Chilean economy, originally envisioned in 
the language of ‘comparative advantages’ by the ‘Chicago Boys’ in the eighties, as Lara Cortéz 
(2016:129, my translation) notes:  
… the growth in trade with China is immediately responsible for the mutations occurring in 
the export structure and the production model of the Chilean economy: it reinforces the 
reprimarization of the export sector, strengthens the importance of mining, and now, 
contributes to the decline of the manufacturing industry, especially the one dedicated to 
the production of consumer goods. 
Thus, in 2017 mining exports accounted for 55% of the country’s total, and represented an 
average of 14.9% of national GDP over the past decade, as well as being the most important 
sector of foreign direct investment, and traditionally one of the strategic sources of fiscal income 
(Consejo Minero 2018). The structural importance of mining, and copper in particular, is 
reflected in how the latter’s international prices are closely linked to the general profit rates of 
capital operating in Chile (Maito 2012). Regarding energy consumption, taken together, mining 
and industry consume 64% of the country’s electricity, with copper mining in particular 
accounting for around 30% of the national total (Consejo Minero 2018). This energy 
consumption currently accounts for around 10% of the industry’s operational costs (Ibid.), 
which, according to a recent industry report (EMIS 2016:49), are steadily rising as “the reduction 
in copper ore grades combined with the hardening of the mineral increased the energy usage 
for ore extraction by 35.8% per unit of copper content over the period 2010-2015”. 
This is why, for mainstream economists looking at Chile’s ‘energy problem’ such as 
Corbo and Hurtado (2015), the increasing inadequacy of the Chilean electrical system is crucially 
expressed in the fact that, relative to other structurally important producers of copper in the 
world market, Chilean electricity prices are inordinately high. In 2015 they projected that in 2020 
the cost of electricity for the mining industry would be almost twice as much as that in Peru, and 
60% higher than in the US. Thus, although extractive activities still report extraordinary rents for 
transnational mining corporations (see Sturla Zerene et al. 2018), if the sector is to increase or 
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sustain its competitive edge over the long term, electricity costs must come down—something 
that for the past decade the electricity matrix in Chile has been incapable of delivering.  
In the light of this, and given the pervasive acritical naturalisation of the notion of 
‘energy scarcity’ in media representations, hegemonic political discourse, and mainstream 
academic literature, it is important here to underscore that the crisis of ‘cheap energy’ (Moore 
2015) in Chile emerges relationally from the competitive pressures and growth expectations that 
drive the planetary valorisation circuits of extractive capital—circuits which in Chile find their 
national political articulation in the form of the neoliberalisation process, and its associated cycle 
of class decomposition/recomposition. The response to these conditions have thus to be 
understood as an aspect of what Massimo De Angelis (2007:40) terms the ‘conatus’ of self-
preservation of capital in the face of its constitutive strategic challenges. 
Bearing this structural determination of energy scarcity in mind, there were several 
conjunctural triggers for this crisis of cheap energy. The immediate one was the already 
mentioned dependence that had developed between 1995 and 2004 on Argentinian gas 
imports, the curtailment of which exacted upon the system a 400% rise in the marginal costs of 
electricity between January 2007 and March 2008 (Corbo & Hurtado 2015). The ensuing 
deepening of dependence on alternative fossil fuels, such as coal and diesel, left the electricity 
sector vulnerable to the steep rise in the prices of these commodities during the very period in 
which gas was being limited: between 2003 and 2008 the price of diesel rose by 500%, while 
coal rose by approximately 800% (Ibid.). On the other hand, the traditional hydropower base of 
the system started to be subjected to considerable stress around the same time, as a still 
ongoing ‘megadrought’ with no regional precedent in at least a millenium began to take its toll 
on the whole of the south-central region of the country from around 2010 (Centro de Ciencia 
del Clima y la Resiliencia 2015; Garreaud et al. 2017; Garreaud 2018). This has greatly impacted 
the system’s hydroelectricity generation capacities: stored water-energy in the system’s 
reservoirs steadily plunged (Rudnick et al. 2014), as well as its relative contribution to the total 
generation mix, and has opened up the question of what the future of hydropower might be in 
the context of the current and future regional effects of climate change. 
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Crisis of cheap energy, the ecoterritorial turn, and the political recomposition of social 
limits 
Nevertheless, the direct consequences of all of the above mentioned conditions (structural and 
conjunctural) were rising prices and a secure projected demand, both of which should, in theory, 
attract investment. The crucial question hovering over the ‘energy crisis’ was, in this sense, the 
failure of investment in generation capacity to keep up. In 2013 a report on this issue 
commissioned by the Confederation of Production and Commerce32 stated that: 
In contrast to previous episodes of investment deficit, this one does not originate in 
regulatory failings that disincentivize investment. On the contrary, the regulatory 
framework, macroeconomic and sectoral, and the attractive price conditions have 
generated great interest to invest. … What is happening is that realising projects is 
increasingly harder and costly due to the increasing environmental and citizen opposition 
they face. In the best of cases projects get done with long delays ... other times these are 
paralyzed completely by decisions of the Executive or Judicial Power. … The judicialisation 
is a growing phenomenon, that affects all kinds of projects—big and small, thermal and 
renewable—in all of the territory, which is making projects more expensive, generating 
juridical uncertainty regarding environmental qualification resolutions, investment delay, 
and, in some cases, even their cancelation. (Bernstein et al. 2013:3, my translation) 
Indeed, by that time, conflict was an issue that had become almost inevitably associated with 
the energy sector in general—any energy project could reasonably expect to have to face local, 
at times national, opposition, which could often throw a project into a morass of lawsuits and 
challenges. Report upon report on the pressing issue of ‘stalling investment’ seems to reach 
similar conclusions, in which much of the problem lies in “the emergence of demands that, in 
previous years, were not expressed openly or massively”, as a report by the Institute of 
Engineers put it (IIC 2016:7). In 2012 Bernardo Larrain Matte, at the time president of Colbún—
one of the three main hydropower companies—succinctly described to a seminar of industrial 
and business representatives the nature of the challenges he faced in the appropriate argot: 
The problem [in materialising investments] is on the non-market context. We have seen 
how different campaigns have been organised against different generation initiatives: a 
wind farm in Chiloé, a run-of-the-river plant in Achibueno, the HydroAysén project, and 
                                               
32 Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio, CPC, the country’s main organisation representing 
business interests on all sectors of the economy. 
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thermal plants in the III and IV region. Maybe tomorrow we will witness a campaign on 
‘Atacama Desert without Solar Panels'33. 
This problematic non-market element is something that would have scarcely surprised Karl 
Polanyi, who already in 1944 famously described how the relentless expansion of 
commodification upon land and labour (and, here one might add, water) can only unfold as a 
‘double movement’ in which this encroachment is at every turn shadowed and confronted by a 
countermovement fueled by the imperative of protecting social reproduction from the tempest 
of market forces (Polanyi 2001 [1944]); a countermovement that can take multiple social forms 
across history. In this case, the keystone of the water-energy-mining nexus that underpin 
extractive operations in Chile is the above mentioned 1981 Water Code, which made water 
rights a tradable commodity separated from land. As previously mentioned, the 
commodification of the hydro-social cycle—ie. the enclosure of the country’s waterscapes—
must be understood as a crucial political-ecological dimension of the national process of class 
rule recomposition; the flip side of the violent decomposition of the working classes upon which 
the new, neoliberal, accumulation strategies were premised. This obliteration of the political 
and material capacities for popular territorial control against capital enabled the Chilean 
neoliberal experiment to introduce an unprecedented variation on the old Wittfogelian 
problematic of the relation between power and water34: a form of hydrosocial power the 
totalitarian nature of which resides precisely in the way it regards itself as being beyond politics, 
in the purportedly ‘apolitical’ realm of market transactions (eg. Büchi 1993). Unsurprisingly, the 
almost unmediated identification of the control over the waterscape with the control over 
money and capital has had the effect of concentrating water rights across the country (Larraín 
2010), a fact that lays bare the class dimension of this postpolitical articulation of hydrosocial 
power. This class power is mounted upon the way in which, at least in theory, exchangeability 
and separation from land titles allows for the law of value to mould the hydrosocial cycle to a 
larger extent that had been hitherto possible: in addition to gravity, water flow was to follow 
value determinations as close as possible—it would, its proponents argue, flow into its ‘highest-
value uses’35 (Briscoe 1996); in effect, mining, export agribusiness, and hydropower (Larraín 
2010). Needless to say, the innumerable use values that water acquires as it flows through the 
                                               
33 Translated from an article in the national newspaper, El Mercurio (Herrera 2012). In his last example, 
he is making reference to the name of the high-profile campaign against the patagonian megadams, 
‘Patagonia sin Represas’.  
34 On the analysis of this problematic in other contexts, see for example Worster 1992 and Swyngedouw 
2015. 
35  But see Prieto 2016 for an account of how in practice the vernacular use values of water often distort 
this process. 
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concrete lives and relations that make up the hydrosocial cycle and social reproduction find no 
effective representation or recognition in this context.  
However, far from doing away with class antagonisms and the inherent politicity of the 
hydrosocial cycle, neoliberalisation only set new terms for their recomposition in novel forms—
a growing social conflictivity that the neoliberal institutionality has demonstrated to be 
completely unable to process effectively, and has steadily grown to become a nationwide 
political problem (Bauer 2015); Larrain 2010). As if under a Polanyian curse, the neoliberal state 
has found itself faced with a hydrosocial cycle characterised more by conflict than by the world 
of efficient market transactions it was meant to oversee—indeed, unlike the former, the latter 
have shone by their relative rarity and geographical confinement to particular river basins and 
hydrological conditions (Baeza Gómez 2018; Bauer 2004). As Carl Bauer notes, during the period 
since 2005—when the Water Code was superficially reformed, and the energy crisis was 
beginning to take shape—“water conflicts became the dominant theme in debate rather than 
water markets, which had been the dominant theme since the 1990s” (Bauer 2015:159). This 
lack of effective institutional mediation of the problematic ‘non market’ element Larraín Matte 
alluded to—a consequence of the exceptionally radical nature of the Chilean neoliberal reforms, 
internally related to the effacement of the political by the authoritarian state—, has led to the 
often mentioned phenomenon of ‘judicialisation’ in which investment projects frequently 
become entangled. In a more abstract sense, all of this is hardly surprising given the neoclassical 
conceptions of social value—ie. ‘aggregate utility’—that underpin the neoliberal institutional 
field, which rest on the spurious ideological conflation between the value that water acquires 
by virtue of its quantitative fungibility in the market economy and the multiple use value(s) it 
acquires through its embeddedness in social reproduction and its mediating cultural forms and 
moral economies—ie. the conflation of water’s exchange-value and its use value36 (cf. Badeen 
& Murray 2016; see Chapter 2), a cleavage that constitutes the very structure of the 
commodification process, and underlies the hydrosocial constitution of class power. The 
commodification of the waterscape has in effect extended and intensified this basic 
contradiction across the hydrosocial cycle, which, due to the lack of effective institutional 
                                               
36 Eg. “The value of water to a user is the maximum amount the user would be willing to pay for the use 
of the resource” (Briscoe 1996:5). From the neoclassical perspective that underlies the Water Code (and 
pretty much every other aspect of the model designed by the Chicago Boys), there is in principle no 
reason for the market not being able to express the social value of water adequately, as the market is 
understood to be merely the aggregate expression of individual choices ideally converging in aggregate 
utility maximization: “[F]or society as a whole, welfare is maximized when: 
- water is priced at its marginal cost and 
- water is used until the marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit.” (Briscoe 1996:4) 
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mediation, is now expressed politically in the systematic conflict that now characterises the 
hydrosocial dimension of the Chilean neoliberal order.  
This has led to the gradual convergence of many territorial struggles across the country 
around the issue of water. In 2010, Sara Larraín, a prominent Chilean environmentalist, wrote 
in the introduction to a national compendium of water conflicts in Chile that   
In this context [of the concentration of water rights in the extractive economy], there have 
emerged over the last years multiple water conflicts, which in the northern region mostly 
pit indigenous and peasant communities against mining. In the central region, it confronts 
local communities and peasants against agribusiness, water companies, and hydropower. 
In the southern region, agriculturalists, tourism enterprises, fishers, and indigenous 
communities confront mainly the pulp industry and hydropower. All of these conflicts … 
have created many organisations; and recently a national articulation for the defense of 
water, constituted by social organisations, indigenous organisations, unions, churches, 
agriculturalists, consumers and local communities affected by overexploitation, scarcity, or 
pollution of water and the natural systems that harbor it. (Larraín 2010:37-38, my 
translation) 
Thus the dialectical unfolding of the neoliberal regime of accumulation has in this sense outlined 
a geography of struggle in which socio-ecological spaces appear torn between two internally 
related dimensions: the operations of a globally articulated law of value (expressed in the 
relative supremacy of the geographies of ground-rent and the related operations of extractive 
capitalism), and the multiple layers of a use-value dimension that through concrete practices of 
dwelling (Ingold 1993) make of these spaces places of meaning, identity, history, and futurity—
i.e. give socio-ecologies their cultural forms and definite social meanings. In this context, and 
given the institutional incapacity to mediate this contradiction, the demand for the recuperation 
of water as a ‘common good’ has emerged as one of the broadest unifying elements around 
which the antagonisms immanent to the ecological dimensions of the neoliberal order have 
become recomposed over the past few decades (see Larraín & Poo 2010; cf. Budds 2018). 
The energy sector has been particularly significant in this process. Not only does it 
concentrate, according to the National Institute for Human Rights (INDH)37, the largest 
proportion of socio-ecological conflicts in the country with 38% of the cases they have 
registered, but it has also been the arena for some of the most emblematic and politically 
                                               
37 See the INDH map of environmental conflicts available at: https://mapaconflictos.indh.cl/ (Instituto 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos n.d.) 
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resonant struggles of the past decades. First, the case of Endesa’s Ralco hydropower dam on the 
Bio-Bío river was particularly significant, as it involved one of the earliest and most protracted 
struggles—which stretched throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s—and directly 
involved the thorny issue of indigenous rights in Chile, as it flooded thousands of hectares of 
indigenous lands, displaced several communities, and destroyed burial grounds (Orellana 2005). 
This struggle was notorious for several reasons. In the first place, it laid bare the deep 
entanglements between the political ecology of neoliberalism and the racially-mediated 
oppression of the Mapuche people: in it the government exerted considerable pressure to get 
the project approved despite its dubious legality, in effect establishing the preeminence of the 
Electricity Law vis-a-vis the guarantees that the Indigenous Law gave for indigenous territories 
(Namuncura 1999). Furthermore, the state applied the infamous Antiterrorist Law—inherited 
from the Pinochet dictatorship—to imprison Mapuche leaders who had participated in direct 
actions against the project (El Mercurio 2002). Although ultimately lost—the dam entered into 
operation in 2004, turning the valley into a lake in which, tragically, one of the most visible local 
Pehuenche leaders of the resistance, Nicolasa Quintreman, would drown in 201338—, the 
struggle played a very important role in placing the issue of Indigenous rights in the national 
debate, exposing with unusual clarity the racist underpinnings of the Chilean neoliberal project 
and its associated modes of statecraft, and in contributing to the experience, consciousness, and 
articulation of both the indigenous and socio-ecological movements and organisations that had 
converged in the resistance.  
The extent to which these front of struggles matured over the ensuing decade, how they 
had managed to gradually make significant gains on the cultural and political terrain, I think is 
illustrated by another high-profile struggle around hydropower—that concerning the 
HidroAysén mega-project. HidroAysen was a joint venture by Endesa and Colbún, which, had 
the project materialised, would have ended up controlling around 80% of the national electricity 
supply. It involved the estimated investment of 3.2 billion dollars in five hydropower plants in 
the Aysén region of Chilean Patagonia, which would generate around 2750 megawatts of 
electricity (Romero Toledo 2014; Reyes Herrera & Rodríguez Torrent 2015). This made it the 
biggest energy project in the history of the country, without even taking into account the 
transmission infrastructure that it implied, which would have stretched 2400 kilometres to 
connect the hydropower plants to the SIC—one of the largest electrical transmission lines in the 
world (ibid.). This project was confronted with an unexpectedly broad opposition, which in 
                                               
38 See Osses 2013. 
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2011—after the government provisionally approved the project—brought between 50,000 and 
100,000 people to the streets in Santiago, the opening salvo in the intense cycle of mobilisations 
that year that would be led by the student movement and its demands (Zibechi 2012a). The daily 
newspaper La Tercera reported in that same year that 73% of the population opposed the 
project. In part due to the place that the Patagonia region has in the international geographies 
of conservation and tourism, and the associated alliances and resources that this gave the 
opposition movement, the struggle upscaled to the international arena with unexpected 
resonance39. At a local level, opposition to this project articulated with long-standing grievances 
around the marginalisation, neglect, and political disenfranchisement of regions such as Aysén, 
which in February and March 2012 exploded into a broad and spontaneous social movement 
that blockaded access to the main cities, repeatedly clashed with the police, and raised several 
demands that aimed to redress the neglect of local economic conditions on the part of the 
central government (Zibechi 2012b; Cuadra Montoya 2012). After the conflict dragged on for 
several years, in 2014, the incoming government of Michelle Bachelet rescinded the project’s 
approval, and in 2017 the companies behind the project finally desisted and declared the end of 
the project.   
What these cases show is how the particular antagonisms expressed in socio-
environmental struggles in general—and those related to energy in particular—have frequently 
overlapped and articulated in complex ways with the multiple grievances that the Chilean 
neoliberalisation process has left in its wake; in the above cases, those related to indigenous 
specificity vis-a-vis the state and the neoliberal economic order, and the local hardships 
associated with the neoliberal intensification of processes of uneven geographical development 
expressed in the concentration of economic and political power in Santiago and its elite, and the 
relative erosion of regional economies and their political capacities for self-management. Also, 
when these conflicts manage to break into the national scale, the projects in question are forced 
to enter an ideological battle over the public perception of whose interests are served by them, 
in a cultural field marked by an intensifying climate of delegitimation of political and economic 
elites (Ruiz Encina 2015). This was an issue that was clear enough in the cultural battle waged 
around HidroAysen: in it, both sides symmetrically framed the issue around opposite 
mobilisations of the notions of ‘common good’ and ‘particular interests’—a constestation 
                                               
39 For instance, in 2011, the New York Times published an editorial characterising the eventual 
construction of the project as an “irreparable mistake”. See The New York Times 2011 
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project supporters had difficulty winning, as proven by the sustained majoritarian opposition to 
the project40.  
In this sense, and in general terms, these struggles are fueled by the ways in which the 
expansion of extraction frontiers articulate with and add to the long-standing and complex 
texture of grievances that constitute the Chilean geographies of uneven development. One of 
the characteristics of this historical moment—not only in the case of the Chile, but indeed 
throughout the different national modalities of what Maristella Svampa has called the 
‘commodity consensus’ in the region (Svampa 2012)—has been the positioning of the eco-
territorial dimensions of accumulation as one of the most dynamic fields for the political 
recomposition of social antagonism, as the extractive economy effects new forms of political 
subjectivation on the territories it is deployed (Ibid.). As the experience of both defeat and 
victory accumulate in organisations and social relations, as alliances and networks are 
consolidated and analyses mature, and as cultural and political terrain is gained and broader 
bases for solidarity are solidified in both consciousness and practice, these movements 
increasingly constitute themselves as an eminently political limit within global capitalism’s 
regions of extraction (cf. Webber 2014).  
In 2015, the Latin American Observatory of Environmental Conflicts (OLCA) organised a 
gathering of over 40 organisations emergent from different socio-ecological struggles from all 
over Chile, which shared the common aim of “overcoming extractivism” (OLCA 2016:4). In it, 
these organisations discussed what they considered had been the main advances in their 
struggles throughout the years. Among the issues listed (OLCA 2016:6-23) were: 
● The consolidation of the demand for “water as a common good” as a central element in 
all their struggles, and the positioning of this issue in the national debate. 
● Substantial gains in the development of local experience, knowledge, and support 
networks for the use of the legal institutionality and administrative processes to defend 
their territories, and to place their demands on the regional, and at times national, 
agenda. 
                                               
40 The campaign in favour framed the issue around how the project aimed to address the energy needs 
of the country as a whole, and how opposition to it was being funded by many foreign organisations and 
actors with no interest in the country’s development. The campaign against it, on the other hand, 
highlighted the issues of monopoly control over energy, and of Patagonia’s exuberant nature as a common 
heritage threatened by the narrow commercial interests of energy monopolies (cf. Romero & Sasso 2014).  
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● The growing density of the network of alliances that support struggles. These have been 
distinctly multiscalar, and include alliances with local organisations such as Neighbours 
Councils, social movements addressing other social demands at a national level—such 
as students—, international organisations which can take the struggle to the countries 
of origin of extractive interests (as in the case of Canadian mining companies), and the 
building of regional or watershed-based networks. All of this has given local struggles 
the capacity to circulate across different scales, and counteract their confinement to the 
local scale (see Svampa 2012).  
As one concrete example of this growing density, the meeting also highlighted the important 
role that the national network “Social Movement for the Recuperation of Water and Life” 
[Movimiento Social por la Recuperación del Agua y la Vida] has played in coordinating a very 
wide range of conflicts across most of the country, organising national meetings, and organising 
demonstrations in different cities, always placing the issue of water as a common good at the 
forefront41.  
This illustrates just one facet of a long process of political recomposition internally 
related to the form of rentier capitalism that characterises the ‘commodity consensus’, a more 
complete picture of which would require an examination of its internal relations to urban 
movements, the expansion of the role of debt in social reproduction, precarisation of labour, 
rural semi-proletarianisation, and the different aspects that characterise the general social 
composition of the working class under neoliberalism. Here, however, it is important to 
understand how this aspect of the process political recomposition attempts—and to some 
extent has achieved—to constitute itself as a social and political limit to the pressures placed by 
extractive accumulation upon social-ecological reproduction at the extractive frontier. And it is 
this is process which appears, in fetishised terms, as a crisis of ‘cheap energy’, and low sectoral 
investment rates.  
 
Energy revolution?  
In 2014 Michelle Bachelet assumed power for the second, non-consecutive, time. The previous 
government, headed by right-wing billionaire Sebastián Piñera, not only had to face the 
apparent defeat of HidroAysen in the arena of public opinion, but more generally, in 2011, his 
                                               
41 Indeed, I had the opportunity to attend one of this network’s meetings and a demonstration in 
Temuco during my fieldwork, in early 2016.  
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government had to deal with the most intense cycle of social mobilisations since the end of the 
dictatorship, which triggered a protracted crisis of hegemony that has not been politically 
resolved to date. Led by student organisations, the movement was able to articulate the 
material experience of mass indebtedness and the misery of public education in a clearly anti-
neoliberal direction, which managed to break the ideological levee and place under public 
discussion some of the basic tenets of the neoliberal project that dominated the country for 
almost four decades. Bachelet tried to capitalise on this social discontent, and through 
broadening her coalition to the left (it notably brought in the Communist Party, which included 
some of the most emblematic student leaders among its militants), her campaign presented a 
programme of reforms that promised to address some of the demands that the mobilisations 
had raised. As it happened, this coalition—in which most of the key players had been the very 
architects of the ‘democratic adaptation’ of the neoliberal order after Pinochet—would become 
bogged down in its own lack of a concerted political will to push through the very reforms it had 
run on, as many of its core forces showed no discernible intention of undermining a system they 
themselves had invested the best part of the past three decades in polishing. By the end of her 
term in 2018, although the government had managed to push through some reforms, what had 
really characterised the governing coalition was its lack of a coherent unifying vision, and the 
way in which a range of high-profile scandals42 laid bare how over the past twenty-odd years the 
traditional political elite—on both its left and right factions—had unsurprisingly developed 
deeply rooted vested interests in preserving the status quo. That year, Bachelet would give 
power back to her predecessor, Sebastian Piñera, once again. 
Although in this context many right and left considered Bachelet’s government to have 
ultimately been a failure, there was one area in which the majority of the political and economic 
elite recognised that Bachelet had achieved a breakthrough—energy. Indeed, by the end of 
Bachelet’s term, the crisis described above seemed to have been, at least for the time being, 
solved. During her term, the sector had become the leading investment destination in the whole 
of the Chilean economy—albeit partly due to the slump in mining investments after the end of 
the commodity boom—, electricity prices had dropped substantially, and the rapid growth in 
alternative renewable sources (mainly solar and wind) had attenuated the oligopolistic 
character of energy generation described above (Núñez 2018; Pacheco 2018). In fact, the shifts 
                                               
42 Many corruption cases affected the Chilean political class as a whole during those years, but perhaps 
most illustrative of all was in the rather scandalous fact that Bachelet’s own Socialist Party (the erstwhile 
party of Salvador Allende) was revealed to hold shares on some of the main companies privatised by 
Pinochet which the government was supposed to regulate, which included mining, water utilities, and 
energy. (CIPER 2017)  
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in Chile’s electrical sector had drawn an important measure of international praise: in 2017 both 
the New York Times and the Washington Post ran cover stories on “Chile’s energy 
transformation” (Londoño 2017) and the “Solar Saudi Arabia” (Miroff 2017), respectively, and 
the rapid proliferation of solar farms over the Atacama Desert served as one of the upbeat notes 
of Al Gore’s otherwise gloomy 2017 documentary “Inconvenient Sequel”43. The main issue 
behind this international notoriety had been the rapid expansion of solar energy capacity, built 
upon the exceptional conditions of the Atacama Desert, which has the highest and most stable 
levels of solar irradiation in the world (Palma & Pacheco 2018; Rebolledo 2018; IEA 2018b). In 
less than three years—from January 2014 to November 2017—solar power generation capacity 
rose from 6.7 to 1,769 MW (Palma & Pacheco 2018:542); and presently accounts for 9.18% of 
national generation capacity (Comisión Nacional de Energía 2018), a proportion that, although 
still far behind coal, is set to keep growing. These developments were in part premised on the 
integration of the northern regions of the country to the centres of national demand in the 
central part, through the establishment during this period of the National Electrical System 
(SEN), which interconnected the northern SING and the central SIC. All of this was also explicitly 
situated in a longer-term vision which aimed to develop the country’s power generation capacity 
with an eye on the energy integration with other countries in South America; integration that is 
currently envisioned in multilateral initiatives such as the Andean Electrical Interconnection 
System (SINEA) (Estévez 2018), which in turn develop in the context of the more encompassing 
infrastructural vision outlined by the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in 
South America (IIRSA/COSIPLAN)44 (CEPAL 2014; Zibechi 2006). In this emerging context, the 
geopolitical meaning of the vast expanses of the Atacama Desert has been transformed45: as the 
then head of international affairs of the Energy Ministry summarised it, “just 5% of the Atacama 
Desert could supply 30% of South America’s electricity demand” (Estévez 2018:236).  
In no small measure, these shifts expressed the previously described political limits 
encountered by the terms that had hitherto mediated the expansion of the energy frontier in 
                                               
43 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnXhTggl3RE 
44 The IIRSA can be seen the infrastructural expression of what Svampa (2012) calls the ‘commodity 
consensus’: it has managed to enroll under a common vision—that of deepening the efficiency and extent 
of the region’s subordination to the demands placed upon it by the international division of labour—
otherwise politically dissimilar, even hostile, governments across the region. Many of its multiple projects 
have faced intense internal opposition, sometimes with important political consequences, such as the 
struggles around the TIPNIS case in Bolivia (see Webber 2014).   
45 This is in addition to the fact that the region also holds the world’s largest lithium deposits, which are 
a strategic component of batteries and new energy storage systems.  
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Chile46 (cf. Baquedano 2018). These limits were perhaps most clearly manifested in the ultimate 
defeat of HidroAysén, in which the country's economic and political elite—the great majority of 
whom had strongly supported the project—had encountered a steadfast and broad opposition 
that made their infrastructural vision simply unfeasible (Ibid.). By the beginning of Bachelet’s 
term, it had become clear for many among the political elite that the problems of the system 
would not be simply solved by building HidroAysén or any other megaproject—it was not a 
problem simply of adding megawatts to the system, but one about political and social conditions 
that had become unmanageable under the way the neoliberal institutional apparatus had been 
operating. For the new Energy Minister, Máximo Pacheco—a former business executive of 
centre-left political leanings—, at the heart of the energy issue was the need for a 
reconceptualisation of the state’s role in the sector, repositioning it as the main agent in the 
urgent process of mediating the multiple conflicts that from his perspective crippled energy 
development in Chile, and in generating a national long term vision for the sector, which free-
market fundamentalism had omitted out of principle. In his own words,  
“Energy is too important to be left exclusively to market forces”. That was the premise I 
started working with, recognising the legitimacy of repositioning the realm of the public in 
our society, with a State bearing the main responsibility for the common good. Yes, the 
State can do it. This State looks to be closer to the citizenry and understands that its main 
responsibility is to build an energy policy with social legitimacy, dialogue and participation. 
A State that distances itself from the commercial interests of businesses, which have their 
focus on profit, without consideration for the value and social impact of their works47. 
(Pacheco 2018:554, my translation) 
For Pacheco, the crux of the solution to the energy issue in Chile was to reposition the state in a 
political role of mediator—rather than enforcer—, so as to create the ‘social legitimation’ that 
energy investments lacked, and that ‘the market’ by itself had proven unable to deliver. The way 
the new administration proposed to achieve this was, on the one hand, by an institutional 
reform of the Energy Ministry—for example, opening a Division of Participation and Social 
Dialogue—and, more broadly, by developing “a long-term Energy Policy, that will be validated 
by the Chilean citizens through a participatory and regional process” (Ministerio de Energía 
                                               
46 Indeed, aside from its exceptional solar radiation levels, perhaps one of the great geographical 
advantages of the Atacama desert that gets hardly ever mentioned, is its extremely sparse population; a 
factor that, one can hypothesise, has given solar power a great competitive advantage vis-a-vis 
hydropower which in Chile has to navigate a much more difficult social and cultural terrain. 
47 Of course, here Pacheco is here presumably referring to the oligopolistic concerns of energy companies. 
What this language obscures is the structural relation between the systemic imperative of profitability 
and the social determinations of energy demand and scarcity.   
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2014:17). In 2014 the Ministry of Energy thus launched a process to build a long term energy 
strategy under the name “Energía 2050”. The initiative included  
four development stages and three participation segments. These cover participation at a 
political-strategic level with an Advisory Committee; at a technical level with sector experts 
involved in energy and thematic panels; and at a public level encompassing the entire 
population with a public platform, discussion workshops and public consultations 
(Ministerio de Energía 2015:33)  
The Ministry invited 27 people and organisations to be part of the Advisory Committee, which 
were deemed to be representative of the different key social actors and interests involved. 
These included representatives from different industry associations, other Ministries of the 
government, academics, and NGOs (Bustos et al. 2018). The discussions and decisions of this 
Committee were to incorporate the discussions emergent from the participatory workshops that 
would take place across the country, which would in turn cover around ten different themes, 
ranging from hydroelectricity, to indigenous issues, associativity schemes, and land use planning 
(Ibid.). This process led to the publication in 2016 of the 146-page-long ‘Energía 2050’ document, 
which defined four pillars of energy policy, and a range of strategic goals that, the initiative held, 
would adequately express a broad national consensus. 
This initiative thus aimed at reconfiguring the political stalemate on which the expansion 
of the energy frontier had been entangled for the best part of the last decade. The context posed 
a difficult problem for many national NGOs, local communities, and movements that had been 
opposing projects. Some of the most high profile organisations that had been invited to be part 
of the Advisory Committee, such as the Council for the Defense of Patagonia, ultimately refused 
to participate, as they were very conscious of the risk of their presence merely legitimating a 
process in which the interests of energy companies—structurally consolidated in all other 
aspects of the legal and institutional order, such as environmental, energy, and water law—
would ultimately prevail (see Liberona 2017; Larraín et al. 2016). Nevertheless, many of these 
organisations did participate in the regional workshops, as a way to influence the discussion. 
This also proved problematic, as being present and able to influence these discussions in any 
meaningful way stretched beyond the human and financial resources of many organisations and 
communities, due to the great number of themes, meetings, and their geographic dispersion. In 
this sense, some denounced the very design of the process of participation as exclusionary, as it 
did not adequately consider the deep asymmetries in resources, access to information, mobility, 
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and political power of the different sectors the process sought to bring together; and that these 
asymmetries risked being represented as spurious consensuses (Larraín et. al. 2016).  
In the case of the Araucanía region—in which the area of study of this dissertation is 
located—the process was also strongly questioned by regional organisations, as the Ministry's 
narrative of participation was undermined by Minister Pacheco’s own repeated statements 
about the huge project portfolio he had in store for the region—about which there had been no 
consultation with local communities, or Municipal governments (Red en Defensa de los 
Territorios 2016)—and the way in which the central government had pushed through the 
approval of a hydropower project (Doña Alicia) against its initial rejection by regional authorities 
(Comisión de Evaluación... 2016). The alienating effect of these issues was compounded by the 
reported failure of the Ministry to adequately inform many communities actively engaged in 
conflicts with hydropower projects of the meetings (Mapuexpress 2015b). Indeed, and as I was 
able to witness during my fieldwork, from the point of view of many organisations and localities 
engaged in ongoing conflicts, the discourse surrounding this process—around conciliation, 
respect, and a new relation to the state—contrasted strikingly with the simultaneous intensified 
encroachment of energy companies upon their territories48 (Mapuexpress 2015a; see Chapter 
7)—a direct outcome of the Ministry’s frantic efforts to boost investment (see Núñez 2018; see 
below). This was something at the time taking place in and through the old relations of racist 
subaltenisation and accumulation by dispossession institutionally enabled by, among other 
things, the Water Code and the System of Environmental Impact Assessment. These 
mechanisms, which express in institutional form the structural character of the power wielded 
by energy companies described earlier, fell largely out of the purview of the discussions around 
the energy agenda, even though they are intimately linked to the way the sector operates in 
practice, and lie at the root of many of the movement and organisations’ demands, as they have 
been shown, according to national human rights organisations, to systematically violate the 
rights of indigenous people to free prior and informed consent, and the Chilean state’s own 
commitments under the 169 ILO Convention (Castro Garrido et. al. 2016; cf. Kelly-Richards et al. 
2017). As much as Pacheco considered those issues to “be history”, and that he was looking to 
“have another approach” (Álvarez 2015), the fact remained that for communities engaged in 
struggles at the energy frontier his Ministry was expanding, these were indeed very much alive 
in the everyday concrete experience of their ecologies and of their relationship to the state, and 
                                               
48 In 2015 there were 66 hydropower projects in different stages of development in the region (Castro 
Garrido et. al. 2016). 
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the apparent lack of proper acknowledgement seemed for many of those I talked to 
manipulative and disingenuous.  
In institutional terms, this tension between the process of participation and the 
simultaneous intensification of the energy frontier was expressed in the fact that at the same 
time as the Ministry opened its Division of Participation and Social Dialogue, it also opened its 
Project Management Unit, the main objective of which was “the promotion of investment in 
energy infrastructure” (Núñez 2018:482). Both instances shared the general aim of facilitating 
the materialisation of investments, and ultimately lowering prices. In addition to the new Unit 
facilitating the administrative processing of projects, the Ministry introduced reforms to the 
bidding processes and made an intense campaign of international promotion to attract new 
companies (Núñez 2018). 
At a deeper level, all of this reflected the contradictions of the ‘green growth’ discourse 
driving the new Ministry’s approach, perhaps more clearly manifest in the tension between its 
ostensible openness to “the participation of every individual, community and entity … to 
establish a long-term policy that represents all Chileans” (Ministerio de Energía 2015:32), and 
the non-negotiable—indeed, naturalised—character of the policy’s ultimate aim: that of the 
energy sustenance of the Chilean model of extraction-driven growth. In the context of the social 
hierarchies that constitute the latter, the unproblematised notion of “all Chileans” that 
underpinned the process only served to further mystify the political problem of the energy 
frontiers it sought to address; which in effect made of the notion of “participation” it mobilised 
little more than a more flexible and refined form of (post-)political regulation (cf. Swyngedouw 
2011) of the dialectics of domination and resistance in the energy frontier. In practice, the field 
of discussion the Ministry aimed to establish was limited to how and in what terms the energy 
frontier was to expand, not to whether this expansion fitted the priorities of local communities, 
their needs, their conceptions of the future, or the particular relations they held with their lands 
and waterscapes. Indeed, these latter aspects cut against the grain of the fragmentation that 
characterises the institutional apparatus in which the participation process was embedded: it 
necessarily involved the issue of water, the relative power of local communities over a land use 
planning process hegemonised by oligopolistic interests, the relation of the state to indigenous 
peoples, among other issues; a complexity that the Ministry—as the institutional expression of 
this fragmentation—was structurally unable to address. This was illustrated in the fact that when 
the truly core issues at play in the ‘energy problem’ from the point of view of indigenous 
peoples—such as water rights, the binding character of consultation processes, or their 
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constitutional recognition as distinct peoples—were raised on the workshops for the Indigenous 
chapter of the energy policy, these were all confined to an Annex entitled “Other demands of 
participants in the process of participation that exceed the competences of the Energy Ministry” 
(Ministerio de Energía 2017:83).  
This particular delimitation of the political field implied in the production of energy 
frontiers effected by the participation process was expressed by the way Pacheco described his 
approach: “energy development could only be achieved if it was made ‘with’ the citizenry, not 
‘for’, ‘despite of’, or, even less, ‘against’ it.” (Pacheco 2018:558) Here, of course, all the political 
questions relevant to the energy frontier—what are the social priorities and values that drive 
this frontier, which social relations and hierarchies does this frontier serve to reproduce and 
nurture, what are the alternatives, if any, to all of the above, and what is the relation between 
this frontier and the notion of sustainability it constantly invokes, to mention a few—lie black-
boxed in the keyword ‘energy development’. As Lohmann and Hildyard note, borrowing from 
Raymond Williams, ‘energy’ constitutes a particularly powerful ‘keyword’ in capitalist ecologies, 
which functions as “a slippery abstraction that trains people into holding certain political biases 
without their being aware of it” (Lohmann & Hildyard 2014:19). Here, in the unproblematised 
notion of ‘energy development’, is included the unproblematised notion of the the economic 
order that defines the forms and magnitudes of the former, and the cultural-political forms of 
subalternisation it needs to deploy to materialise—in this case the negation of the right to self-
determination of the peoples inhabiting frontier spaces (see Castro Garrido et. al. 2016; Kelly et. 
al. 2017); a right that, were it to be recognised, would necessary bring all these questions onto 
the table. I will return to these themes empirically in Chapter 7.      
 
The reconfiguration of the hydropower frontier: small-scale hydropower as spatial fix 
In the new context delineated by Energía 2050, hydropower retained its strategic role, in 
particular as the basis for the regulation of the variable energy provided by sources such as solar 
and wind farms. The Energía 2050 document explains that: 
Hydroelectricity emerges as an important source in all the scenarios analyzed. It is 
important to increase the level of hydroelectricity to enable a greater penetration from 
variable sources, adding flexibility to the grid and minimizing emissions and costs. Although 
there will be increasing technological alternatives for energy storage, the advantage of 
hydroelectricity in terms of costs and availability as a domestic resource is significant. In a 
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country with a good potential for storing energy in reservoirs, the possibilities of their use 
should be explored to the maximum extent possible… (Ministerio de Energía 2015:71) 
As a range of organisations observed (Codeff, et. al. 2016:7), this regulatory function mostly 
refers to the reservoir system, which implied that the prospect of new large-scale dams still 
loomed over the new Energy policy, even as the explicit mention of this was avoided in the 
document. This silence was in a sense not surprising, as hydropower became one, if not the most 
contentious issue during the participatory process; so much so that the discussion of the topic 
was treated separately by the Ministry, and its results published a year after Energía 2050. The 
people who participated in the organisation of the whole process called it ‘the H word’, as in the 
first phases of the Advisory Committee discussions explicit mention of it was avoided for fear of 
narrowing the grounds for consensus too soon (Bustos et. al. 2018:361). Nicola Borregaard, who 
at the time was the Chief of the Sustainable Development Division of the Ministry of Energy, 
writes that the issue 
[w]as left as a pending dialogue in the Energía 2050 policy document. It was considered as 
highly complex, and it required dedicated work with related actors from different 
perspectives. The magnitude of the conflict around hydropower is made evident by the high 
number of projects in which the decision by the final administrative instance, the 
Committee of Ministers, has been challenged, reaching the Environmental Courts. These 
projects add up to 3,757 MW, which accounts for over 15% of the current electrical matrix. 
(Borregaard 2018:165)     
The “Participatory Table for Sustainable Hydropower” had a hard time laying the bases for the 
dialogue it ostensibly wanted to establish. Three of the most important environmental NGOs in 
the country refused to participate, arguing that the Ministry had amply demonstrated, both in 
practice and in the Energía 2050 document, a commitment to hydropower development 
irrespective of the opinions that civil society organisations had given on other instances of 
participation, and that the structural issues behind the degradation of watersheds and conflicts 
surrounding hydropower—such as the Water Code and the system of environmental 
assessment—needed to be addressed before any talk about ‘sustainable hydropower’ could 
take place (Larrain et. al. 2016). Otherwise, these organisations argued, framing the discussion 
in these terms not only misled the public, but actually accentuated the damage being done at 
the hydropower frontier. From the other side, some of the Table’s outcomes, in particular those 
pertaining to the establishment of a guide to define ecological flows in the processes of 
environmental assessment, was opposed by power companies, who questioned the binding 
nature of the guide and highlighted the greater costs these measures would imply for them 
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(Borregaard 2018:168). Given the irreconcilable nature of the interests embedded in the social 
determinations of hydropower infrastructure in Chile—described throughout this chapter—, it 
was of little surprise that the majority of the recommendations that derived from the Table 
referred to the need for more and better information concerning the conditions and impacts of 
hydroelectricity generation of watersheds and communities, and were remarkably thin on the 
substantive political issues underpinning the systematic conflict that characterises the industry. 
Indeed, as the document explains, regarding indigenous rights, 
Some of the objections to hydroelectricity have related to national debates between 
indigenous peoples and the state regarding constitutional recognition, which implies the 
recognition by the state of the existence of “peoples”, with all their own characteristics 
coexisting inside the national territory; the fulfilment of the state’s duty to protect and 
promote the rights of indigenous peoples, such as the special protection of their territories 
and environment, the right to consultation and consent; and to define their own form of 
development. The table took notice of these issues, but not a common stance nor did it 
debate them in depth. (Ministry of Energy 2017:5, my translation and emphasis)   
The lack of discussion of these issues is indeed remarkable, especially considering the history of 
the conflicts in the sector (see Susskind et al. 2014), and the fact that according to the Ministry’s 
own strategic plans, the areas of highest hydropower potential coincide with the ancestral 
Mapuche homeland (see Ministerio de Energía 2018, see Introduction).   
It is easy to understand the mistrust shown by the organisations that rejected the 
invitation to participate in this Table in the context of the unprecedented push that the Ministry 
and its Project Management Unit were giving hydropower investments at the time, in particular 
to ‘mini-hydro’ projects49 (Nuñez 2018). According to the head of the Unit at the time, Pacheco 
had asked 
… if we were capable of obtaining, towards March 2018, one hundred new ‘mini-hydros’ in 
development. The bet was high: in the history of our country, until March 2014, we had 
around 60. … Despite the adverse outlook, Pacheco insisted on promoting this industry, and 
proposed three axes to do so: 1) to advise and support the monitoring of investment plans, 
development and execution of companies in minihidro projects; 2) support in identifying 
administrative bottlenecks in the processing of initiatives, and 3) support the development 
                                               
49 As had been observed (Kelly-Richards et al. 2017), the notion of ‘small’ or ‘mini’ hydropower varies 
significantly across the globe. In the Chilean context, these are all projects under 20 MW. 
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of intersectoral coordination actions for the promotion of these type of projects (Nuñez 
2018:490-491, my translation)   
This aggressive policy led to a veritable boom in ‘mini-hydro’ projects. If in March 2014 there 
were 64 projects in operation, accounting for 342 MW, by December 2017 these had more than 
doubled, with 54 new projects already operational, and 12 more under construction, totaling 
250 MW of new generating capacity. On top of this, 54 additional projects had obtained approval 
over the same period. This meant that, “17 mini-hidro plants were developed each year on 
average, almost triple what had been registered in previous years” (Nuñez 2018:493, my 
translation). This was added to the support that the Ministry had given larger run-of-the-river 
projects, such as Alto Maipo in the central part of the country, which in 2016 totalled 975 MW 
under construction (Revista Electricidad 2016).  
These sort of projects presented a key advantage in relation to the traditional mega-
dams like those of HidroAysén. María Isabel González, a well-known energy consultant, told an 
important industry magazine that “historically reservoir projects have been very competitive 
with other technologies, including run-of-the-river hydropower, but the opposition faced by 
stporage dams has induced the development of run-of-the-river plants” (Revista Electricidad 
2016, my translation). Something similar was pointed out by the director of the Electrical 
Engineering Department of the University of Chile in the same report:  
From an economic point of view a 550 MW dam, versus five 100 MW run-of-the-river plants, 
is a cheaper project, but if you add the restrictions related to the environment, territory, 
and communities, maybe is more feasible to do run-of-the-river plants of a smaller size.  
The issue of the water regulatory capacities afforded by big reservoirs can be, according to other 
experts interviewed in the report, managed by an integrated coordination of various smaller 
projects. Hugh Rudnick says that these projects, “can manage water storage over one day, which 
is enough to back up the intermittency of solar or wind energy, so medium-size reservoirs can 
be enough”. In this sense, Luis Vargas holds that “what could be done is an integrated 
management of small reservoirs, so that they behave like a big project”. 
In this sense, perhaps the key advantage of the geographical dispersion enabled by the 
smaller hydropower projects that the Ministry of Energy promoted in this period was above all 
a political one. In a way the technological form of the mega-dam itself generated relatively 
favourable conditions for the political composition of its opposing social force: the scale of the 
intervention de facto opens up a concomitantly broad field of (potential) political unity among 
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what otherwise would be relatively scattered, at times even antagonistic, social groups. This was 
clearly illustrated by the case of HidroAysén, in which the scale of the project necessarily 
confronted it with imaginaries of national, and even international, ‘heritage’ that managed to 
articulate and focus a coalition of opposing forces that the project's supporters could not 
overcome.     
In contrast, small(er)-scale hydro as being developed in Chile has implied a very peculiar 
sort of scalar politics. Insofar as it is developed as an alternative to big dams—ie. it still seeks to 
respond to the energy needs delineated by the circuits of extractive accumulation that dominate 
the Chilean economy—, the technology only finds its social meaning in the regional 
concatenation of multiple projects connected to the national grid. This broader scale, however, 
is systematically obscured in the concrete deployment of the infrastructure, which tends to posit 
the ‘local’ as the default scale in which these projects are experienced and articulated, both in 
political and institutional terms. This means that, at the institutional level, the social and 
environmental assessment of these projects is never done on the aggregate scale but 
individually; which, as many studies have shown (Kelly-Richards et al. 2017; Bakken et al. 2012; 
Kibler & Tullos 2013), can obscure impacts that only become visible at, for instance, the 
watershed level—and which may be even greater than those implied by an equivalent, in MW 
terms, large-scale dam (ibid.). On the political level, this has meant that, far from doing away 
with conflict, this takes the form of a proliferation of many disarticulated struggles, whose main 
challenge then becomes composing the antagonism on a scale at which it can successfully 
constitute a challenge to this new geographical and scalar articulation of the energy frontier. In 
other words, the new policy pursued by the Ministry of Energy during this period—the self-
proclaimed ‘Energy Revolution’—consisted, in the case of hydropower, of pursuing a socio-
scalar fix: it didn’t resolve the antagonism that plagued the Chilean hydropower frontier, but 
merely fragmented it. This has, until now, proved to have a measure of efficacy in temporarily 
solving the political stalemate in which the hydropower frontier had become bogged down for 
the past decade. Nevertheless, insofar as the structural issues remain unaddressed, hydropower 
still lacks the “social validation” the ministry sought to create. Indeed, as the frontier expands 
into new territories, conflicts have kept on intensifying—reaching in some cases new levels of 
violence —, new networks have appeared, and the territorialities of more and more 
communities have suddenly become grounds for new forms of politisation and subjectivation 
from which critical perspectives on the energy question continue to emerge.  
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In this sense, the Llancalil hydropower project must be understood in this general 
context and dynamics shaping the contemporary energy frontier. As described in the 
Introduction, this is a run-of-the-river project—ie. a project that has no big reservoir, but that 
diverts the course of the Liucura and Llancalil rivers over, in this case, 3.3 and 1.2 kilometres—
that will generate 6,9 MW of energy, and will imply an investment of aproximantely 23 million 
USD. In the following chapters I will explore the processes described earlier as they develop in 
the locality of Huife, by examining the way in which this frontier-making movement, expressed 
in the circumstances surrounding the potential contruction of the hydropower plant, articulate 


















4. Refuge and settlement: The historical constitution of 
the cordillera as inhabited space 
[The tension between ‘historical fact’ and tradition] exposes the cultural 
work in the organization of a historical praxis, how what happened has 
been effectively recuperated in the terms of a particular sociocultural 
order. ... [What it] reveals is the way—which is never the only possible 
way—the events have been culturally construed by some social process of 
valuation. For historians and anthropologists both, the fundamental 
question is not what actually happened, but what it is that happened. 
Marshall Sahlins, The atemporal dimensions of history: In the old Kongo 
kingdom, for example. 
 
Every year, as the southern summer gives way to autumn, the imposing araucaria50 forests that 
characteristically crown the Andes range at these latitudes start to shed their seeds. Locally 
known as piñones, since time immemorial these nutrient-rich pine-nuts have been an important 
part of the winter diet for those living in these parts of the Andes, and beyond. At some point 
during March, the people living in the communities located in the river valleys that narrow into 
the mountains prepare to undertake the first ascent of the season to these forests to harvest 
piñones, or to piñonear. Normally done on horseback, during the ascent of the steep slopes one 
is likely to witness a common succession of landscapes; one that characterises many of the 
region’s mountain valleys, like the one in which Huife is located. First, one would go through a 
mosaic of meadows dotted with young hualle51 trees, different kinds of shrubs—such as 
blackberry and rosa mosqueta, both normally harvested during the previous summer months—
and quilas, a local species of bamboo, ruminated by the scattered cows. As one ascends, the 
landscape gradually becomes more forested, and the previously isolated patches of secondary 
forests become dominant. These young forests are composed mostly by young hualles, coigües, 
and other native52 pioneering species. Despite the increasingly steep slopes, cattle still graze in 
                                               
50 Araucaria araucana, known in English as monkey-puzzle tree, locally known as araucaria, pehuén, or 
pino. 
51 Local name given to young specimens of Nothofagus obliqua, or Patagonian oak, one of the most 
common local pioneering species. Once these trees achieve maturity, its wood hardens and turns red, 
becoming a pellín, much rarer nowadays. This latter’s hardwood is greatly valued for its durability. 
52 The term ‘native’ applied to flora, especially trees, is quite a conspicuous term in what one could call 
Chile’s ‘cultural botany’. This has to do with both the biogeographical characteristics of the country and 
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the understory and meadows; as Osvaldo, an old inhabitant of lower Huife, remarks, “here we 
raise four-wheel-drive cows”.      
Throughout this vertical progression of the landscape one is likely to encounter several 
elements that suggest fragmented glimpses of its hidden history. For instance, it is common to 
see huge tree stumps, half-covered by grass. Or occasional gigantic, long dried-out coigüe trunks, 
that stand as pale skeletal witnesses of some long past calamity. But, ever since I was a child 
seasonally visiting the location of Pichares, what for me stands as one the most conspicuous 
features of these landscapes is the abrupt break that can be seen in the highest parts of most 
mountains in the region: an imposing grey wall of thick and tall coigüe and monkey-puzzle trunks 
raising above their youngsters, which have been slowly reclaiming the lower slopes for many 
years. This break between the unfathomably ancient forest covering the mountain tops and the 
somewhat more mundane expanding patches of young trees delineates not only an ecosystemic 
boundary, but also points to the overlapping temporalities that have carved this landscape. And 
as one crosses the imposing threshold marked by the ligneous pillars of coigüe trees, one has 
the distinct impression of entering a space ruled by a wholly different sort of time. In the words 
of Pablo Neruda, ‘this is a vertical world: a nation of birds, a multitude of leaves’; a space whose 
fundamental features inhabit a temporality that renders human time microscopic, but that at 
the same time is paradoxically, at times tragically, radically subjected to the ant-like strife and 
violence of human histories. The divergent and clashing paths of these histories of inhabitation 
percolate into the nooks and crannies of the mountain’s ecological constitution, into its 
venerable temporality, and vice-versa, constituting a humanized, deeply historical, ecology.  
                                               
its environmental history. Chile’s temperate rainforests—which account for nearly one-quarter of the 
world’s total (Wilcox 1996)—stretch roughly between 37°S and 45° S, in what presently are the Araucanía, 
Los Ríos, Los Lagos, and Aysén administrative regions (Neira et al. 2002). Topographically and climatically 
isolated, these rainforests are widely considered to be a bio-geographical ‘island’: to the north lie central 
Chile’s mediterranean-climate valleys—beyond which the Atacama desert stretches for thousands of 
kilometres—, to the east the Andes mountain range and the Argentinian steppe or ‘pampa’, and to the 
west and south the Pacific and Antarctic oceans, respectively (Armesto et al. 1995; Wilcox 1996). This has 
effectively isolated southern forests from other tropical and subtropical forest formations in the continent 
for over a million years (ibid.). Non-anthropogenic genetic exchange has thus been very rare, leading to a 
very high level of floral and faunal endemism; many of which consist on monospecific genera and families 
(Newton 2007; Armesto et.al. 1995). These characteristics distinguish these from the more 
interconnected northern hemisphere’s temperate rainforests.  
The relatively recent introduction and widespread expansion of exotic tree species such as different 
varieties of eucalyptus and pine trees, has had an enormous impact in the country’s socio-ecology, and 
arguably constitute one of the main features of the political ecology of neoliberalization in the country 
(see Klubock 2014). This makes the exotic/native binary particularly significant within Chilean 
environmental politics and forestry.  
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Figure 12. Picture taken by the author in Llancalil, showing the ecological boundary between the old 
growth and the secondary forests in the background, followed by the grazing areas below. 
This chapter will present an ethnographic exploration of these historical dimensions of the 
landscape, the trajectories through which human communities have made the upper Liucura 
River’s valleys an inhabited space. These practices of inhabitation and dwelling (Ingold 1993) 
have not only produced a particular landscape, but they have historically constituted a 
geography of meaning, identity, and value, a historical and geographical frame in which current 
expansion of the energy frontier acquires its local significance and political direction. In this 
sense, the idea of this chapter—in its relation to the following ones—is not only to reconstruct 
history understood through the rather simplistic notion ‘of what actually happened’, but to also 
try to approach this historical facticity through the way in which it has been incorporated into a 
particular socio-cultural order; as it persists in the living memory I encountered in these valleys. 
This is, to approach history as it can only exist and be actually made: as the social historical 
consciousness—the cultural weaving of intergenerational relations—in the context of which 
present human practice must negotiate its meaning. To paraphrase anthropologist Marshall 
Sahlins (2017) in the epigraph above, the historical role of culture is none other than defining 
what it is that happens when something happens. 
This web of intergenerational relations is one of the determinant elements being 
mobilized in the conjuncture brought about by the possible development of the ‘Llancalil’ 
hydropower project. These historical relations provide one of the central backgrounds in 
relation to which these transformations are evaluated, and possible futures imagined. Thus the 
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modular, gradual, and contested process of neoliberal reconfiguration of the Liucura valley’s 
socio-natural relations can in this sense only be understood as working their way through these 
relations. 
 
The Wallmapu: from the Frontera, to the occupation 
The landscape described above bears the weight of a deeply conflictual history of variously 
internally related moments of displacement, settlement, and state-making. This history is 
characterised by significant particularities, which ultimately trace their roots to the very special 
relationship the region had with the Spanish colonial regime (from the mid-16th to early 19th 
century). It is therefore necessary to describe the broad contours of this relationship up to its 
upending in the late nineteenth century, if we are to adequately situate and understand the 
origins of the territorialities that concern this study. 
The first defining feature of the region is its relatively late incorporation into the Chilean 
state, and through it, into the capitalist world-system. The people that the Spaniards 
encountered in the southern limits of the Tawantinsuyu, or Inca Empire, in the mid-16th 
century—what are now the south-central regions of Chile and Argentina—were one of the few 
American populations that successfully resisted Spanish conquest throughout the colonial 
period, effectively achieving a military equilibrium with the colonial regime that would last for 
almost three centuries53, indeed several decades into the postcolonial history of both the 
Chilean and Argentinian states (Bengoa 2000). The relative autonomy that the region 
maintained during these centuries from the incipient capitalist world-system had important 
consequences from a socio-ecological point of view. In contrast to Chile’s central valleys, 
laboured under the encomienda system54 and ultimately subjected to the demands of the 
                                               
53 In 1549 the first expedition led by Pedro de Valdivia departed from the newly founded colonial city of 
Santiago to the south, with the aim of submitting southern lands to colonial rule. This opened a period of 
constant war and uprisings, in which the definitive turning point took place in 1598: in the battle of 
Curalaba the Spanish army is definitely defeated, the colonial governor executed, and all cities south of 
the Bio-Bio River burned or abandoned (Bengoa 2000). This outcome (later legally consolidated through 
the Quillin Treaty, celebrated in 1641) was spatially expressed in what would be one of the defining 
geographical features of the colonial period in Chile: the establishment of the Bio-Bio River as a frontier 
between colonial society and the autonomous Mapuche lands. Far from impermeable, this frontier was a 
porous space in which different forms of mestizaje and cultural exchange started taking place in terms 
wholly different from those ruling the fiercely hierarchical colonial caste system across the Americas 
(Boccara 1999).   
54 The encomienda was the standard form in which labour came to be organized after the Spanish 
conquest. The Crown gave some conquistadores rights over labour and tribute from a specified number 
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imperial centre, the region remained beyond the control of the colonial regime, and its links to 
the colonial economy55 remained generally subordinated to the needs and scales defined by the 
logics of reproduction of Mapuche society itself, not by those imposed by the reproduction of 
the colonial system. This meant that during this period, the lands south of the Bio-Bío River, 
known to the Mapuche as the Wallmapu, remained under multi-scalar indigenous territorial 
logics, at the core of which were the reproduction of extended kinship and territorial ties 
structured around patrilineal descent (like the lof), long-distance and trans-Andean relations of 
exchange and war, and the diversified, mobile agropastoralist socio-ecology that had developed 
in the centuries following the arrival of the Spaniards56.  
It is important to underscore that the socio-natural conditions of this period were 
themselves a product of the colonial encounter and war, and probably as different from the pre-
Hispanic conditions as they would be from those emergent after the final incorporation of the 
region into the Chilean and Argentinian states in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Indigenous organization, identity, forms of life, and the biodiversity associated with them, were 
all transformed to different degrees following the arrival of the Spaniards, despite—or rather, 
as a condition for—the successful resistance to colonization and the preservation of indigenous 
territorial and political autonomy. The introduction and rapid adoption of European cattle and 
crops, coupled with the demographic collapse brought about by diseases and warfare during the 
16th and 17th centuries, thoroughly transformed indigenous socio-ecologies, which from being 
articulated around a diverse combination of horticulture, camelid rearing, and foraging, by the 
19th century came to be shaped by a mobile agro-pastoralist way of life based on the seasonal 
usage of different microenvironments and heavily reliant on species introduced by the 
Europeans (notably wheat and European livestock) (Bengoa 2000, Boccara 1999, Klubock 2014). 
Furthermore, the congealment of the more or less differentiated indigenous peoples that 
populated the region in pre-Hispanic times into the, also more or less, unitary identity of the 
contemporary Mapuche, can be traced to the processes of ethnogenesis set off by the colonial 
war (see Boccara 1999). Indeed, the region saw an intense process of cultural transformation, 
as people and a wide range of cultural elements of European origins were incorporated in the 
                                               
of people from conquered communities; in turn, encomenderos supposedly had the responsibility of 
Christianizing the indigenous population and instructing them in the Spanish language. 
55 Mapuche political autonomy hardly implied isolationism: Mapuche commerce with the frontier 
regions of colonial society acquired very important proportions during the 18th and part of the 19th 
centuries, trading in everything from piñones, to cattle, to woollen ponchos (Boccara 1999, Bengoa 
2000).  
56 Millalen (2006) provides a detailed description of Mapuche socio-territorial organization during this 
period.  
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terms of the rapidly transforming Mapuche culture—in short, a process of cultural hybridization, 
mestizaje, in terms wholly different from those imposed by the fiercely racialized and 
hierarchical colonial caste system that mediated this process throughout colonial America (see 
Boccara 1999; cf. Silva 1992).  
 
Primitive accumulation and the centrifugal socio-ecology of the Occupation 
It was in the period stretching roughly from 1861 to 1883 that the region was finally occupied 
by the Chilean and Argentinian states through a series of military campaigns on both sides of 
the Andes57. This invasion marked a fundamental historical break for the region and those living 
in it, and unleashed a chaotic process of primitive accumulation in which the origins of the 
territorialities dealt with in this study are to be found.  
It is hard to overstate the socio-ecological significance of the incorporation of the region 
into the Chilean and Argentinian national states. According to archaeobotanical surveys, the 
final decades of the nineteenth century brought about transformations in the region’s landscape 
on a scale only comparable to those brought about by the end of the last Ice Age, i.e. the 
beginning of the Holocene epoch58 (Armesto et al. 2010). These transformations had multiple 
facets. In the first place, there was a complete territorial overhaul after the destruction of 
Mapuche autonomous territorialities. In the region, from approximately 10 million hectares 
controlled by the Mapuche before the invasion, their land was reduced to 500,000 hectares; 
approximately 5% of the original extension (Bengoa 2000; Correa et al. 2005). This reduction 
implied the radical transformation/destruction of Mapuche socio-ecological, organizational, and 
territorial conditions: from increasingly hierarchical, relatively wealthy, and highly mobile 
agropastoralists, they were forcibly turned into largely homogeneously impoverished peasants 
forced into (many times sub-)subsistence agriculture, and confined to marginal plots of land—a 
                                               
57 Officially, the Chilean government at the time called this invasion the ‘Pacification of the Araucanía’, 
while the Argentinian side called it ‘The Conquest of the Desert’. Needless to say, these terms—which for 
much of the twentieth century remained the dominant nomenclature in official historiography—have 
been widely criticised by the Mapuche people as a thinly veiled obfuscation of what effectively was an 
openly genocidal war of expansion of the newly constituted national states.  
58 After the arrival of the Spaniards (and with them, the diseases) in the 16th century and the intense 
period of war that followed, there was, as in most other parts of the Americas, a demographic collapse of 
cataclysmic proportions. This led to important changes in the region’s landscape as forest cover expanded 
on the abandoned, previously cultivated, valleys. This process however seems to have been far less rapid 
and widespread than that following the occupation in the last decades of the 19th century. 
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process referred to by several historians as ‘campesinización forzada’ or ‘forced peasantisation’ 
(Ibid.).  
 
Figure 13. Chilean troops during the Occupation of the Araucania. 1883. Source: Biblioteca Nacional de 
Chile, taken from www.memoriachilena.cl 
Klubock (2014) notes that despite this general territorial disarticulation, many of the trans-
Andean trade and migration routes, as well as mobile practices such as the seasonal use of the 
highlands for cattle grazing (veranadas), not only survived, but for some acquired even greater 
subsistence significance given the acute land scarcity faced by the Mapuche after the reduction 
process. These were, nonetheless, practiced against the grain of the state’s territorial projects, 
such as for example, the Chilean-Argentinian border, or later, the establishment of the region’s 
National Parks and Nature Reserves. What is important to highlight in relation to areas in the 
cordillera, such as the upper Liucura valley in which Huife is located, is that during this period, 
and throughout much the twentieth century, the cordillera would remain a space where 
contesting geographical projects, meanings and practices clashed: the cordillera was a space of 
refuge, a trans-Andean passage, a border, and a no-man’s-land ripe for settlement—all at the 
same time.     
Despite the state’s almost complete lack of effective administrative presence in the 
region beyond military forts, the newly seized lands were declared tierras fiscales, or ‘public’ 
lands. This, coupled with the destruction of Mapuche territorial control, threw the region’s 
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territorial dynamics into a tailspin: large extensions of poorly charted lands were auctioned off 
to wealthy Chileans in faraway cities like Santiago, opened to colonization by newly arrived 
European settlers, and squatted by landless Chilean campesinos (Bengoa 2000; Klubock 2006; 
2014; Correa et.al. 2005). Deforestation became quickly implicated in a two-fold process of 
military control and expansion of markets: after the violent elimination of Mapuche territorial 
control, forests where burned on a vast scale to establish new land claims, access fertile soils, 
raise property values, and submit it to the vertiginous dynamics of real estate speculation 
(Bengoa 2000; Clapp 1993; Klubock 2014). All of this created a deeply conflictual agrarian 
structure where fraud, overlapping claims, irregular occupation of land, and widespread 
agrarian conflict became the norm. The fertility produced by the burning of huge volumes of 
biomass positioned the region’s valleys as ‘Chile’s granaries’ for several decades (Clapp 1993; 
Klubock 2014). The boom in the region’s agricultural production further intensified pressure on 
both the remaining forests and small landowners. However, as initial fertility withered away in 
the first decades of the twentieth century, the toll of deforestation became evident through 
heavily eroded soils, frequent droughts, and floods (Klubock 2014). This eventually pressured 
many small landowners to sell degraded lands to increasingly larger estates, swelling the already 
ample underclass of underemployed landless or land-starved peasants, many of which fled to 
marginal lands (Ibid.).  
 
Figure 14. Image of cleared forests in the region, in the early twentieth century. Source: Biblioteca 
Nacional de Chile, taken from www.memoriachilena.cl 
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Figure 15. Image of a recently cleared forest in the region, in the early XX century, illustrating the 
ecological conditions for the constitution of agrarian property in the region. Source:  Biblioteca Nacional 
de Chile, taken from www.memoriachilena.cl 
The history of the constitution of the communities in the area of study has its origins in these 
tumultuous decades that followed the military occupation; a period that, as noted, was 
characterised by epoch-making geographical reconfigurations. It is important to note here that 
the origins of the territorialities of the cordillera can in this sense be seen as a consequence of 
internally related processes of state-making and state-fleeing, reminiscent to those described 
by Scott (2009) in the context of south-east Asia. The socio-ecological constitution of both state 
power and market rule over land implied, in the first place, a huge demographic movement of 
the Mapuche population to regions of refuge, such as the cordillera, and on the other, the 
establishment of fiercely exploitative relations of production in the main valleys, from which the 
rural landless tended also to flee given half the chance. Frontier forests presented such an 
opportunity, albeit one that implied several risks and hardships, as I will show below. But what 
is important to note here is how the cordillera became a region of refuge from the newly 
constituted forms of power and their socio-ecological articulation. Rendering this process of 
spontaneous settlement of the frontier forests legible (Scott 1998) would indeed, as Klubock 
(2014) shows, be one of the most important tasks of the state in these regions during the first 
half of the twentieth century. 
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The origins of Huife: itinerancy, refuge, and the production of inhabitability. 
Two main interrelated processes lay behind the settlement of the upper valleys of the Liucura 
River. In the first place, there was the large-scale displacement and movement of the Mapuche 
population effected by the waves of military advancements; the last of which reached the 
Villarrica Lake, and refounded the city59 of the same name in 1883, which had been destroyed 
by the Mapuche almost three centuries earlier. Throughout the decades of Chilean military 
advancement, many of the displaced Mapuche families sought refuge in the cordillera, and 
further into the Puelmapu (present-day Argentina). Some years after the end of the invasion, 
the cordillera also became the object of a chaotic process of spontaneous squatting by 
campesinos looking for the newly declared ‘tierras fiscales’ or ‘public lands’ to claim, in order to 
establish themselves as landowners, and escape the often brutal conditions of the various forms 
of rural proletarianizaton and inquilinaje, or tenancy, that characterised the Chilean traditional 
rural society. 
Sometime around the turn of century, the Mapuche families Millaqueo60 and Nahuelan, 
arrived at what is now known as ‘Huife Bajo’ or lower Huife and settled on the northern bank of 
the river. Years before, these families had fled the invading Chilean army and abandoned their 
lands in the region’s central valleys. These lands, according to the community’s oldest members, 
amounted to hundreds of hectares, located in the area around what now are the towns of 
Labranza and Nueva Imperial, near the region’s capital Temuco, in the central valleys. In the 
words of some of the oldest members of the lower Huife communities:  
My father's father had a whole lot of land around Labranza, my father's mother also had 
another lot, hundreds of hectares of land she had. And that they abandoned because the 
Spaniards [here referring to the invading Chilean army] where coming for them. And they 
were very afraid, so many bad people, and the Spaniards were on top of them, threatening 
people with death. And then, that is what the old ones did, my father's father, we ran, we 
went to the cordillera, we fled, we hid ourselves there. Feliciano Millaqueo, 84 years old. 
                                               
59 Today located approximately 35 miles to the west of Huife. 
60 Judging from my conversations with the family members, the precise origins of the ‘Millaqueo’ family 
name is somewhat unclear. The family that settled in what now is lower Huife was composed of Antonia 
Quintrequeo, Juan Colimil, and their four children, two boys and two girls. According to some 
interviewees, the name ‘Millaqueo’ was acquired afterwards, during the process of being registered with 
the Civil Registry; either due to the alcoholism and negligence of the official then in charge, according to 
one testimony, or to the fact that the reference to ‘gold’ that the Millaqueo name carries in mapuzungun 
(milla means gold) appealed to Juan Colimil, according to another.  
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We fled because the Spaniards wanted to own our lands. And they were going to kill 
everyone, they were going to send Spaniards, gringos, who knows what they were, the 
wingkas61. (...) Everyone came from around Imperial, near Temuco. They were going to kill 
them, so they fled. (...) Then, after, they said, why don't we ask for some land in that 
mountain. And that's how they did it, everyone who was displaced agreed. Millarayén 
Nahuelan, 93 years old. 
I remember that don Juan [Colimil] used to say that they came from around Labranza first 
to Loncoche [in the region's south], and there they arrived among other Mapuches running 
from the malones [raids], as they used to say before (…). Because at that time the 
government had already agreed to give land to the foreigners and the wingkas. Osvaldo 
Ibarra, 83 years old. 
The elders in the community tell the story of several years of semi-itineracy that followed the 
initial displacement, during which the families took refuge with other Mapuche in different parts 
of the region; first southwards, in Loncoche, and finally on the mountains to the east, arriving at 
Menetúe, a location just south of the Huife valley. During these years, their situation got 
progressively worse. In the words of Osvaldo Ibarra: 
And there to Loncoche arrived my father-in-law's father [Juan Colimil], with their animals 
and all their things, and the land they lost. And they arrived to Loncoche to live with other 
Mapuche there. And from Loncoche, years after, when they had even fewer resources left, 
they arrived at Menetúe, and there they stayed for some years (...). And from Menetúe 
came don Juan Colimil, he came as friends with Nahuelan. (...) And there they took 
possession of all of this side [of the river], from Lefincul to here [lower Huife]. 
In those times, there only existed a rudimentary track along the southern bank of the Liucura 
River, which went through the cordillera towards the Reigolil valley62, and beyond, to the 
Puelmapu, what is now Argentina. For a period of time, both the Millaqueo and Nahuelan made 
several exploratory incursions into the valley, and progressively laid the ground for a more 
permanent settlement. According to the oldest members of the communities, at the time there 
was no permanent occupation of these lands63. At the time the new settlers only found traces 
of sporadic previous occupations, like, for example, some forest clearances along the southern 
                                               
61 Mapuche term that can mean foreigner, white person, or Chilean, depending on the context. 
62 This is an adjacent valley that runs perpendicularly (north-south) to the Liucura and Llancalil valleys, 
just between these and what is now the border between Chile and Argentina.  
63 Here there is the exception of one interviewee who tells of a Mapuche family that lived there but left 
shortly after the arrival of the Millaqueo and Nahuelan families. 
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bank of the Liucura River64. As they did not want to risk anyone else returning to these already 
cleared lands—and the associated possibility of losing any work done in them—they decided to 
settle on the northern bank.  
In those days, the place was, in the words of one interviewee, a “closed mountain” 
(montaña cerrada), meaning it was covered by old-growth forests, characterised by very dense 
undergrowth dominated by the local bamboo species (coligüe and quila). Although these kinds 
of forests had always had a very important place in traditional Mapuche forms of production 
(see discussion above), in the precarious conditions that the refugee families where enduring, 
by themselves—i.e. decoupled from complementary agro-pastoral systems, and the combined 
use of different ecological niches—they offered no viable livelihood. The transformation of these 
inhospitable lands into an inhabitable space is thus invariably remembered as a period of intense 
poverty and toil. There is only one living member of the community who recalls part of this 
period directly, Francisco Millaqueo, 103 years old at the time of the interview. According to his 
calculations, he must have been a very young child during this period, apparently around 4 or 5 
years old. It is worth reproducing this period in his own words:   
They lived with a very big suffering. (...) What we the Mapuche did was in the first place, 
cross this river, with a little toasted flour, toasted peas as well, toasted broad beans, and 
they cut down green coligües [native bamboo], they piled them up around, and made 
'broken poles' as they say (...) so to sleep under branches, which in good weather is ok. But 
when it rains, there's suffering (...). In the meantime, felling trees, opening up the land. 
Those trees are hard to dry up, they don't burn. Half a year, maybe one year, it dried, and 
to the fire. There they sowed a little wheat, some peas, but only a little, only a little plot. 
Potatoes as well, a little. Very big suffering. No money, we didn't know how to get money. 
(...) Hunger, very bad trail, suffering, that's what we had. That river there, in winter it got 
very deep, there was no way through, we had to wait for it to come down, then fell a thick 
coigüe and then we could cross, it served as a bridge. So we crossed, barefoot. Because we 
didn't know of shoes in those years. (...) The little ones cry of hunger, what are you going to 
do, there is nothing. They cry of hunger, then they go to sleep. Awake, and again. A little bit 
of flour, who knows what else, to keep us going. That not only happened to us, it happened 
all the way down as well. Mapuche towns, Nahuelanes, bigger families. Yes, that's what 
happened. Year on year, clearing up the mountain, sowing a little bit more, a bit more, every 
year a bit more, and that's how it was. 
                                               
64 Many years later, when the present road in the southern bank of the river was built, an undated, 
presumably Mapuche, cemetery was unearthed, which points to a possible older history of occupation 
of these valleys. 
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It is important to note the emphasis on the generalized nature of the conditions described. 
Francisco’s family was not the only one affected by this situation, but almost the whole of the 
Mapuche families in the region, many of whom were suffering from the consequences of 
displacement: they were part of a mass movement of people, refugees who had fled the military 
invasion many years ago, and had undergone several years of itinerancy and precariousness 
before finding places suitable for settlement, at a relatively safe distance from the Chilean state 
in the making. The conditions that these families endured can still be glimpsed in other stories 
referring to the period and the times immediately preceding it, which preserve the memory of 
persecution and of the cordillera as both a place of refuge and hardship. For instance, Feliciano 
Millaqueo told me the story—passed on by the Mapuche families in the sector of Pichare, 
located downriver—of a Mapuche family that hid from the persecuting Chilean army around the 
wetlands just up the mountain from Huife:   
Those were people that ran uphill, to Laguna Seca [dry pond], there’s a big mallin [Mapuche 
name for the grassy wetlands common in the region’s mountain tops] (…). About three 
hours walk from here, uphill. They were escaping the Spaniards that were chasing them. 
And there they arrived, and had ran out of food. They were desperate, they would suffer 
from hunger and the Spaniards were on top of them. So they left one of the little children, 
that could not walk anymore, they left him with a bit of food and told him to hide. The 
others kept on going uphill, to see if they could hide as well. And then, the oldest one that 
was there, the longko [chief], dreamt, and they told him in dreams that they should go to a 
particular place, there would be an animal there, and they could butcher it and they would 
have something to eat. And the longko talked to his people, they heard, “go to this place, 
there will be an animal there”. And they went, there was a big herd of animals lying there. 
When the animals saw them coming, they stood up and ran, they were wild animals, and 
only one stood there, lying, a big animal. Then they butchered it. Then, later, they came 
back down for the boy, and fed him. 
These sort of stories convey in present memory the conditions that many of the Mapuche are 
remembered to have faced in the aftermath of the occupation: ruthless persecution by the 
army, the cordillera as a place of both refuge and hardship, and the brutality of the kind of 
choices people were forced to make (in this case exemplified in the choice between the survival 
of a small child and that of the whole family). These are conditions that transformed the 
cordillera from a route of passage to the Puelmapu, which it had been in the preceding centuries, 
to a place of refuge and, ultimately, permanent settlement.  
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The main concern for the families that settled on the northern bank of the Liucura river 
during this period was, then, to build the basic conditions for subsistence through the gradual 
clearing of forests, establishing very small scale slash-and-burn agriculture, the foraging of forest 
produce (everything from bamboo sprouts to mushrooms, but specially the seasonal harvest of 
piñones), and, later, being able to sell some products in the markets in the new regional settler 
towns such as Pucón. Here, some of the older members of the Mapuche families remember the 
importance of the silversmith skills that the first generations still preserved65. For instance, 
Feliciano Millaqueo, tells how his father embarked on trips that would last several weeks, in 
which he would go to markets as far as Temuco to sell silver-made objects, and bring back other 
produce to reinvest in their land: 
My father, he worked with silver in the old times, he learnt back in Imperial. (...) And he 
brought his tools (...) He had his tools to make bombillas [silver straw used to drink mate], 
he made spurs, headstalls, he made everything, silver stirrups as well. And then (...) he left 
on his horse to sell them, he went all the way to Temuco on horseback, selling spurs, rings 
as well (...) he went for weeks at a time selling. And then he returned with some produce, 
and all that while here the grandfather and grandmother stayed suffering asking, 'when will 
the bread arrive?', or anything to eat. And that's how my father made a little bit of money, 
he kept clearing the forest, paying people to help (...). And father kept on working with 
silver, and paid other people to clear the land. They sowed a bit of peas, potatoes, wheat 
(...) and stored it around, removing an oak's bark, and making a place to store the grain. And 
that's how my father slowly cleared up the land and worked on silver, so that later we got 
bigger and could live better. 
As years passed, the trails and roads connecting to the regional towns gradually improved and 
made it possible for commercial activities to play an increasingly important role in the still largely 
subsistence-based local economy. In particular, the production of railroad sleepers from the 
sturdy, and in those days abundant, pellín timber was to become one of the prominent 
commercial activities for communities such as Huife during the following decades. As I will 
describe with more detail below, this process was also underpinned by the consequences that 
slash-and-burn agriculture had as it grew in intensity and scale with the arrival of other settlers. 
 
                                               
65 Working silver became very characteristic of Mapuche culture during the colonial period, and still to 
this day silver ornaments such as trapelacuchas and trariloncos, remain one of the main symbols of 
Mapuche identity.   
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The arrival of Chilean and German settlers. 
It would still be several years before the first Chilean settlers ventured into the upper valleys of 
the Liucura River. According to Francisco Millaqueo, “every five or ten years” families of 
campesinos started to arrive looking for tierras fiscales—lands that the state had declared 
‘public’, and open to be claimed. Most of the first families to venture up the valley had first been 
agricultural workers on nearby large estates, who would later look for land of their own to claim. 
It is hard to identify a precise date when this process began; it was very gradual, as it normally 
entailed seasonally working on opening the land for more permanent settlement, and some of 
the families that first arrived left decades later or have no descendants left in the area. However, 
from my interviews with the descendants of some of these settlers and Mapuche families, it is 
safe to say that by 1930 there were already several families permanently settled both in Upper 
Huife and Llancalil.  
The name “Huife” has its origins around this time, as the Chilean settlers tried to wrap 
their tongues around Mapuche toponymy. Francisco, the oldest member of the community in 
Lower Huife recalls that "people from elsewhere would come and look for my dad as a guide, to 
go further into the mountain”. The upper part of the valley was known by the Mapuche families 
of Lower Huife to be frequented by a great deal of coots, which in mapuzungun were called 
‘wed-wed’; therefore, the place was known by them as Wedhue, literally, ‘place of coots’ in 
mapuzungun66. Chilean settlers would later change this to ‘Huife’, a name easier to pronounce 
in Spanish, and one that would stick as more Chilean families gradually arrived and eventually 
became the majority. The origins of the ‘Huife’ and other local toponyms signal an original 
instance of what would become one of the characteristic aspects of these valleys: 
notwithstanding its remoteness and the relative sparsity of its population, from its very origins 
the emerging community was confronted with a multicultural condition that would acquire 
further complexity with the later arrival of German settlers to the Llancalil valley. The associated 
dynamics of both cultural convergence and distinctiveness would play important roles in the 
following decades.  
The Chilean families had all come from other parts of the region, such as Loncoche, 
Quitratue, or Huichahue. According to their present day descendants, the first settlers were 
looking mainly for land to claim for their own, as the word in the region was that there were 
plenty of good ‘public lands’ still to be claimed in the cordillera. These rumours were 
                                               
66 In mapuzungun, the suffix 'hue' is a locative. 
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compounded by the conditions these families endured back where they were coming from, as 
there was no land for most and poverty was widespread among the landless. The inaccessibility 
of the upper valleys made of this process a very gradual one, in which people would come to 
work seasonally, clearing forests and making better and bigger tracks. As Baltazar Matus, a 
descendant from colonists in Llancalil, explains:  
My grandfather was from Quitratue. (...) From there they came looking for land around 
these places, all those years back. (...) At that time they came up through Llancalil, this was 
a really awful track. They would go into the valley on horseback, they worked the track, and 
later managed to get oxen carts through... Same in [upper] Huife, same thing. 
In a similar way to that of the Mapuche families, the memory that the colonists’ descendants 
keep of this period is characterised by the general hue of hardship and poverty. These lands 
were indeed very remote—it took three days on horseback to reach Pucón, the nearest town—
and for the Chileans, whose decidedly agricultural rural culture had originally developed in the 
Mediterranean climate of central Chile, these cold frontier rainforests generally presented a 
form of chaotic wilderness; an ecology which, for the practical purposes of subsistence, was for 
the most part illegible. Especially during the very first period of settlement, when isolation 
rendered any commercial value of timber largely marginal and made of establishing a base-line 
subsistence agriculture a priority, clearing forests became the main concern of those wanting to 
lay claim to new lands. This was compounded by the fact that government officers were unlikely 
to recognize the claims of poor squatters unless they demonstrated beyond any doubt that their 
land was being occupied—which normally meant being used for agriculture or raising cattle. The 
forests however, were dense, and most people that settled on the frontier forests had very 
limited resources. As Marta, an older woman living in Upper Huife recalls:  
My grandparents came up here, and these were all virgin jungles. … They always spoke of 
all the miseries they went through. There was no help from the government, they had to 
make do on their own. 
Likewise, Adolfo, another elder man in Upper Huife explains the difficulties entailed in 
making these forests suitable for settlement:  
It was hard work to come and clear a plot of land so that it could produce something, it took 
three or four years for it to produce properly. (...) It was hard because in those times there 
were no chainsaws, one had to fell trees with old saws. 
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All of these conditions made the profligate use of fire a common feature of the settling process 
during this period, not only in Huife, but everywhere in the region. And although the Mapuche 
families also made use of fire in line with their traditional slash-and-burn agricultural methods, 
the arrival of settlers meant a qualitative leap in scale and intensity. According to the older 
descendants from Mapuche, Chilean, and German families, these fires frequently got out of 
control, and transformed into dangerous and damaging wildfires, which would repeatedly scar 
the cordillera throughout the twentieth century. “Those burned in 85’”, Baltazar Matus told me, 
as he pointed at the scattered dead standing stumps mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
“but the rest of those clearances below, those were made by the settlers as they began to arrive, 
they started to clear and burn to open up the land”. Fire, which in this part of the world is almost 
entirely anthropogenic, became, with the arrival of settlers, a crucial element in the production 
of the cordillera’s contemporary landscape.    
A few years after the first Chilean families arrived, two German families settled in the 
Llancalil valley, the Goeppinger and the Rascheya.  In the case of the Rascheya family, they were 
second-generation settlers coming to Llancalil from the nearby Quilaco colony, which had been 
settled a generation earlier in lands specially conceded by the government to European settling 
enterprises. In the case of both Chilean and German settlers, it was common for the families 
that once settled, they called on other relatives or friends to claim lands in the locality. Ilse 
Rascheya, now over 70 years of age, and one of the last remaining permanent residents in the 
upper Llancalil valley, remembers: 
My father arrived in 1906, 1908, sometime around then. He was 4 years old when he arrived 
in Chile [from Germany with his family], very young. They arrived in Valdivia. From there, 
they took them to Quilaco, and were assigned a plot of land there. (...) When the old ones 
died, the new ones each looked for different horizons. Here [in Llancalil] were the lands that 
they later requested from the Chilean government. (...) The forests were cleared by fire. (...) 
[My husband's family] came from Quitratue (...). They were Chileans. A cousin of my father-
in-law, he had arrived here before, and as there still was land left he brought him over. (...) 
[Those who came here] were people that sometimes worked in the fundos [large estates], 
maybe they made some contacts around, heard that there was some land around, and 
occupied them. Afterwards they sorted the papers out with the government. (...) It took a 
great deal of effort [to regularize land tenure]. Several years went by living just like that, 
without papers. They usually came to settle way before doing any paperwork. 
Likewise, Ana Goeppinger, of a younger generation and now resident in Lefincul a few miles 
downriver, recalls that  
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[My] grandfather used to say that they made the road with shovels… the government had 
given them a pair of oxen, shovels, hoes, and an axe. And that was it. … At first it was only 
his family, but later other friends of his from Germany arrived, and they kept settling 
[colonizando] (…). 
As I will describe with further detail below, this support that the state gave to German families, 
though apparently modest, made an important difference in the context of the dire conditions 
of the period.  
 
The regularization of land claims, the state, and stratification. 
As in the rest of the region, this whole process of settlement was largely spontaneous and lacked 
any direct oversight by the state, whose role was generally limited to the post facto 
regularization of occupied lands. Nevertheless, this regularization process was a fundamental 
intervention as it was thoroughly mediated by officially sanctioned racial and gendered 
differentiations that would become cemented in the agrarian structure itself. Only male settlers 
were able to claim public lands, and the regularization process was beset by racial biases, as the 
Mapuche were systematically disfavoured in the litigation of overlapping claims, done in the 
Spanish-speaking courts of the occupying state. In addition, German settlers apparently got 
preferential support from authorities, and had fewer problems getting their titles, which some 
remember were obtained with much greater celerity than was the case with other settlers, many 
of whose fights to get their lands recognized were even passed on to the next generation. 
The process of regularization would be the source of a series of land conflicts still 
remembered by the older members of the Mapuche families in lower Huife, in which they claim 
to have lost a substantial part of the lands their families originally occupied.  This defined a tense 
relationship with some of the Chilean families that originally settled around lower Huife in the 
very early days of settlement. As an older member of the community in Lower Huife recalls:  
My father's father had solicited more land than that he ended up having. The wingka took 
his land upriver. They came afterwards, (...) and took from my father there. And here there 
was another one as well, and they took from my dad, so my father ended up pretty 
insignificant [quedó medio chico mi papá] (...) and fighting over the line [land limits]. [The 
struggle was about making sure] That they took no more land, that the move further over 
there, (...) and defending one's part. (...) What happened was that we the Mapuche had no 
word to defend ourselves. Those who went to the offices in Loncoche or Temuco didn't 
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understand, they knew little of how to speak castilla [castilian spanish], and that's why they 
got surrounded, they got very little land... and Chilean people, those got to the office and 
talked and talked, and the Mapuche just stood there, didn't understand... they didn't know 
how to read... that's why we got so little land. 
Although most elders in lower Huife consider that the Mapuche families were generally 
disfavoured by the regularization process—as was the case for the overwhelming majority of 
the Mapuche in the region during this period (see Correa et. al. 2005)—with the progressive 
settlement of claims and land titles these conflicts appear to have eventually subsided, 
especially as families began to intermarry. Feliciano Millaqueo says that, after some years “with 
the title on hand, things calmed down, and [settlers and Mapuche] treated each other as 
neighbours. They greeted each other, and did cambio de mano [reciprocal labour], they got 
married”. As I will develop in more detail below, this illustrated a tension that marks the history 
of the communities: the production of a common identity, rooted in the shared habitation of 
these valleys; a perpetually tentative commons always in tension with the complex interplay and 
evolution of economic stratification and ethnic difference. 
It is important to note that throughout the region post-reductional Mapuche lands were 
normally recognized through the so-called ‘Títulos de Merced’67, special titles handed by the 
state to Mapuche families, and through which they constituted officially recognized ‘indigenous 
communities’. This was, however, not the case with the families that settled in Huife. Apparently 
because of their isolation from other families alongside whom the state would recognize a 
‘Mapuche community’, these families had to regularize their lands through the same process as 
those of the Chilean settlers: submitting their claims to tierras fiscales (public lands) to the 
“Office of Land and Colonization” [Oficina de Tierras y Colonización], having them measured by 
a government topographer, acquiring a title, and finally getting it registered in the Land Registry. 
“Here we got settler titles, as Chileans, not títulos de merced. … We didn’t arrive here as 
community, we arrived as families”, explains Luis Hernán, the current head of the Mapuche 
community in Lower Huife. This meant that, until very recently68, the lands of these families had 
no official recognition as being indigenous. 
                                               
67 These were titles especially conferred by the Chilean state to the Mapuche, which established the 
figure of ‘the indigenous community’, that although foreign to original Mapuche forms of organization 
and territoriality (which, as described previously, hinged around extended patrilineal lineages and agro-
pastoral mobility) would become central to the form in which both resistance and state domination 
would be exerted henceforth. See Correa et. al. 2005 
68 The Millaqueo family would officially constitute themselves as ‘indigenous community’ only in 2001. 
See Chapter 5.  
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German families, on the other hand, had in the previous generation acquired lands in 
the region through the special settlement schemes facilitated by the government to settlers of 
European origin. According to some interviewees, in settling Llancalil they got preferential 
treatment by the state, mainly consisting of the material supports mentioned earlier and a 
quicker and less cumbersome process to get their titles. This was significant, as for most families 
this process of regularization of land claims normally took many years, in some cases decades. 
On the other hand, in this initial period even a relatively modest support, such as a pair of oxen, 
could make an important difference over time. As a member of a Mapuche family in Lower Huife 
explains:  
That is why [that generation of German] settlers generally did better in life, because they 
got support from the state. The Chilean settlers came making their roces [burning the 
forests to cultivate], the Mapuche making roces, fighting to define their lands, and the state 
did nothing. But to the German settlers the state gave oxen, as initial capital. So Chilean and 
Mapuche settlers began to work for them sometimes, and the Germans ‘went up’ [got 
richer]. 
In this way, ethnic difference and economic stratification became entangled, albeit in ways 
which in the following generations would prove to be non-linear and highly complex.  
 
The agrarian structure emergent from the settling process 
Land tenure 
The agrarian structure resulting from this settlement process would present important 
differences to the one that would dominate the valleys around the nearby towns of Pucón and 
Villarrica—and indeed, Chilean rural society in general—up until the Land Reform of the late 
1960s and early 70s, whose main form was that of the latifundio, hacienda or large estate. As a 
consequence of the spontaneous frontier settlement process described above, small and 
medium scale holdings69 had spread in mountain valleys such as Huife and Llancalil, with plot 
extensions averaging around 70 or 80 hectares in this particular location70. These extensions are 
to some extent misleading, however, as when they were claimed most of them consisted either 
                                               
69 Here ‘small and medium’ are not understood not in strict terms of extension/farm size, but rather in 
terms of the type of farming and the relations through which it was undertaken, in this case mostly 
through family labour. See Bernstein 2010. 
70 In contrast, surrounding haciendas normally extended for thousands of hectares.  
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of mountain slopes of varying inclinations, and/or thick forests. Also, these plots where mostly 
worked with family labour. Both of these factors placed a limit to the amount of land that could 
be put to productive use in this period, which normally did not exceed a few hectares, albeit 
continually growing as communities consolidated, lands became subdivided through 
inheritance, and forests were cleared. 
As mentioned, differences in quantity and quality of land, added in some cases to 
differing initial resources, would underpin the progressive development of a certain local 
stratification, as for example, some families relied to different degrees on complementary wage 
labour in others’ lands for subsistence. But according to interviewees, most if not all extended 
families had access to land, which precluded the formation of a locally resident rural proletariat71 
and therefore the development of class antagonisms to the extent, persistence, and depth that 
would characterise the latifundio in the lower valleys. According to interviewees, the 
inquilinaje72—the fundamental relation of the contemporary rural social structure—was only of 
a circumstantial or exceptional nature in this particular area.  
Once land titles were settled the main differences in access to land became articulated 
around gender and generational divisions: as previously mentioned, only men could claim public 
lands, and, as inherited land was split amongst siblings, new generations tended to receive 
progressively smaller plots. This established mobility patterns whose main features have 
accompanied the communities’ history to this day; a diasporic element embedded in the 
territorial constitution of these communities since their inception. On the one hand, it was 
common for at least part of the families’ male siblings to sell their lands to other family members 
and to migrate to other regions and cities, sometimes across the border to Argentina. On the 
other hand, given that they only exceptionally had direct claims over land, women might also 
leave the communities, establishing a clear patrilocal tendency in marriages. However, far from 
cutting ties with their communities of origin, these migrant members of the communities have 
been fundamental in the establishment of multiple relations with other regions and localities 
that feed into the construction of a particular, territorially rooted, identity—they in fact extend 
community ties geographically, as many of these members maintain active relations to their 
lands and families. Moreover, as will be described in greater detail on the next chapter, many of 
                                               
71 By this I mean a proletariat articulated to local capital. These communities indeed produced 
increasing numbers of proletarians in each generation, as plots where subdivided among siblings, and 
land became scarcer. They, however, tended to migrate to cities or other regions (see below).  
72 The inquilino, roughly translated as “tenant”, was a labourer which was allowed to work an estate’s 
marginal lands in exchange for labour for the landlord.  
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these migrations describe a long cycle, in which members of later generations lived a good part 
of their adult lives working outside the territory, but settled back years after, sometimes upon 
retirement. In fact, this situation describes that of a sizeable part of the contemporary resident 
population.  
 
Agriculture and the metabolism of settlement 
During the period following settlement, these thickly forested lands offered what older 
members of the communities remember as a truly exceptional fertility. “Land was very good in 
those years, whatever one sowed, it grew”, as Félix Salazar, a 70 year old inhabitant from Upper 
Huife recalls his father and grandfather telling him. These were lands that had never been sown 
before, and crops grew effortlessly and vigorously amongst the thick ashes of the burnt biomass. 
This production was complemented by the foraging of the various resources offered by the 
forests, such as mushrooms, bamboo shoots, fishing, but above all the seasonal harvesting of 
piñones, which provided a crucial part of winter diets. Timber was also very important for the 
construction of dwellings; the so-called casa canoga73 became the common form of dwelling 
during the settlement period. Most of these cultural elements were, to be sure, acquired from 
the Mapuche knowledge of these forests, and became one of the central pillars of the 
reproduction of settler families during this period. 
Notwithstanding the exceptional fertility, the scale of agricultural production was 
confined to sustaining a subsistence economy in this first stage after settlement, or the first 
generation of settlers. Slash-and-burn agriculture thus provided the metabolic basis for the 
families to establish a foothold in these lands; one that would thoroughly transform these 
valleys, and thus, eventually, the ecological underpinnings and economic strategies of the 
communities as well. As Osvaldo, an older resident of Lower Huife, describes this method:  
One burned [the forest] and after the fire, one sowed. Wheat, broad beans, oats, potatoes. 
We sowed potatoes with a hoe, in the roce [burnt forest]. We just sowed among the roots, 
and covered the seed as best we could. And potatoes grew very well. After, when the root 
rotted, we took the root out and sowed more potatoes. And while there was still tierra de 
hoja [topsoil] left, the harvests were very good. Now the soil does not yield, not as it did … 
the costs are not worth it. … When one burns a plot for the first time it burns only 
                                               
73 This consisted in a one room house made out of long trunks with its centres carved  out—in the 
manner of a canoe with both of its extremes cut out—and  placed against each other in the manner of 
roof tiles, which provided drainage and required almost no other materials. 
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superficially, and all the roots remain underneath. And later the trees start falling, the 
branches, you put them together and then one has to burn it again. But only part of the 
whole land, because the sowed plots were always more or less small. 
This form of agriculture could hardly be sustained for too long, especially given the tendency 
towards a progressive subdivision of family plots. People identify an unequivocal tendency 
throughout the decades towards gradually falling yields due to the exhaustion of the topsoil, as 
the method and growing intensity of cultivation intersected with the sloped nature of the terrain 
and the rainy climate typical of the region, which made the exposed soils vulnerable to erosion. 
As Feliciano, an older member of a Mapuche family in Lower Huife told me, in a matter-of-fact 
yet still lamented way:  
There is none [fertile soil] left, it all got lost. The land is old, as oneself. It doesn’t have 
strength. All its strength went to the sea, the river took it. (…) Because the land has no 
woods, the land is stripped [está pelado], and if it is a slope, everything runs [with the rains]. 
This tendency in agricultural productivity became associated with the growing importance of 
commercial activities in local livelihood strategies, especially from the second generation of 
settlers onwards. These activities grew in importance as tracks were improved, albeit slowly and 
marginally. In particular, the first important commercial activity the communities engaged in 
was the sale of railroad sleepers, which were extracted from the forests that were being cleared 
in this period. These sleepers were made with axes, and transported to local towns in oxen carts. 
This transition was an important characteristic distinguishing the first and second generations 
of settlers, as Osvaldo, who is a second-generation descendent from Chilean settlers, now part 
of the Mapuche community in Lower Huife, explains:  
Before people didn’t sell any wood, everything got burned in order to sow wheat, oats, and 
potatoes. … Afterwards it was that sleepers were being sold, in the second generation, when 
those of us who are 80 were kids. 
This transition was, however, in some ways tendentially inscribed in the socio-ecological 
strategy of the settlement process. The fertility and relatively high yields afforded by slash-and-
burn allowed these communities to gain a foothold in an otherwise hostile environment. Insofar 
as this method proved successful in producing the inhabitability of this valleys, it could not be 
sustained as plots were subdivided, forests receded, and initial fertility declined. The 
transformed socio-ecological conditions necessarily implied a change in the livelihood strategies 
of the following generations, notably the growing role of small-scale commercial exploitation of 
forests—the production of railroad sleepers—and cattle rearing in local economies as 
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agricultural lands were increasingly transformed into pastures and meadows. In this sense the 
changes in the landscape through which the communities in these valleys constituted 
themselves would become increasingly mediated by their relations to local and national 
markets, a process of relentless commodification of the subsistence economies that were 
established through the settlement process. In this way, the process of retreating forests and 
extension of grasslands for cattle became inextricably embedded in this overarching tendency 
towards the commodification of subsistence, which as Bernstein (2010) argues, can be seen as 
one of the defining tendencies of the evolution of peasantries under capitalism over the last 
century. This trajectory will be further explored in the next chapter.  
 
Commons and difference in the socio-territorial constitution of Huife and Llancalil 
Throughout this chapter I have used the term “community” and/or “communities” somewhat 
loosely, as a way to signal the shared identities and relations of solidarity articulated in reference 
to a common relation to the landscape, i.e. identities and solidarities which are, to different 
degrees, territorially rooted, and which, to be sure, have notably permeable and diffuse bounds. 
These territorial identities and the sense of community they imply are important precisely 
because of the salience they have acquired and the crucial role they have played during the 
course of the conflicts around the possibility of the Llancalil hydropower project, and scales 
introduced by it (such as those implied in the notion of ‘national interest’ normally 
accompanying projects such as these). How did such a commons emerge from the process 
described above, one characterized by the convergence of such radical forms of difference?  
As this chapter has described, the historical constitution of these valleys as an inhabited 
space was characterised by the convergence of many different paths and trajectories that had 
emerged from the chaotic process of occupation and primitive accumulation during the last 
decades of the nineteenth century: Mapuche refugees, Chilean landless campesinos, and 
German settlers. The convergence in these remote mountain valleys of families and peoples 
bearers of often radically different histories is a necessarily complex picture to reconstruct, but 
it is clearly sedimented in the complex identities of their descendants, and the way they relate 
to this history. In general terms, these identities, and the stories and testimonies that reflected 
them, suggest a process defined by the generative tension between the production of a 
necessary commons rooted in the co-habitation of these remote mountain valleys, and the 
persistence and evolution of difference, structured around the internally related axes of 
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economic stratification, hierarchically articulated ethnic difference, and gender. Some 
important elements in the material sustainment of these differences, such as the different 
positionalities vis-à-vis the state and the forms of land tenure, have been suggested in the course 
of this chapter. How these tensions have evolved to the present day will be examined in more 
detail in the next one. 
Of the three main ethnic origins of the families in these valleys, the Chilean campesinos 
would end up making up the majority. As I previously described, the Mapuche families 
established themselves on the northern bank of the Liucura River, in what is now Lower Huife, 
while both of the German families settled lands in the upriver Llancalil valley. Chilean families 
would settle in Upper Huife, Llancalil, Papal, and around the Mapuche families in Lower Huife. 
As I described earlier, there were important land conflicts in the first period of settlement, in 
particular between the Mapuche and some neighbouring Chilean settlers. Nonetheless, 
especially with the second and third generations, a clear cultural commons emerged, derived 
from the shared geographical and agrarian conditions, but above all from the gradual 
development of relations of kinship and labour across ethnic lines. As previously mentioned, 
practices taken from Mapuche ecological knowledge, such as piñoneo, and the usage of different 
forest resources became part of the basic territorial knowledge and practice of everyone, 
Chileans and Germans included. Thus a common metabolism emerged, and with it, a common 
cultural ground, which deepened as families intermarried, and new generations grew together. 
These ‘cultural commons’ were expressed in elements such as the technique of making houses, 
the livelihood and productive strategies, food, and symbols of prestige (such as, for instance the 
different types of houses, the ones made of wooden tiles being a symbol of wealth, in contrast 
to the casas canoga). And above all, it was expressed through the creation of identities that 
blurred and/or moved across any strict ethnic boundaries, or highlighted some axes of 
differentiation over others74. This latter point is well illustrated, for instance, by the case of 
Denisse, who is married to the current head of the Millaqueo Mapuche community in Lower 
Huife. Although of German/Chilean descent, she “feels Mapuche”, as she has “lived in the 
cordillera” all her life. Identity is thus, in this case, linked not only to descent, but to a particular 
way of life, and relations of kinship established throughout the course of one’s life. The changing 
relative importance of these different markers of identity needs to be thus seen as contextually 
determined, as different situations shed different light on the complex texture of difference and 
commonality emergent from the history here presented. In particular, and as I will show in the 
                                               
74 For instance, some Mapuche became relatively wealthy vis-à-vis some Chileans, in which case as an 
interviewee put it “at the end of the day, money mattered more as to who was the best of whom”.  
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following chapter, the meaning and value of being ‘Mapuche’ has been subject to many changes 
across the generations, especially as mediating a differentiated relation to state power. 
This chapter has attempted to explore the socio-territorial constitution of what, in the 
context of the current struggles associated to the hydropower plant, appear as a territorial and 
historical commons, and the identities attached to it. These constitute a fundamental part of the 
present conflict, as references to tales told by the previous generations of the hardships and 
struggles involved in the settlement process have become a central part of the local counter-
narratives around the prospect of the hydropower project. The history sedimented in the local 
landscape constitutes a layer of meaning and value that challenge and decentre the discussion 
when placed in terms of ‘how much is the land/river worth’—the crucial but always problematic 
manoeuvre of imposing an exchange value on land or water—, as it necessarily references a 
common social (and ecological) body, one that although not officially legible (it has no 
institutional form), nonetheless arises as part of what Polanyi (2001) referred to as the double 
















5. Living in Huife: semi-proletarianisation, the tourist 
economy, and the shifting grounds of identity  
 
As I highlighted at the beginning of the previous chapter, the history presented there constitutes 
not only an approximation of the way in which the human community in Huife came to be, but 
perhaps more significantly, it describes a centrepiece in the general frame of meaning through 
which, for those whose identities are linked to these places, current events, transformations, 
and trends acquire their collective significance and value—it is in relation to these local histories 
that events appear as either challenges, threats, and/or opportunities. Furthermore, this is a 
frame of meaning inscribed in the local landscape and its changing ecology, in the mountains 
scarred by the fires brought about and endured by previous generations; in the slow march of 
young forests over lands left idle by the slow decline of campesino commercial production; and 
the related new and contested potentials that these lands hold in the context of the determinant 
role that wage labour and semi-urban life have acquired in the livelihoods of the young. In this 
chapter I will describe these and other aspects that, in the context of the conflict introduced by 
the Llancalil hydropower project, have emerged as some of the crucial dimensions of the local 
peoples’ relation to their territories.  
I will first analyse the complexities involved in the differentiated and multifaceted 
relations to the territory entailed by the condition of semi-proletarianisation that define these 
communities in the present. Most people fall at some point in the spectrum that the notion of 
semi-proletarianisation describes—with full-wage dependence at one end, and rural production 
at the other—a position that shifts through the different stages in people’s lives. Among other 
things, this means that when we talk about ‘the community’ we are speaking of a human group 
and a social commons whose geography encompasses but is not limited to to these valleys. It is 
from the internal relations between the different elements in this extended geography of the 
semi-proletarian condition that many of the values of the territory emerge.    
I will then describe the livelihood strategies that are centred in the territory, and place 
particular attention on the deeply ambivalent relation local territorialities have with the tourist 
economy. The tourist economy, through the fraught dialectics between the use-values it has 
projected onto the territory and its effects on real estate dynamics, is locally regarded to be the 
source of the gravest threats to local territories, while at the same time positing the terms in 
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which local futures are envisioned. Finally, I will focus on the issue of ethnic difference and the 
Mapuche condition, as one of the core aspects that have been mobilised in the course of the 
conflict.  
 
Social reproduction and the extended geography of the communities 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the geographies, mobilities, and temporalities of the 
area’s communities make their demographic contours porous and diffuse. As a consequence, 
the complexity of the community’s relations to the territory are hardly susceptible to be derived 
from official census data75, or, for that matter, the studies commissioned by the hydropower 
company for the project’s assessment, which treat the communities as coextensive to 
‘permanent’ residents.  
Of course, official data do reflect important aspects of the communities’ reality and the 
conditions of their social reproduction. It is easy, for example, to observe in the field that an 
important proportion of the permanent residents in the area are over 50 years of age, a pattern 
that is consistent with the national tendency towards a rapid ageing of the rural population. 
These demographic trends are locally perceived and explained mostly in terms of the dwindling 
opportunities that young people find in rural areas such as these, regarding both education and 
work. In one of our first conversations, Luis Hernán, the president of the Millaqueo Millahual 
community, told me that there were very few young adults left in the locality, and most young 
people tend to leave, either to study or work. This for him was a direct effect of the Municipal 
government policies, which, among other things, have in the past years privileged bigger and 
fewer schools, centralised in denser rural areas, and have closed down the local schools in upper 
and lower Huife76. For him, it was clear that these sort of policies made it very difficult to project 
oneself in the area, particularly as a young person. Take for example, the words of Adiba 
Millaqueo’s, Luis’ 36-year-old cousin with whom I spoke in Lower Huife: 
People leave because of work, there is much more work outside than here. [Here] there is 
little work, and whatever little there is, it is only to survive, but not to do other things one 
would like. Por example, in Santiago the boys earn more … they have enough, for example, 
                                               
75 The official census data for the area of study is only disaggregated up to the municipal level, for which 
in 2017 was reported a population 28,523, 63,4% of which is urban, and 35,7% rural.  
76 This contrasted with the policy in the neighbouring Municipality of Curarrehue, where rural schools 
have remained open. 
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to keep on studying. Here the wage is the minimum, one can make do, but not have 
anything more.  
Nevertheless, the situation is much more complicated than the simple linear trend so often 
portrayed of migratory trends draining rural territories of their young; a complexity that was 
reflected in local understandings of these trends. Adiba’s own story is a good example of this. I 
spoke with her and her sister during the late summer, as she took a break from working on her 
then almost finished new cottage in a small plot of land she had inherited in Lower Huife. For 
years she had lived a few miles downriver in Huepil and Lefincul and worked on the local fish 
farms, finally moving to Pucón a few years back. She had thought of selling the plot in Lower 
Huife, “but then”, she told me, “we said ‘no’. Because there is nothing like having a plot of one’s 
own, money goes away, but land doesn’t, it only increases its value. We took the sign off, and 
said, ‘it is no longer for sale’”. When I spoke with her she was still based in Pucón, but was in the 
process of moving back to lower Huife, in order to, as she put it, “exploit tourism”.  
Adiba’s case resonates with the way I found demographic movements to be generally 
understood locally. Although the lack of local opportunities for the young was widely recognised 
as a problem, local explanations were also emphatic in recognising that the out-migration of 
young people, far from severing ties with the territory (which, of course, did also happen in some 
cases), extended the territory’s links to other parts of the region and the country, as many of 
those that left came back, either temporarily or permanently, at some points in their lives. 
Indeed, as mentioned in the previous chapter, migratory patterns have been a part of these 
communities since their inception, and were considered to be a normal part of the long cycles 
of people’s life phases. For instance, Guillermina, at the time head of the Huife Neighbours 
Council, and fierce opponent of the hydropower project, told me, in the context of discussing 
these trends, 
I was raised here, until I was twelve, and then I moved [to Santiago]. I studied, and then I 
studied and worked when I was older. Much later I came back, because it is a root one 
cannot sell. 
In a similar vein, Luis Hernán, told me that, 
Young people leave for Pucón, and beyond. There are many who have gone to the North, 
to work for the mining companies. … What I do notice is that many have the idea of getting 
back here, those that left to work outside because of their profession or trade are now with 
the idea of building [a house] and living here. That’s like their goal. They have the project of 
saving money, and come back to Huife to their territory to build and live out their resting 
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times. Many of the younger ones have the project of returning to Huife. … My cousin next 
door [Adiba], for example, she just arrived to establish herself back here. 
Luis Hernán, who at the time was in his late thirties, is one of the few members of his generation 
in his community who has mostly remained in the territory, and lives permanently in Lower 
Huife. His older brother, Omer, on the other hand, had left for different towns with his family 
years ago, and was now coming most weekends to work a small plot of land in the community. I 
spoke to him when he and his family arrived for a public meeting with the company behind the 
project (see Chapter 7).  
Look, I think that everyone, all the youths, go to towns and cities because there it is easier 
to make a living. In the town you can progress more easily. It is easier in terms of the job, 
education, and everything. But it comes a time in which you stagnate, in the sense that your 
concern is now yourself and your partner, and the little ones take care of their own life. And 
it is at that point in which one wants to go back and spend time in the countryside, you need 
less to get by, less to get through, and that’s how it turns out, I see people of 45 or 50 years 
of age and up, that if they don’t have a safe job it will be hard to get one. So one also sees 
this from that angle, and the day I am without a job I don’t want to work for a boss any more 
[no quiero volver más a trabajar apatronado], you want to come back, the land is there, 
work with just a little bit, and make life. 
In this way, it is easy to see that the community of people that cultivate both material and 
symbolic links to these lands far exceeds those that appear at first sight as the ‘permanent’ 
residents. Furthermore, this is a condition that, as explained in the previous chapter, finds its 
roots in some of the inheritance aspects of the agrarian structure, and the tendency toward 
patrilocality in marriages; conditions that make both the young and female more mobile. As 
such, for these communities mobility is far from being an extrinsic characteristic, although its 
conditions and intensity are strongly modulated by the effects that the neoliberal era has had 
upon livelihoods, real estate, municipal policies, etc. Many like Guillermina, who are now 
permanent residents, migrated to cities at some point during their lives, some made most of 
their lives there, to finally come back to the territory after they turned 50. The few conversations 
I was able to have with young people—which were much more rare due to the fact that most of 
them lived in regional towns studying, working, or in some cases doing military service—far from 
reflecting a purported severance of new generations from rural territorialities, expressed the 
myriad ways in which the territory participates in the complex geographies through which the 
life-histories that make up these generational layers of the communities take place. For instance, 
just as I was introducing myself to the community, I had a brief exchange with a young man, 
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possibly around 17 or 18 years old, who was doing his military service and had come back home 
to visit. I had come asking for his mother, who I had been told lived in a small cottage just by the 
side of the portion of the river the Llancalil project would drain. After he told me that she was 
not there, he went on to say that he loved this valley in which he grew up, and that he would 
stop anyone who would mess up the river in front of his house by any means necessary, 
including, he said, sabotaging the machinery with his friends. His links with the land seemed far 
from severed. Another example was that of a member of the Goeppinger family, in his late 
twenties, who had studied in Temuco, and now lived in Pichares, a few miles downstream. He 
was at the time involved in setting up a tourist network/circuit specially focused on the Liucura 
valley, including the localities of Huife and Llancalil, where his family had lands. These are some 
examples of the constant glimpses one could come across of the many ways in which important 
parts of the communities were present in absentia; of how, in spite of distance, their relations 
to the territory retained their symbolic and material significance.   
There were multiple ways in which these relations were expressed in the conversations 
I had. The reasons people gave for coming back to these lands, for example, varied, but most 
revolved around the feelings of attachment to the land, a feeling associated with the way in 
which these valleys participate in people’s sense of identity. For many, as for example Omer, it 
is the contrast with the very experience of urban life and wage labour that gives life in the 
countryside much of its value; ie. the fact that, while it offers little by the way of economic 
possibilities, having land does give a sense of security and autonomy many times lacking in urban 
life. The common environmental qualities of the territory also become much more valued by 
those that have lived in urban settings; references to tranquility, abundance and quality of water 
(see Chapter 6), silence, etc, were often brought up in conversations about these issues. Take 
for example what Graciela Krausse, who lives in Llancalil, told me when I asked what she valued 
most of living in these lands: 
The tranquility of nature, because here, imagine, one sometimes doesn’t even know what 
day it is (laughs)... and here one is free because, for example, there in town one has a time 
schedule, one has to conform to certain obligations… here one is one’s own boss, if I want I 
skip work for a day, or [work] just what is needed and that’s it. But if one has a boss [si está 
apatronado] one has to comply. One has greater independence here. It is harder, but there 
is a freedom… The cost also, here it is cheaper, in the town one has to buy everything. And 
[what] if you don’t have money? Here, on the other hand, say you don’t have much money, 
but you have the meat that you produce, an orchard, so then it is not so bad, or one has at 
least enough to defend oneself, but the one who works in town, if you don’t have a job 
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you’re screwed. … That’s the difference, here if the campesino goes hungry it would be… 
you’d have to be really lazy (laughs). 
In Graciela’s testimony, life in the territory offers a certain degree of autonomy from the work 
and time discipline imposed by wage dependence that characterises urban life (Thompson 
1967), a question that in our conversation she weaved seamlessly with environmental qualities 
such as tranquility, and free access to water, forests, and other resources. For Adiba and Omer, 
who were both in the process of transition back to their community’s lands, these same 
elements stood out, and were similarly attached to the environmental qualities of the landscape.  
It is important to point out that, in this sense, many of the values locally attached to the 
territory emerge from the internal relations between the different elements that make up the 
extended geographies of social reproduction in these communities, a geography of partial 
proletarianisation expressed in life-histories that navigate and negotiate between wage work 
and the self-creating possibilities opened by the city, and the ‘austere autonomy’ and sense of 
identity offered by their rural territories. The relative importance of these values, of course, 
changes throughout the different phases of people’s lives, and the different concerns and needs 
that each of these phases imply. 
 
Livelihoods and territory: living in Huife 
One thing one can conclude from the previous section, is that while the different places of work 
constitute differentiated relations to the territory, it is impossible to approach these 
communities through a strict distinction between those ‘who left’ and those that ‘remain’. The 
dynamics involved in different livelihood strategies normally situate people on different points 
along a spectrum between, at one end, those that have left and settled elsewhere, and, on the 
other, those that largely depend on activities that take place in Huife itself. In this section I will 
look more closely to these latter strategies. In general, and especially for those of younger 
families with access to land (whether their own or their extended families’), these strategies 
tend to combine several different sorts of activities, which may range from working different 
trades and/or wage labour in the area or in nearby towns, to commercial livestock rearing, and 
production for household consumption. Luis Hernán from lower Huife explained to me that 
“generally, young families have a variety of sources of income. I, for instance, live off making 
furniture, off renting the cottages I’ve built, off my sheep, some gathering, etc.” Nevertheless, 
the combination and proportion of these different activities varies considerably between 
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families; while some rely almost exclusively on cattle production—as is particularly the case for 
many families in upper Huife and Llancalil—others rely much more heavily on wage work, or on 
the different local aspects of the tourism economy. In the case of most if not all of members of 
older generations, the basic government pension (Pensión Básica Solidaria de Vejez), which at 
the time amounted to a monthly payment of around 130 USD, constitutes a fundamental, if 
precarious, base for their household’s economies. This is especially true for those that cannot 
rely too much on direct support from younger members of the family.  
 
Cattle rearing 
The main form of commercial production for the more permanent residents in the area has for 
many years now been livestock rearing, cattle in particular. As described in the previous chapter, 
the main ecological transformation that came as a consequence of (and condition for) the first 
generations’ settlement of this area consisted in the clearing of forests through slash and burn 
subsistence agriculture and small-scale commercial production of railroad sleepers. This would 
tendentially degrade the soil conditions that sustained the (initially exceptional) agricultural 
yields, which would in turn eventually give way to the cultivation of pastures for cattle.   
Nowadays, this activity mostly combines the cultivation of oat and clover fields, and the seasonal 
combined usage of the different ecological levels in the mountains77. Many grazing areas 
correspond to a patchwork of bush and grass lands and the secondary forests that have slowly 
reclaimed the mountain slopes over the past few decades. Nowadays, it is common to see cattle 
roaming freely between pastures and young forests, grazing on grass and the local bamboo 
species known as quila (chusquea quila), as well as, in season, on the piñones seeds shed by the 
araucaria forests located in the higher parts of the mountains. Nestor Salazar, who lives in Papal 
and for whom cattle rearing constitutes his main activity, says that,  
one cultivates meadows to reap fodder, pastures they call them. That is what is being mostly 
done now. … One cultivates the land first, to kill off the weeds, the grasses, and then one 
sows the oats with the clover, and you get the pasture.  
 
                                               
77 This is the seasonal alternation between pasturing sites, in Chile known as invernadas (winter 
grazelands) and veranadas (summer grazelands); the former in the lower parts of the valleys, and the 
latter normally consisting in the natural meadows and undergrowth in high parts of the mountains.  
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Figure 16. Pastures and grazing grounds in Llancalil. Taken by author, March 2016. 
The continued access of animals to water sources is fundamental to this activity, and it is one of 
the main concerns people in upper Huife have regarding the hydropower project, since cattle 
normally access the river to drink in the area that would be directly affected.  
The varieties bred in the area are those for meat production, normally Angus, plus one 
variety locally known as Clavela. Generally the animals are sold live to intermediaries who then 
take them to the regional markets and fairs. Baltazar Matus, who has lands on both upper Huife 
and Llancalil, says that “the calves are sold at the fair, in Freire [in the coastal parts of the region]. 
We sell them live. A full calf would be around 280 or 300 thousand pesos”, around 440 USD. 
According to the people I interviewed, prices have been for years on a downward trend, in 
particular in relation to the price of land, which has increased dramatically (see section below). 
Marta, from upper Huife, says that   
The price of the animals is always getting worse. It is almost not worth it to raise them. They 
pay too little for a live animal, but they do charge a lot for meat … so one basically works 
for the butchers. … The animals used to be have a much better price, and the land was 
cheap. Before, for just one calf one could get a hectare of land. Now a hectare around here 
is around 5 million pesos, imagine how many calves one would have to sell to buy a hectare, 
like ten for a hectare of land. ... No, I think that now animals are not worth anything. We 
got to buy land back in those years, when it was still cheap. Now we don’t buy anything, it 
is too expensive. 
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I this sense, most describe the situation as one in which, if one has enough land, you can sustain 
yourself—“it is enough to eat”—but it is hardly enough to generate significant savings. 
 
Production and gathering for household consumption 
Cattle rearing, which tends to be a male-dominated activity, is usually complemented by a very 
varied range of activities for household consumption, which tend in turn to be done by women; 
although neither of these are strict norms. Nearly all houses have some kind of backyard orchard 
in which a great diversity of species are cultivated, like tomatoes, chards, beans, quinoa, maize, 
squash, and many others. A great proportion of houses also have small greenhouses, in which 
production is carried on year-round. Fruit trees like apple, peach, cherry, and maqui78 are also 
common in people’s backyards. Cultivation of potato, an important local staple food, is also very 
common for household consumption. Backyard animals normally found in the area include 




Figure 17. A domestic orchard in Papal. Taken by the author, March 2016.  
 
                                               




Figure 18. Fruit trees in Papal, overlooking lower Huife. Taken by the author, March 2016. 
The gathering and usage of different forest products plays an important role as well. Of these, 
perhaps the most important one is firewood, which, being as it is the main local source of 
combustion for heating and cooking throughout the year, constitutes a fundamental resource 
for households, and in some cases may also be sold. Timber is also harvested for certain 
construction needs, like fences, sheds, or simple kinds of furniture (which, at least in the case of 
Luis Hernán, was also a commercial activity). Different edible fungi species, like digueñe (Cyttaria 
espinosae) and changle (Ramaria flava), which respectively grow on and underneath the hualle 
trees that dominate the surrounding secondary forests, are gathered during the season. In 
addition, there is a wide range of medicinal plants that are used locally, both by Mapuche and 
non-Mapuche families. Osvaldo Ibarra in lower Huife says that, 
People still gather the poleo, the mint, llanten, matico, paramela, and quinchamalí. … Some 
of these have to be gathered in the Reserve [the old-growth forests in the adjacent 
Huerquehue National Park], but in addition not too long ago we gathered trunes and michay 
root, nalcas, chilco, and oak bark, mallín mud, to use them as wool dye.  
Wild berries such as blackberries and sweet-brier also grow copiously in the local meadows. 
These are normally collected during the summer months and conserved either as jams, or 
prepared as kuchen, a sort of baked tart of German origin typical of the region. Both of these 






Figure 19. Picture taken by the author in Llancalil, with quila bamboo and berry bushes in the front, and 




Figure 20. Forests between Llancalil and upper Huife where people gather different products, and the 
potential site through which the hydropower plant’s pipes would pass. Taken by the author, March 1206 
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Also, as described in the previous chapter, the seasonal foraging of the araucaria pine nuts, or 
piñones, has historically been, and continues to be, an important source of winter food, both for 
human and animal consumption. Finally, the fishing of rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) in 
the Liucura river used to provide another significant source of food; however, most people say 
that the amount and size of fish have diminished considerably over the last decades79, and now 
people rarely rely on this activity. Luis Hernán, speaking of these last activities says that,  
People gather digueñes, blackberries, nalcas, the changles and gargales, which we go to 
upper Huife and Llancalil to get, the same as piñones, which there one can find more, and of 
a better quality. And fishing on the river … well, overfishing has taken a toll. Before, fifteen 
years ago, one could go and bring something back for dinner, but now if one goes fishing to 
bring something for dinner, one will have to make do without dinner.   
 
Forests and markets 
As we saw in the previous chapter, during most of the communities’ history commercial forestry, 
tethered as it was to a peasant economy of subsistence production, remained small in scale. It 
consisted of the production of railroad sleepers for sale in local town markets; the supply of 
which also remained limited by the precarious means of transport and roads that connected 
these towns to frontier forest territories such as Huife. This was also production done with very 
limited technical means, which mostly consisted of axes and hand-operated saws. It was only 
during the 1960s that some settlers invested in sawmills, powered by small water turbines, on 
which other local people worked as wage labourers as well. By all accounts, however, the overall 
impact of these sawmills remained limited. Baltazar Matus told me, pointing to the other side 
of his land in Llancalil, that “just there the German settler who was around bought a sawmill, 
and with the waterfall he made a turbine, and that’s how it worked. … With the years more 
people started buying those motor-powered sawmills”. 
During the early eighties however, outside companies started to rent forests to some families 
for exploitation. Matus told me that, during those years,  
Big firms started coming in. Martiní was one … there was another based in Villarrica that 
was called Ecomabi [?] … it bought forests and exploited timber. … The owner of the land 
                                               
79 There are many possible reasons for this, the most important of which is probably overfishing in 
spawning season downstream. Some people I talked with also said that the logging company workers that 
came to upper Huife during the late eighties fished them to near extinction. The rainbow trouts—and 
more rarely some other native species—that are seen rarely nowadays reach edible size.  
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over there sold them its trees, and that firm brought a sawmill and put people and exploited 
the forests during those times. They took the timber and later the young trees started 
growing, it became forested again. … And later, the owner of those other lands sold all 
pellines and coihues to Martiní…. That was around ‘86. And they only left thin trees that 
didn’t have enough wood, they took all the thick ones, and left the hollow ones for seeds. 
This was the first time in which clear cuts began to happen at a larger scale, the effects of which 
are still visible in the slopes surrounding Llancalil and upper Huife. According to some 
interviewees, the presence of big groups of logging workers had a considerable effect, in 
particular on the river’s fauna, as they fished them at an apparently unprecedented rate. After 
the original forest fires originated in the settlement period, this moment clearly marked a high 
point of deforestation in these valleys.  
Nevertheless, as Matus observes, now most of the mountain slopes surrounding the valleys are 
covered in young trees. During the decades following this period, the relative marginalisation of 
campesino production and the transformations in the agricultural sector associated with the 
deployment of the neoliberal project—ie. the official favouring of a model centred in 
agroindustrial export production—have led to the intensification of migration to towns by the 
new generations mentioned previously, who see little future in farming. Of course, this has 
implied the deintensification of agricultural and cattle production in the territory; one of the 
consequences of which has been this sustained natural regeneration of forest cover, as seen in 
the ubiquitous secondary forests, dominated by young hualle and coihue trees, that have slowly 






Figure 21. Picture taken by the author in upper Huife shows, on the opposite slope, the secondary 
forests in an area that had been affected by both fire, and later, logging. March 2016. 
 
 
Figure 22. Border between a patch of young forest, and cattle grazing grounds, with some scattered 
dried quila bamboo, and blackberry bushes. Taken by the author, March 2016. 
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Huife and the tourist economy 
The overarching tourist economy that defines the Municipality of Pucón constitutes a 
determinant context for the different livelihood strategies of the community in Huife, the 
challenges and threats it faces, and the terms in which possible futures are locally envisaged. 
The aspects of the local economy and territoriality related to this therefore merit separate 
treatment.  
Pucón has been an important node in the national geographies of tourism since very 
early on, in particular since the construction of the Great Pucón Hotel (Gran Hotel Pucón), built 
in 1934 by the State Railway Company (Empresa de Ferrocarriles del Estado), as a part of a 
general policy of incentivising national travel (Martínez 2014). During the ensuing decades, the 
place this region would have in national geographical imaginaries would shift from being an 
‘uncivilised’ forest frontier—a place for timber extraction and a transit route to Argentina—to a 
place characterised by ‘pristine’ nature, manifested in its fish-filled lakes and its old-growth 
forests, a ‘natural heritage of the nation’. This was a process of ideological integration into a 
consolidating national geography in which both the establishment of National Parks and the 
Railway Company’s travel publications that circulated in the country’s main urban centres would 
play an important role (Espinosa 2016). Tourism in this stage focused on its lakeside beaches, 
hot springs, national parks, and sports fishing, and appealed to a relatively elite, mostly national, 
public. From the 1970s onwards, the opening and/or pavement of new roads made the 
municipal territory much better connected to the larger regional towns, and also made an 
increasingly larger portion of its territory accessible (Ibid.). This would open the way for an 
important shift towards mass tourism, especially concentrated in the summer months (ie. 
January and February). As a consequence, to the use-values and imaginaries that the above 
mentioned process of integration projected onto the Municipal territory, a great deal of new 
ones would be progressively added. For instance, during the last decades Pucón has 
consolidated its place within the global geographies of adventure sports tourism: it hosts an 
annual triathlon part of the Ironman international circuit, its rivers have become a famous 
location for white water sports such as rafting and kayak, its adjacent National Parks are a 
popular trekking destination, and the Villarrica volcano has become one of the important skiing 
and mountaineering spots in southern Chile. In addition, Pucon has also become an important 
node of both ‘sun and beach’ and nightlife-oriented tourism, centred around its lake beaches, 
casinos, restaurants, bars, etc. More recently, ethnic tourism circuits have also opened, centred 
around local Mapuche culture, something particularly noticeable in the adjacent Municipality of 
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Curarrehue80. The area has also become a focal point for what has been termed ‘alternative’ 
forms of tourism and ‘amenity migration’, which are expressed in everything from spiritual 
healing centres, to yoga ashrams, to private conservation projects of a ‘deep ecological’ 
orientation (Zunino & Hidalgo 2010). All of this has implied a significant growth81 and 
diversification of the tourist and resident population, as both categories have increasingly 
incorporated a much wider range of regional and national middle classes, and an increasingly 
important foreign population from Argentina, Europe, and North America, among other places.  
In this way, the region’s incorporation into the national geography through the cultural 
imaginaries of the tourist economy has implied the historical territorialisation of a very diverse 
and contradictory spectrum of values—linked to conservation, new forms of spirituality, leisure, 
sporting circuits, etc.—that pervade all aspects of the municipal geography, and are closely 
attached to environmental qualities that the capitalist tourist economy itself, which enabled this 
process, increasingly tends to erode82. This complicated web of values and the contradictory 
manner in which they unfold through the region’s ecology, is a condition with which not only 
local territorialities have to constantly negotiate, but also one that the company behind the 
Llancalil project has had to confront, as they constitute one of the main vectors of opposition to 
the Llancalil project at the Municipal level (see Chapter 7).  
These contradictions are locally experienced in many forms. On the one hand, the 
livelihoods of many local families are heavily reliant, either directly or indirectly, on the tourist 
economy. This is particularly, though not exclusively, true for the younger families, for whom 
staying in this region normally entails working on some area related to tourism, either as 
employed in the service industry in the town of Pucón, or on setting up small-scale enterprises 
                                               
80 Curarrehue used to be part of the Municipality of Pucon until 1980, when it was constituted as a distinct 
comuna, or Municipality. While also in the orbit of Pucon’s tourism economy, Curarrehue is distinguished 
by a much greater proportion of rural and Mapuche population. Huife is located very close to the limit 
between the two Municipalities. 
81 This is illustrated in the fact that between the 1992 and 2002 censuses there was a 47% population 
growth in the Municipality, from 14,356 to 21,107 inhabitants. In the last 2017 census, the population 
stood at 28,523. 
82 This contradiction is illustrated by the nearly universal complains one hears from both residents and 
visitors to Pucon and its surroundings, regarding what were often described as unbearable conditions of 
overcrowdedness and saturation the Municipal territory faces during the summer season. This was added 
to comments on rising prices, spatial segregation of the local population in Pucón, water shortages, 
pollution, and the seemingly out of control dynamics of real estate development, many of which are 
expressed in the area of study, as I will show below. As an example of what was perceived as a near 
collapse of normal life during the frantic summer months, during the summer I did my field work, at peak 
hour what would have been under normal conditions a 25 minute car ride from the place I was staying to 
the town of Pucon could take nearly 3 to 4 hours—ie. a 15-mile-long traffic jam on a one lane highway. 
One can only imagine the reaction of those who had come expecting an escape from urban ills. 
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in rural areas like restaurants, shops with local produce, camping sites, etc. From the perspective 
of Luis Hernán in lower Huife,  
Pucón is a municipality that depends on tourism. We are all in one way or another related 
to tourism, be it working for some tourism company, or whether animals sell better due to 
tourism. So everyone is at least indirectly involved in tourism, it is like the net that drives 
the system here. 
The Liucura valley, and the name of Huife in particular, figures in the Municipal tourism circuit 
mainly through the several hot springs that dot the sides of the river, most of which have been 
developed into spa centres, with pools, hotels, and restaurants. The most famous of these is the 
Hotel Termas Huife, located in Lower Huife, on which some of the local people are employed. 
Around one mile upriver towards upper Huife there is also the somewhat less exclusive Termas 
Los Pozones. Both centres receive a great number of visitors all-year-round, and have given the 
area a certain notoriety in the Municipal tourist circuit, and beyond. These have come to define 
the economic context for local families, and, according to Luis, now “much of our subsistence 
has come to depend on different tourism enterprises, in this case the hot springs. Many of the 
young families here work in the hot springs, or at least someone [in their family] does”.     
As Luis Hernán points out, these centres are for some families in the communities a 
source of employment, and in the case of Los Pozones, which is owned by a local family, a main 
source of income. However, the main local impact of these centres is an indirect one: as they 
draw people to the locality, they have opened space for local families to sell a range of home 
made products—jams, pies, eggs, cheese, bread, honey, vegetables—as well as opportunities to 
offer services such as trekking and horseback tours to the adjacent Huerquehue National Park, 
both formal and informal camping sites, the rental of cottages and rooms, and access to fishing 
spots. Nery from lower Huife says that,  
I have a cottage, … and I do my publicity through the internet. I work as well, so most of my 
income is from tourism really. … The other thing that people do a lot here is selling kuchen, 
homemade bread [pan amasado], and other kinds of homemade products. Pucón is far from 
here, so people look for these sort of things. 
In addition, it was due to the hot spring centres and the tourist traffic that they draw, that the 
road that traverses the valley was paved a few years ago, all the way up to Los Pozones, where 
the road divides into the two unpaved roads that lead to upper Huife and Llancalil. One 
consequence of this has been a rise in property prices, with the concomitant pressure to sell 
plots. This has led to a constant trickle of plots being converted into rural residential properties 
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and country houses for the urban middle and upper classes, either for direct use, or in some 
cases for rent. Among other things, this implies a constant negotiation, in many cases friction, 
between different ways of relating to the landscape; in particular between its use as a space of 
leisure, and as a space of sustenance. For instance, in a conversation we had on this issue among 
several neighbours in lower Huife, Guillermina complained about her low-intensity but constant 
tug-of-war with a neighbour who had bought a plot adjacent to her’s, and then built some 
cabins, which he rents out to tourists during the summer season. As a consequence, she has had 
to deal with what in her eyes was the utter obliviousness of these tourists, who are in the habit 
of leaving the fences open on their way to a nice river spot in front of her plot—opportunities 
of escape her pigs seized upon without fail—and who happily stepped on her growing winter 
fodder as if it were any sort of weed. “These are people who come once a year, they just set up 
camp, and that’s it”. Guillermina’s experience was acknowledged with a knowing nod by those 
present, who then also shared their own similar stories.  
While this is something that has been going on for decades, and rarely escalates beyond 
these sorts of frictions, there has recently been an intensification and upscaling of this process 
in the lower parts of the valley which threatens to take this to a qualitatively different level: the 
acquisition and subdivision of formerly large estates throughout the valley by developers, who 
later sell small plots as rural residential or vacation properties. For many of the people I 
interviewed, this constituted a worrying tendency. When I did my fieldwork, for instance, there 
was one such new project in Huepil, a few miles downriver from Huife. This project—rather 
pompously named “Altos del Huife”— was a particularly large and visible one which had 
subdivided a large estate into a gated community of more than 160 plots, most of which still 
remained unsold. The plots were at the time being marketed in a glossy office in central Pucón. 
Projects such as these one have led to a sense of alienation on the part of some of the people I 
interviewed, in more than one respect. First there tends to be a negative aesthetic judgment, as 
the project’s architecture, density, and organisation of space jarrs with these places’ vernacular 
spatial and aesthetic qualities. Luis Hernán says that, “I see Quetroleufu, I see Huepil, and it’s 
ugly. There are many houses of an urban style. … there is too much population”. The 
disconnection of these developments from the local sense of space and place is further 
expressed by the way in which the toponym ‘Huife' has been appropriated and resignified during 
the course of this process: from denoting a particular place in the local geographies (which for 
the inhabitants of Huife is linked to a sense of identity and a history), it has turned into a 
marketing brand broadly associated with the upper Liucura valley in general, one of the 
consequences of it being originally integrated into the geography of tourism mainly through the 
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hot springs centre that bears the name. This has led to the name being used in everything from 
roadside restaurants on the way to the hot springs, to the aforementioned gated community, 
which is actually located miles from where Huife even begins. “Huife sells, Huife has become a 
brand. In Huepil, all new restaurants, all new plot subdivisions, they are calling them ‘Huife’”, 
says Luis Hernán, to which his sister Nery compounds, “it makes me angry, because they just call 
it Huife to sell, but people that are [supposedly] coming to ‘Huife’ just stay down over there”. In 
this way, and in general terms, the tendencies in the valley bear a strong family resemblance to 
processes of gentrification in cities, in which, through the shifting relations of value and land, 
communities and their territorialities become fragmented and ultimately displaced, as in this 
case rural spaces are subsumed under the motley geographies of the middle and upper classes 
(see Phillips 2004; 1993; 2005; Phillips & Smith 2018).  
The broader consequences beyond the gates of these sort of projects, yet to fully unfold, 
also generate a sense of uncertainty among some of those I spoke with. Fernando Goeppinger, 
a descendant of German settlers in Llancalil who had recently graduated from university in 
Temuco, wondered, “those people [the buyers of the plots in the gated community] will need 
everything… what happens with all [of the trash and waste], where does it go?”. And indeed, 
one of the reasons words like ‘collapse’ and ‘overflow’ get thrown around frequently in local 
descriptions of tourism in the municipality, is that there has historically been little integrated 
planning around projects such as these, so that issues such as water provision, traffic, and waste 
disposal have tended to be confronted piecemeal once they become a problem. 
And nevertheless, the fact that Fernando wondered about this as we talked in front of 
his roadside stall where he sold local produce to tourists, illustrated the deeply contradictory 
relation local people and their territorialities have with the tourism economy—a fact that did 
not escape Fernando. For him, and many of the people I spoke with, tourism simultaneously 
constituted the terms in which they thought of the conditions of possibility for the future 
economic viability of their territories, and one of the main vectors of threats they faced. This 
ambivalence, in my experience, is the defining characteristic of the local relation to the tourism 
economy. 
Regarding these tendencies and contradictions, Adiba Millaqueo—the woman of the Millaqueo 
family in Lower Huife who at the time was in the process of moving back to the community from 
Pucón—told me that  
to tell you the truth I don’t like it. There are more people, it is getting too populated. And it 
is nice to be by oneself. Moreover, they start felling trees, they start constructions. But on 
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the other hand, there are more jobs. There are a lot of rich people houses, and people go 
to clean them up, especially in the summer season.  
Her case, however, exemplified the kind of choices that tourism present to the local families. 
After being tempted for a long while by the rising prices, she had finally decided to keep the 
land, and indeed moving back to lower Huife with “the plan of exploiting tourism”, to which she 
added, tongue-in-cheek, “why then do they come? If they come to mess with our tranquility, at 
least I am going to do that”. She was planning on building her own cottage to rent out in the 
summer season, an alternative many in Lower Huife had done, or were planning to. For her, the 
crucial issue had become how to engage with the tourist economy while retaining control over 
the land.  
Adiba’s case was brought up by her cousin Luis Hernán in the above mentioned meeting 
we had among several neighbours in Lower Huife to talk about the general situation on the 
locality. For him, the option taken by Adiba constituted the main alternative to what he 
perceived as an ever-rising tide of real estate speculation that could only culminate in the 
disintegration of the territory. 
This [the subdivision and selling of plots] was what worried me, but then I started to see 
that my cousins were wanting to come back, and the vision of my aunts and uncles of saying 
‘I want to let my sons build something’, not to sell, I see that that tendency is taking place, 
and one can tell. The people have become conscious, the older generations, to say, ‘I am 
not selling, so that [the land] remains with my people’. If one looks around, it is mostly the 
fundos [the larger estates, most of them in the lower parts of the Liucura valley] that are 
getting subdivided. 
Nevertheless, as Luis and everyone else present recognised, by themselves these sorts of 
individual choices are unlikely to constitute an effective basis for establishing a certain degree 
of local control over what goes on in the valley. Guillermina, for instance, recognised that many 
plots have not been sold yet only because the old generation is still living in them, but once they 
are gone, there is a great likelihood that many of the younger generation will sell, and especially 
if land prices continue to rise, as they are likely to.  
As we were speaking of these issues, Pablo, a Mapuche activist from Pucón friends of 
the Millaqueo family, arrived at the campsite in which we were meeting, for an unrelated visit. 
As he sat down and overheard the conversation, he told us of the case of Quetroleufu, a 
Mapuche area much closer to the town of Pucón, where the situation was “much worse”, and 
that had recently managed to come up with a communaly drafted land-use plan that was at the 
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time being negotiated with the Municipal government. “This is the only way to control this”, he 
said, as everyone agreed, “because now Pucón is completely overwhelmed”. This opened a 
deeper conversation, which touched on what I think are some of the core issues emergent from 
the virtually complete subordination of the Municipal territories to the capitalist tourist 
economy. Luis reflected that, 
Here in Pucón tourism was imposed as ‘the thing’, and, of course, I do think tourism is vital 
for Pucón… but they presented the matter as: the tourist comes, and we have to give 
everything to the tourist, … let's sell cheaply, let’s work cheaply, so that the next year she/he 
returns. So a mentality of idolatry of the tourist was created. And the technical talks the 
Municipality gave encouraged that. And now I realize, as we have collapsed, that once 
March [the end of summer holiday season] is here, one often hears in [Pucon’s] 
supermarket ‘thank God these fucking tourists left’ (laughs). It is the collapse. 
This expressed the general consensus that was emerging from the conversation: the fact that 
Pucón’s communities and their territories had to work for the tourist economy, and not the other 
way around. For Pablo, this was expressed in the political dynamics of the Municipal government 
he had become acquainted with during his years as a local organiser:  
This has to do with how the authority imposes a form of development, not a development 
that is defined from the ground up, in which communities define how they are to live and 
develop. … So then people say, ‘I don’t want this job, the pay is bad, they intervene the 
forests, they intervene the rivers, one cannot go to Pucón as one used to’. … because of that 
form of development, the great investors come to invest, and the only thing one can do is 
to give labour, and some services. But one doesn’t have the possibility of developing and 
establishing some enterprise. Because nowadays in Pucón … local people have no possibility 
of competing, because the big ones come from Santiago with huge amounts of money, huge 
businesses, and locally one doesn’t stand a chance. That is closed. Local people have no 
possibilities beyond being a worker. 
As the conversation drew to a close, there was a shared sense of how tourism had become a 
sort of unfettered beast that threatened to destroy not only the very socio-ecological conditions 
upon which it was premised, but with it rural territorialities and their future viability. The 
increasingly large investments being constantly poured into the Municipal territory translated 
not only into pressures upon local control over land, but also into an extremely uneven playing 
field in which the local population could scarcely find any place other than being a reserve of 
cheap labour power. In other words, from the point of view of rural territorialities, tourism and 
its contradictions were developing through a process of relentless proletarianisation of rural 
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communities, the flipside of which was the process of rural gentrification, as the Municipal 
territory became subsumed under the demands of mass tourism. 
Nevertheless, this local consensus on the worrying tendencies of the tourist economy 
generally appears in tension with the also generalised, but normally unspecified, hope in the 
possibility of a different way in which tourism could respond to the needs of the local 
communities and not the other way around; a possibility that was glimpsed in several local 
initiatives, all albeit still small-scale and somewhat incipient. A possibility also constantly 
highlighted by the interest of tourists from all around the world in these lands, which for many 
of the people I spoke with is a direct expression of their territories’ ‘natural wealth’, of the fact 
that the rivers run clean, native forests still stand, and tranquility is still found. Locally managed, 
tourism was generally considered to constitute a possibility of permanence of local 
communities, their livelihoods, and their links to these lands, ie. their territories. And crucially, 
it was this, the potential rather than the actual aspects entailed by the enrollment of their 
territories in the geographies of tourism, that underpinned much of the local resistance to the 
projected hydropower plant (see Chapter 7). In other words, the resistance to the intervention 
of hydropower was not, at least not only, about preservation of their current situation—which, 
as we saw, was locally perceived as entirely problematic—but of the possibilities that this 
situation still was locally regarded to hold. Take for example what Osvaldo told me, at his 83 
years of age, of what he saw as the main avenue for the future of his community in lower Huife, 
Here there is a lot to exploit regarding tourism. Because people here, there are many who 
have a beautiful section of the river and can do what we have here [the Araucaria camping 
site]. And others are starting to do it, and have a little extra income. … But there are many 
that have a place at least for them to go and have some mate by the river, in a beautiful 
place. And people [tourists] value what we have, and they are opposed to the hydropower 
plants. … I think that we need to exploit tourism in what we have. Because here we have 90 
hectares in total, and those can be explored with treks, paths, there’s native forests. … To 
do walks, horseback rides — I dream of making a canoga shed up over there, with a trek, to 
take the tourists and tell them how houses used to be here.    
It is important to note, with Osvaldo, that this alternative form of engaging with tourism is not 
entirely confined to potentiality, but it is already glimpsed in a lot of instances, some of which 
were notable in the degree of collective organisation they involved. Perhaps the most 
economically important local initiative is the Los Pozones hot springs centre, which is managed 
by a local family and has grown considerably over the years. However, this, like other individual 
initiatives already mentioned—ie. the building of cottages for rent, and the small-scale sale of 
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traditional products, or the organisation of occasional treks—, normally do not transcend the 
household in its scale of organisation. There was, for instance, the case of the Cariman Sanchez 
community in their relatively recently acquired lands in Llancalil. As explained in the 
Introduction, these lands were acquired for the community by the CONADI, as a way of resolving 
a conflict over land restitution in another part of the region. For the persons from this 
community with whom I talked, one of the main value of these lands resides in their perceived 
potential to develop a communally managed tourism project. During the time I was in the field, 
members of this community routinely visited their lands in Llancalil exploring potential trekking 
routes, and were in the process of building 3 cottages with the idea of some day receiving 
tourists.       
Another interesting instance is that of the Araucaria camping site of the Millaqueo 
family, notable in the way it has also been an instance in which the community has experimented 
with alternative forms of organisation, such as setting up a cooperative. For members of the 
cooperative, this project significance goes beyond the economic, but reaches into the socio-
political, as, in the words of a member, it “has built a certain degree of autonomy”, which he 
understood as collective capacities for action beyond simply dealing with the state, as most local 
organisations are limited to.  
 
Figure 23. The Araucaria camping site in lower Huife. The Liucura River runs to the left of this picture. 
Taken by the author, March 2016. 
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In sum, the enrolment of these territorialities in the global geographies of tourism has unleashed 
a fraught and markedly ambivalent process, in which rural territories both are swooped up in 
the vortex of land speculation and gentrification tendencies implicated in the dynamics of real 
estate, and at the same time have acquired new use values which for local people open the 
possibility of finding a new place for rural territories in an otherwise hostile world. The hope, 
sketched in local aspirations, of a tourist economy tethered to the class interests of rural 
communities, if entirely within the realm of possibility, remains remote in the context of the 
balances of power that shape Municipal politics in Pucón.      
 
Being Mapuche in Huife 
One of the most visible dimensions of the conflict introduced by the Llancalil hydropower project 
has been the way in which it has foregrounded the shifting meanings and value of the notion of 
‘being Mapuche’, a condition shared especially among the families in lower Huife. On the one 
hand, the emphasis that in the course of local resistance to the hydropower project has been 
placed on the ways local territorialities are linked to indigenous identity has opened new political 
dimensions, as it places the communities and their struggles squarely in an evolving geography 
of resistance rooted in the historical specificity of the Mapuche people—one undergoing a long 
process of recomposition through the struggles that have taken place in region during the 
neoliberal period (Pairicán 2013). But, perhaps more significantly, this emphasis also operates 
as a remodulation of the community’s relation to its own history, as it revitalises fragments of 
meaning latent within the Mapuche families’ memory, frames of reference from which the past 
is resignified and reconnected in new ways to the present historical context these families 
navigate. 
The meaning and value of ethnic difference, and the ways it intersects with economic 
stratification, has gone through important transformations across the generations that have 
passed since these lands first became settled. As I explained with more detail in the previous 
chapter, for the generation that first came to these lands, being Mapuche implied a wide range 
of hardships associated with the process of dispossession and racialised subordination through 
which the Chilean state was integrating the conquered peoples of the Wallmapu. Locally, the 
fact that the first generation did not speak Spanish is remembered as a source of systematic 
discrimination. In the context of the chaotic process that shaped the local agrarian structure—
in particular the way it was consolidated through a state apparatus both culturally and 
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geographically remote—this language barrier implied an immensely costly structural 
marginalisation. This marginalisation made Mapuche families subject to all sorts of arbitrariness 
from both the state and the non-mapuche population, as shown in the previous chapter. In 
addition, and in contrast to other parts of the region, these first families were relatively isolated 
from other Mapuche families. If in other places in the cordillera several Mapuche families had 
the opportunity to band together, claim recognition as a community by the state, and carve out 
a common social space in which their language, cosmology, and ritual practices could be 
transmitted and reproduced, in Huife the relative isolation of the Mapuche placed a huge 
amount of pressure on several crucial aspects of their cultural heritage and identity. For 
example, one of the direct consequences of this situation was the reluctance that the second 
generation—ie. those that had come of age in this context, and very directly felt the systematic 
stigmatisation of Mapuche culture—had of teaching their language, mapuzungun, to their 
young. Today, only the two or three surviving members of this generation know the language, 
and everyone from the third generation onwards has only very rudimentary knowledge of it. As 
Luis Hernán explains,  
Here my grandparents didn’t teach mapuzungun to my mother and my uncles/aunts, 
because they had been discriminated. … so they said that it was so that they didn’t suffer, 
that [was the reason] they didn’t teach them mapuzungun. 
This is a story that was repeated with varying intensities throughout the country during the 
twentieth century, as the descendants of the conquered Mapuche were faced with the colonial 
stigmatisation of their culture, and the necessity of some way or another integrating themselves 
to a fiercely racist national society (Antimil 2016).  
Yet, according to the current members of the community, the first generation of these 
Mapuche families did try to sustain links with other communities in the area, which opened 
some space to resist isolation and sustain a relation with the fundamental elements of the 
Mapuche cosmos. Luis says that,   
It was quite different here [from other Mapuche areas] because we didn’t come here to live 
as community, we came to live as family. So the Mapuche, in order to be part, as they had 
that community root, the families went to Quetroleufu83, as the Millaqueo were relatives 
of the Millahual [who live in Quetroleufu], for the nguillatun, and all that.   
                                               
83 Place located near Pucón, where there is a larger Mapuche community. 
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Older members of the community recall that once there even was a nguillatun84 celebrated in 
Lower Huife, which was led and organised by Antonia Quintrequeo, who was a machi85. This was 
a very important event, as the organisation of a nguillatun implies the establishment of a rewe, 
in the multiple senses of the word: a ceremonial place, an altar, and a ritual congregation. This 
ritual, which thanks and calls upon Ngenechen/God for providence, thus implied the renewal 
and reaffirmation of the families’ bonds not only with the constitutive powers of the Mapuche 
cosmos, but also with relations of kinship that expanded throughout the region. Indeed, this 
event reportedly also articulated in interesting ways with the interethnic context in which these 
families were living. Feliciano Millaqueo recalls that,   
[It was] In the old days, I was perhaps 8 years old, and am now 83. I was young but I 
remember. My grandmother, Antonia Quintrequeo, she invited Mapuche people from 
Quetroleufu, from Curarrehue, from Villarrica, and from where they were originally from, 
Imperial. A lot of people came and gathered there on front of [where] the bridge [is now]. 
… there was a lovely meadow there. My uncle and my father made the cross, the rehue, and 
there they did the nguillatun. … There was a very big drought by then, very big, people were 
desperate, there was no water, for animals, there was no fodder, no nothing. Even a gringo 
[German settler] came, who’s name was Goldammer … he came to talk with the old man, 
that he should do a nguillatun. He had faith in the indians, that gringo. He came to speak 
with him, and my father-in-law thought well of him. He went out on horseback to consult 
with the other people, the longkos86 over there, in Quetroleufu, Villarrica, Imperial, 
Menetué. From there the family on the part of the grandparents came. To ask for water so 
that it rains, so that the pastures can recover for the animals. They did that nguillatun, they 
cooperated with a hundredweight of flour, toasted flour, mate, sugar, fat, to do sopaipilla87, 
meat, a calf, a horse, the rich cooperated, the Monroy, the Goldammer, the Matus, those 
were the rich back then. They all cooperated, and they did nguillatun, they butchered the 
horse, … the mutton, the beef. They prayed so that it would rain. And they went on horse 
to the river. They got into the river on horse, and they did their prayers there. That it rained, 
that it rained. … So, a night passed, and the next day clouds started gathering, and the wind 
blew, and after midday it rained, it poured. Around here the wingkas laughed, ‘look they 
are going to ask for water’ they said. When it did rain, they didn’t know where to hide 
                                               
84 The nguillatun is a fertility ritual, the most important and large collective event that Mapuche 
communities hold (Course 2011). 
85 The machi plays one of the fundamental social roles in traditional Mapuche society, she is the link 
between the spirit/divine world, and the human world. She normally acts as both healer and ceremonial 
leader. See Bacigalupo 2007 for a detailed ethnographic account. 
86 Mapuche chief, or leader.  
87 Deep-fried bread. 
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(laughs). They all got soaked. … Afterwards they didn't do more, because the old ones were 
too old, and the youth didn’t go along.   
As this testimony shows, the first generation was still firmly inhabiting a Mapuche cosmos, the 
conditions of reproduction of which had nevertheless been severely fragmented by the 
preceding decades of occupation and refuge. The geographical dispersion of the relations that 
made the sustainment and reproduction of these relations to the cosmos possible—in addition 
to the stigma they carried in the imaginaries of the national society they were now a part of—
would eventually make the transmission and reproduction of these by the next generations 
impossible.  
Nevertheless, as is made clear by Feliciano’s testimony—in which the non-Mapuche 
figure as instigators, participants, and ridiculers—the interethnic relations that were developing 
locally at the time were far from being monolithically mediated by stigma. Indeed, in Huife the 
process of acculturation suffered by the Mapuche families was far from a linear one in which 
Mapuche culture became stigmatised and then simply lost. On the contrary, this was a process 
that became ever more complicated as its direct effect was the increasing permeability of the 
very ethnic barriers and hierarchy on which it was premised. As some of the most conspicuous 
cultural elements—like traditional authorities, language, and ritual—were lost, others became 
part of a common cultural ground, like, for example, the seasonal harvest of piñones and other 
forest products, the ecological knowledge of native forests and the medicinal usage of different 
species, and even the adoption and reproduction by Chilean campesinos of the, perhaps 
constitutively ambiguous, belief in supernatural non-human creatures inhabiting these valleys88. 
As Luis Hernán explains, 
Everything became mixed, as there are many non-mapuche families… The first thing is that 
everyone is related, there are no Chilean families that don’t have either a nephew, uncle, 
cousin, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, or someone who is Mapuche. … The way of life is the 
same, the very German settlers gather piñones, it is the custom here, is what this land gives. 
… The way of life and the food is the same, the gathering, etc. 
                                               
88 In these valleys stories about the chimallenes, or chumalguenes, are relatively common, and I have 
encountered different versions of them before and during my fieldwork, in both Huife and Pichares. These 
are beings associated to witchcraft, that can appear in the night as little furry men or children, or flying 
lights. They give wails that, according to one Chilean woman who adamantly assured me she had heard 
them, sound like something between a goat and a small baby. In one account from a chilean campesino, 
they are inherited by certain Mapuche families, and they are both a curse and a source of power; while 
they can do their master’s bidding (for example looking after cattle), they also demand great sacrifices, as 
they live on (purportedly human) blood, and milk. One of the interesting things about the stories I heard 
was that they often took place in the context of fraught interethnic relations.  
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As shown in the previous chapter, ethnic difference intersected with economic stratification by 
the way it mediated the relation with the state during the settlement period. According to many 
of the people I spoke with, the most significant lines of difference would tend to be the economic 
ones (signalled by status symbols such as house build, land, cattle, etc.) which although always 
retaining an ethnic inflection, in time could decouple to varying degrees from ethnicity. In this 
sense, Luis Hernán, speaking of the German families and how they got a better start, says that, 
nevertheless, 
as the children were raised in the environment of this area, and they went out to drink 
together [with everyone else], they ended up just as poor as everyone else (laughs). Today 
most of the German settlers are the same as everyone else. Some may have more, some 
less, but one cannot say they have a lot of money, they ended up the same as everyone 
else.  
As the different groups intermarried, children grew up together and went to the same small 
rural schools, the identities of ensuing generations were thus progressively forged through the 
navigation of a complicated and shifting cultural terrain in which markers of ethnic difference, 
such as surnames, persisted, even as they diffused across families of widely different origins. 
This is very clearly illustrated by the composition of the Millaqueo family themselves. The 
president of the indigenous community, Luis Hernán, is son of the marriage between Osvaldo 
Ibarra, a Chilean settler of the second generation, and Malvina Millaqueo, a Mapuche woman. 
Luis Hernán is in turn married to Denisse Albornoz Goldammer, who grew up on the nearby 
locality of Coilaco and is of both Chilean and German descent. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, in some of our conversations she was adamant in stressing that she “feels Mapuche”, 
as she has “lived in the cordillera” all her life. In this case, her willingness to identify as Mapuche 
points to how the relations of value (and stigma) attached to ethnic markers have shifted in very 
important ways with each passing generation and the different historical contexts these face89.  
The reasons behind this revalorisation of Mapuche identity are very complex, as they 
emerge from a dialectic that plays out at a national scale, involving both the political 
recomposition of the multi-generational struggle of the descendents of those who suffered the 
occupation and destruction of their territories and ways of life by the Chilean state, and the 
changing ways in which the neoliberal incarnation of this state and the international order in 
which it operates interpellates and attempts to govern its subjects (Leve 2011). When I asked 
                                               
89 This was also the case with Osvaldo, who in the meeting with company and government representatives 
referenced his Mapuche relations as part of the historical value of the territory he was defending. See 
Chapter 7.   
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Luis about the reasons of why people are more interested now in recovering their Mapuche 
identity, after pondering for a moment, he told me that 
The one who is Mapuche never ceases to be, you always feel it. Blood is too strong, it pulls. 
But there are some who feel this, and still renege it, which I think is wrong. And for another 
big portion, [the fact that] now the state gives you a benefit, … something falls to you here 
and there, and that made certain people want to be Mapuche again. …  
In this sense, again, the relation to the state apparatus and its shifting ideological modes of 
interpellation90 (Althusser 2006) have played an important role, as people use the spaces and 
terms opened by the official shift towards multiculturalism (Boccara & Bolados 2010) that has 
characterised official policy in post-dictatorial Chile to negotiate their positions in the neoliberal 
order. This is more clearly reflected, for instance, in the constitution of the Millaqueo Millahual 
indigenous community in 2001. Luis Hernán explains that 
There was a time of the ‘boom’ of indigenous communities… it was like a necessity, the law 
19,253 of the CONADI began to be known, so the indigenous scholarships started, so we 
started to organise the community. … As a community we can find funds, we could have 
projects, and stuff like that, which hasn’t happened much, as the CONADI has less and less 
money. What has been beneficial has been for example the bridge, and the other works in 
the river, which we negotiated as the indigenous community. … So in that sense it has been 
good. Also, regarding the hydropower plant, opposing as an indigenous community is 
better.  
As with many other instances of collective organisation in the area in general, the collective 
figure of the indigenous community has served primarily as a new interphase with the state, one 
that allows for better terms of negotiation of, in this case, the families’ access to public resources 
and infrastructure projects.  
It would be, however, a mistake to reduce the local resurgence of Mapuche identity and 
the revaluation of it to a unidirectional effect of the state’s strategies of what Boccara and 
Bolados (2010) have called ethnogovernmentality. Rather, at a national level this official strategy 
of recognition is aimed at governing more effectively over a problematic that has persisted 
despite and across generations of assimilationist policies91. This is, ultimately, the historical 
                                               
90 Interpellation refers here to a political and ideological process of subject formation; how a ‘subject’ 
comes to be through the multiple ways in which they are recognized, ‘hailed’, by the particular 
configuration of power they are part of. See Althusser 2006. 
91 The most radical instance of this approach was that of the Pinochet dictatorship, in which any legal 
recognition of the ethnic specificity of the Mapuche people was rescinded, in line with the social ontology 
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problematic that emerged from the disruption of the relative equilibrium that had been 
achieved during the colonial period between the Mapuche region and the colonial (and later 
Chilean) state, which culminated in the military occupation in the late nineteenth century: that 
of the conditions for the reproduction of the specific horizon of meaning that constitutes the 
Mapuche condition—the values and relations it entails, in particular its complex relations to the 
land and its potencies; all of which ultimately converge on the material question of land and the 
political question of territory—, in a world subsumed under the imperatives of capital 
accumulation and its articulation under the cultural rubric of the colonial supremacy of the 
Chilean nation. Under neoliberal multiculturalism, Mapuche culture is conferred space and 
recognition only insofar as it does not challenge this supremacy; ie. multiculturalism offers the 
chance of participation in a hegemonic project and value regime, the definition of which is out 
of the purview of interethnic dialogue (see Chapter 3 and 7). Being Mapuche is allowed, 
encouraged even, insofar as this identity is practiced in a subsumed, ‘productive’, form; notions 
of acceptable difference that are expressed in the state’s folklorization and appropriation of 
cultural elements as elements of official ideology, its encouragement of ethnic 
entrepreneurialism, its definition of legitimate interlocutors, etc. This situation of structural 
subordination is consequently expressed in the symptomatically dual form in which state power 
operates in relation to the problematic posed by Mapuche specificity: the ethnobureaucratic 
field of multicultural integration, and its repressive flipside. For Boccara and Bolados (2010:685, 
my translation), 
In addition to contributing to the formation of differentiated representations of the 
indigenous (of the good indian or the allowed indian versus the antisocial terrorist indian), 
these logics of power participate in the constitution of differentiated territorialities within 
which specific legal and institutional frameworks operate. Because in concomitance with 
the formation of the ethnobureaucratic field, there is the tendency to produce a territory 
ripped from the pacified and civilised space of the nation: the territory of subversion, or 
rebellion, of delinquency in which mechanisms of production of alterity and of exercise 
repressive power analogous to those of the colonial period are perpetuated. 
This constitutive tension implied in the Mapuche condition under neoliberal multiculturalism, is 
expressed in the political experiences that this identity has entailed for Luis Hernán and his 
family. Far from simply containing and governing difference—ie. of enrolling these families in 
the geographies and terms of multicultural governance—the rediscovery of Mapuche identity 
                                               
that underpinned the regime’s official ideology; ie. the idea of homo economicus, for which cultural 
specificity held little to no consequence.  
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has also placed these families in the complex geographies of the ongoing recomposition of the 
struggles of the Mapuche people, and the wide range of political orientations these take. This 
has led, for Luis and his family, to an ongoing reflection and problematization of their relation 
to the state, and of the specific conditions of the Mapuche within their Municipality. As Luis 
explained,  
In territories like this we have another vision than in territories who had more community, 
so to speak. … where this didn’t happen, where there are Chilean settlers, German, 
Mapuche, because here in Pucón we are that, most of us are settlers, and there’s 
everything. … That is why here there’s a vision, a difficult one, because to the Mapuche here 
it happens that, sometimes there’s very little vision of her/his ethnicity. We realised this 
ourselves because we went to a meeting [of Mapuche organisations] in Temuco and when 
one gave one’s opinion or spoke something the others scowled at us [nos miraban feo]. So 
there is a tendency going on, there are Mapuche with more committed ideas. The 
communities that have strong links to their territory have the dream of being autonomous 
from the Chilean state, they want a Mapuche nation. … here we [the Mapuche in Pucón] 
are in a different situation, we are more docile, which is not a good thing. Because the 
communities of Pucón… autonomy we have never had. They depend too much on the muni 
[Municipal government], so, if the muni doesn’t call for the meeting, or if the muni does not 
organise the wetripantu92 celebrations, the communities would not gather. … So in the 
defense of the territory, the Mapuche people in Pucón are weak, these are the weaknesses.   
In this way, the generational shifts in the value of Mapuche identity has not only involved the 
community's participation in the state’s ethnobureaucratic field, but has also opened up a 
process of political reflection in which the relation to the state is problematised, and terms like 
‘autonomy’ and ‘territory’ become slowly incorporated into local discourse and mobilised in 
making sense of the local experience. In short, the way in which the condition of indigeneity 
mediates the relation to the state is a deeply ambivalent one: through it novel forms of power 
are exercised, while at the same time it introduces a frame of reference through which the 
relation to the state is critically reflected upon, existing forms of power questioned, and new 
forms of interpretation of the community’s problems and struggles are made possible.  
In this sense, it is important here to note that the significance of this foregrounding of 
the Mapuche element in the complex identities of these families far exceeds the relations of the 
communities to the state; it also implies a remodulation—a shift in emphasis and meaning—of 
                                               
92 Mapuche celebration of the return of the sun, commonly called the Mapuche ‘new year’, celebrated 
during June, during the southern winter solstice.  
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the relationship to their memory, to a particular collective historical experience. This is to say, 
the foregrounding of indigeneity has implied a shift in the frames of meaning through which the 
fragments of local memory are recuperated to navigate the present, a shift that has a direct 
impact on the meanings and values that the territory holds for those inhabiting it. The relation 
to the collective historical experience implied in the Mapuche condition thus acts as one of the 
crucial relations through which people make sense of current transformations and struggles, a 
background against which transformations such as the projected hydropower plant acquires its 
local significance. For example, it was significant that in my discussions with older members of 
the Mapuche community around the historical origins of the territory, the parallel was 
frequently drawn between the dispossession of their forebears’ lands that originally brought 
them to the cordillera, and the current threats to the river by the hydropower project, in 
particular the illegitimate acquisition of water rights by the company (see Chapter 6). Another 
example is the way in which the very process of struggle against the hydropower project has 
stoked the interest of the younger generations in this history. Luis Hernán, for instance, told me 
that he had only become aware of the fact that a nguillatun had been held in the meadow that 
separated his house from the Liucura river through the conversations that had taken place 
within the family as a consequence of the project and the first studies the company had done in 
the community. When I told him that in the conversations with the community elders I had 
heard that this “had been ceremonial grounds”, he corrected me, telling me that he understood 
that “ceremonial territory was, and will always be, that’s the Mapuche conception”. The 
sacredness that this history uncovered was not dependent on his awareness of it, but for him it 
was something that once acquired, remained as an attribute of the place, and that he had only 
discovered through a reconnection with his family’s memory. 
In this sense, the exploration of the history of Luis’ family that the struggle against the 
hydropower project had compelled was the rediscovery and resurfacing of hitherto 
unacknowledged dimensions of his own lands; fragments of meaning that interweaved 
seamlessly with the recomposition of intergenerational relations through the exploration of the 
symbolic depth of a territory that far from being clearly defined in the minds of those who 
defended it, remained constitutively open, and in many ways mysterious. This, of course, only 
compounded the value that for him these lands had, values that the hydropower project 
threatened and ignored.  
In this sense, this process opened for the younger generation the question of the 
possibility of recovering the ceremonial site. When I spoke to Luis in 2016, he had already talked 
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about it with Francisco, who at over 100 years of age was the oldest member of the community 
and had taken part in the nguillatun as a teenager, to see if they could perhaps organise another 
one. He told me that Francisco told him that yes, provided one would organise the family’s 
Mapuche relations, ie. build a congregation that would gather here once more. This further 
illustrates how this reconnection with Mapuche identity opens up the possibilities of reinserting 
these families in relations and geographies which would necessarily entail important 
transformations in local territoriality, in the practices and meanings that constitute these lands. 
The idea of recovering the ceremonial grounds still lingered in Luis’ mind the last time we spoke 
in 2018. 
In this way, in the case of Lower Huife, this process of foregrounding of the Mapuche 
elements of identity has been a crucial aspect in the way opposition to the hydropower project 
has been articulated, and one of the main sources of the ‘counter-values’ mobilised against it93. 
Furthermore, as it will be explored with more details in this study’s conclusions, it has opened a 
broader geography of solidarity and resistance in which alliances are established on the grounds 
of how these cultural and historical elements are mobilised on a broader scale.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has approached several of the different social, historical, and geographical relations 
through which the values that mediate the community’s relation to its territory emerge. These 
are those entailed by the geographies of semi-proletarianisation and rural production through 
which the community is reproduced, those of the contradictory relation of the tourist economy, 
and those entailed by the condition of indigeneity. These are all dimensions that exist in constant 
relation (and sometimes tension) to the historical web of intergenerational relations explored 
in the previous chapter. I will now turn to the issue of water more specifically, and to how these 
relations converge on the hydrosocial articulation of a moral economy that, in the context of the 
process of enclosure and commodification of the waterscape that has enabled the possibility of 
hydropower development, has become one of the main sources of local opposition to the energy 
frontier.   
 
                                               
93 This will be further exemplified in Chapter 7, in which I analyse a meeting that the community held 
with the company and government representatives. 
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6. Commodification and the moral economy of water in 
Huife 
In Chile, there had to be, so to speak, a complete sweep within all 
the sectors of the economy to remove the statist weeds. That was 
what gave the Chilean economic revolution so much significance, 
range, and depth. 
Hernán Büchi, Chile’s Minister of Finance under Pinochet (1985 
– 1989), La Transformación Económica de Chile 
[W]e’ve been seeing in the news that waters now belong to the 
state, we need to regularise them, otherwise anyone can take 
them, and then sell them back to you … That was not known before. 
Félix Salazar, in upper Huife, 2016. 
 
Looking at the Liucura river as it peacefully flowed by the Ibarra Millaqueo family’s camping site 
in the late summer months of 2016 in lower Huife, it was hard to imagine that the stories that I 
had just been hearing about how people barely managed to cross the river by felling big coihue 
trunks took place on the same river. The green and yellow stones in the riverbed could be clearly 
seen under the receding afternoon sun: one could easily cross the river walking and get away 
with nothing more than a wet pair of trousers. As everyone here recognizes, the rivers have 
indeed changed a lot with the years, changes that perhaps provide a particularly visible index 
for the broader transformations people have experienced within their communities.  
In fact, changes in the waterscapes of these valleys feature prominently in local accounts 
of historical change. The ways in which water flows in these valleys is tightly implicated in a thick 
web of histories, relations, meanings, and values. These symbolic and practical meditations are 
what define this small portion of a hydrosocial cycle (Linton & Budds 2014; Swyngedouw 2015) 
that flows through different scales, connecting these valleys to the region, the national 
economy, and beyond.  
In this chapter I will delve deeper into the hydrosocial relations that have developed in 
these valleys, and the way these interact with the process of commodification and enclosure of 
the waterscape that constitute the political-ecological conditions of possibility for the new 
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geographies of energy in Chile. In particular, I will look at the way in which the waterscape figures 
in local production of intergenerational ecological knowledge, and how it is integrated into a 
local moral economy (Thompson 1971, see Chapter 2) through which the ‘social’ commons I 
have described in previous chapters are reproduced. From this basis I will also approach the 
literature on the Chilean Water Code—a juridical regime (in)famous for its paradigmatically 
orthodox neoliberalism—and see how a focus on the moral economy of water might shed a 
different light on the relations between nature, markets, the state and its bureaucratic 
apparatus, which in this literature too often remains confined within the liberal opposition of 
the market and the state that underpinned the Code’s original design.  
 
The neoliberalisation of Chile’s waters 
Chile’s 1981 Water Code is widely recognized as the textbook example of the commodification 
of water rights, notable for both its precociousness and ideological zeal. During its now almost 
four decades of existence—during which it has only been reformed at the margins—, the 
notoriously orthodox neoliberalism of the Water Code has positioned it as a paradigmatic point 
of reference for international debates around water politics and policy across the political 
spectrum (see Dourojeanni & Jouravlev 1999; Bauer 2005). Especially during the early 1990s, 
the code was hailed in various World Bank reports as a model to be followed by other countries 
(e.g. Thobani 1995), and by myriad intellectuals on the right as an example of the creative 
application of free-market rationalization to inefficient and ossified forms of ‘statist’ natural 
resource management (eg. Büchi 1993). The Chilean Water Code was to become something of 
a poster child for ‘market-based’ natural resource management, a legal framework that 
resonated powerfully on an international stage hegemonised by the neoliberal triumphalism 
that followed the end of the Cold War. For many in the multilateral institutions that at that time 
were busily overseeing the global consolidation of market rule, it showed the path forward 
(Briscoe 1996).  
However, by the late nineties, it became evident that the model was failing to deliver in 
several fronts on its own terms; in particular, many noted markets in water rights had been 
notoriously inactive, monopoly and speculation, particularly acute in non-consumptive rights, 
had been widespread, and public institutions had no effective means to mediate and process 
conflicts or plan river-basin management in any meaningful way (see Chapter 3; Bauer 2004; 
Dourojeanni & Jouravlev 1999). For the left field of these debates, the Chilean case has provided 
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a sort of textbook example of the ‘neoliberalization of nature’, as an extreme case of an 
unbridled market rationality bent on colonizing every aspect of the conditions of life, including 
the most basic of the ecological plots underlying its reproduction: the water cycle (eg. Mundaca 
2014; Larraín 2010).  
Being as it is a paradigmatic example, the Water Code has received considerable 
attention from a wide range of disciplines, generally focusing on its economic, institutional, and 
legal aspects. As we saw in Chapter 3, less frequent have been analyses that focus on the role 
this legal artefact played in the broader, refoundational, transformations in the nature of power 
in Chilean society (e.g. Budds 2013). Neoliberalisation implicated a thorough transformation of 
all aspects of the social order, transformations that cannot be understood without the radical 
reconfiguration of its metabolic base, its hydrosocial cycle. The Water Code was a crucial 
cornerstone of this process, one that allowed for the operation of the law of value within the 
hydrosocial cycle in new and unprecedented ways. In the case explored here, it represents one 
of the main political-ecological conditions of possibility for the deployment of the new energy 
geographies now expanding upon the southern Andean foothills.  
For the most part, however, much of these discussions have remain burdened by the 
terms and metaphors through which those that designed the Water Code understood the nature 
of the transformations effected. As illustrated by this chapter’s epigraph, for the Chicago Boys 
the Code was to finally get the state’s distorting hands off water management, and deliver this 
to the unadulterated rational magic of the market. But, even when this market is critically 
analysed, and revealed to be far from rational, to be monopolistic, and/or ultimately 
underpinning class power, the idea that the Water Code was basically about the undermining of 
the state’s capacities to regulate and intervene in the hydrosocial cycle normally remains as a 
persistent common ground. 
I would argue that this conception—ultimately rooted in the a liberal social ontology 
that posits the state and the market as clearly separate and distinct social realms—obfuscates 
the ways in which commodification and the constitution of markets not only has not 
undermined the capitalist state’s hydrosocial power, but actually underpinned an 
unprecedented extension of its reach over the peripheral territories and geographies in which 
the energy frontier is currently operating. This is what makes it a variation, rather than an 
overcoming, of what in Chapter 3 I called the ‘Wittfogelian problematic’ of the relation between 
the constitution of political power and water.     
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In this sense, even in those approaches that attempt to more explicitly politicise that 
which neoclassical approaches consider the ‘apolitical’ realm of market transactions by, for 
instance, analysing their institutional context (eg. Prieto & Bauer 2012; Bauer 2009; Bauer 2015), 
little attention is placed on the relation between commodification—primitive accumulation—
and the social constitution of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ as distinct spheres, a cleavage 
that constitutes the basis of the capitalist form-determination of social reproduction. This is a 
process that both shapes and is shaped through transformations in socio-ecologies in general, 
and hydrosocial relations in particular. In other words, even though the political and the 
economic are recognised to necessarily influence each other, their separation is however taken 
for granted as an ontological apriori. As a consequence, their relation cannot be but external: a 
political economy of water is conceived—which is supposed to surpass the ‘apolitical’ economics 
of the neoclassical economists—but not a critique of both the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ as 
particular forms of (hydro)social relations, a dual reification immanent to capitalist relations of 
production (see Holloway & Picciotto 1977; Bonefeld 2014; Clarke 1991). For neoliberalism, seen 
as a mode of political practice, “not only does the free market require the strong, market-
facilitating state, but it is also dependent on the state as the coercive force of that freedom” 
(Bonefeld 2010:17). 
In fact, and as I will show below, these are the terms in which the struggles against 
commodification are waged at the energy frontier. In this chapter I will examine how the 
imposition of the commodity-form upon the waterscape is experienced from the point of view 
of the vernacular hydrosocial relations that have historically developed in Huife, which articulate 
what I will refer to as a ‘moral economy’ (see Chapter 2), in which the waterscape is embedded, 
and constitutes the arena in which the process of primitive accumulation that presently enables 
the energy frontier acts upon. These experiences might help shed some light on the prevailing 
metaphors used to understand the nature of the neoliberal state.  
 
The 1981 Water Code 
The Chilean process of neoliberalisation is notable, among other things, for it refoundational 
character, which was only made possible by the fiercely authoritarian political conditions that 
surrounded its deployment. As I explained in Chapter 3, this process has to be understood as 
the way in which the Chilean ruling classes managed to resolve in their favour the crisis brought 
about by the events during the Unidad Popular government (1970 – 1973), one that did not 
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resort to the simple reinstitution of the previous order—characterised by a nationalistic and 
state-led form of capitalism which many on the right, particularly the new neoliberal wing, 
thought had led to the crisis in the first place (Gárate 2012)—but radically transformed Chilean 
society to its foundations. The process of neoliberalization was one that profoundly reconfigured 
the patterns of accumulation, intensifying the imperatives of the world market on the country’s 
landscapes through the expansion of natural resource extraction industries—mining, forestry, 
fisheries, export agriculture—, which were consolidated as the metabolic basis of a new social 
order. Due to the nature of these industries, control over the hydrosocial cycle is at the centre 
of neoliberalism as an ecological project, control juridically articulated through the 1981 Water 
Code.   
This code was part of a broader process of institutionalisation of the Pinochet military 
regime in the early eighties, one that encompassed all aspects of the institutional apparatus, 
from the Constitution upwards. Nominally, the code establishes that water is public property to 
which the state grants private rights of use. These rights are, however, a form of private property 
separate from land, which can be freely bought and sold, transferred, or mortgaged, and that is 
zealously protected by the constitution (Bauer 1998; Budds 2004). Bauer (1998:35) points out 
that this dichotomy of water itself being an inalienable public good, while the right to use it a 
private commodity, has been considered by several observers as juridically incoherent. This 
discrepancy however can be seen as necessary for the establishment of a market in water. As 
Karen Bakker (Bakker 2003) has noted, water’s physical characteristics make it a particularly 
‘uncooperative commodity’: water must, to a degree, be decoupled from its immediate physical 
characteristics if it is to assume a commodity form94. The code therefore established water-as-
element to be a public good, while the right to use it was established as a tradable commodity. 
In practice however, given the very strong protection of private property rights enshrined in the 
1980 Constitution, the former aspect was rendered largely inconsequential. 
Water rights are granted by the General Water Directorate (Dirección General de Aguas, 
DGA), but once constituted, these are subjected to the general system of real estate registration, 
and to civil (private), as opposed to administrative (public), law (Bauer 1998). Public agencies 
have thus no role in water management, nor the solution of potential conflicts; these are either 
resolved through civil courts, or through private bargain. The General Water Directorate (DGA) 
is required to grant rights if there is any water available, and to do so free of charge. Once rights 
                                               
94 Recall here the discussion on the abstract and the concrete in the production of nature developed in 
Chapter 2. 
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are allocated, any further transfer must take place through the water market (Prieto & Bauer 
2012). Given that water management is considered to be the exclusive remit of the private 
owners of rights of use, the DGA cannot establish priorities on how water should be used; this 
is, in theory, left to the market to decide. 
There was, however, one key distinction within the code—briefly touched upon in 
Chapter 3—that crucially determined the functioning of said markets, how water was to be used 
and allocated in the following decades, and the sort of conflicts and tensions that would develop. 
The code distinguishes two kinds of water rights: consumptive and non-consumptive. The 
former refers to activities such as irrigation, mining, or urban use, which imply that the water is 
consumed, while the latter refers to uses that allow for water to be returned to its original 
stream. Although not explicitly mentioned in the water code, the creation of non-consumptive 
rights was evidently aimed at encouraging hydroelectric development in the headwaters of river 
basins without contradicting irrigation rights downstream (Bauer 2009; Prieto & Bauer 2012). 
According to Prieto and Bauer (2012), several issues evidence the institutional preference for 
hydroelectricity: the code only recognizes as uses warranting rights those that extract or capture 
water at some point from the stream (any application must specify a point of extraction, and 
release, in the case of non-consumptive rights), which in general excluded all non-extractive 
and/or in-stream uses, such as fishing, recreational or cultural use, etc., from applying for the 
original free acquisition of state-granted rights. Furthermore, in the original code, applicants had 
no obligation of using their acquired rights, nor were they required to pay any sort of tax for 
them. This allowed for widespread speculation in water rights, which was one of the reasons 
that led to the partial reform of the code in 2005 (after thirteen years in discussion), which 
introduced a new tax for non-usage. One consequence of this was that it further marginalized 
in-stream uses, since the only alternative to the acquisition of rights from the state is to buy 
them from the market, but after the reform this implied for in-stream uses an extra tax for ‘non-
use’ (Prieto & Bauer 2012)95. Non-consumptive rights have also generated conflicts with 
downstream users: these rights are regularly used by energy companies to control the flow of 
rivers (storing and releasing water according to the demand of the national electricity grid), 
which has frequently clashed with the irrigation needs of consumptive users (Bauer 2009). 
Today, nationally, virtually all non-consumptive rights are in hands of the energy sector (ibid; 
see Chapter 3). 
                                               
95 This had consequences for the Municipality of Pucón in particular. See discussion below. 
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The Municipality of Pucón, in which the area of study is located, constitutes a partial 
exception in this regard. In 2005 the Municipality had solicited non-consumptive rights in ten 
rivers within its territory, as a way of protecting its tourist economy, heavily reliant on nature 
tourism and water sports. This was the only case in the country were water rights had been 
acquired by local authorities. However, given the tax for non-use introduced by the reform to 
the Water Code, when the administration changed, between 2009 and 2012, these taxes were 
not paid, which generated a debt of over 1700 million Chilean pesos—around 2 and a half million 
USD. This generated a long legal process in which these rights risked being auctioned. Only in 
July 2017 was the situation resolved by a legal manoeuvre that transferred the rights to the 
Ministry of the Environment, making the debt redundant (Araucanía Cuenta 2017).  
This ad hoc solution further exemplifies the extent to which a wide range of uses of the 
waterscape are only marginally represented in the law, if at all. As explained in more detail in 
Chapter 3, overall, one of the effects of the 1981 Water Code was establishing the dominant 
role that hydroelectricity companies have assumed in river basin management in Chile, through 
the creation of non-consumptive rights. As Bauer (2009) holds, notwithstanding the doctrines 
championed by the neoliberal economists behind the water code reform, this was not achieved 
through putatively ‘neutral’ market dynamics, but rather by an institutional framework designed 
to foster the use of rivers by hydropower capital, excluding other uses and activities from an 
equivalent legal recognition. This has been at the core of many conflicts since. 
 
Climate changes in the cordillera: abundance and scarcity in Huife’s waterscape 
In the traditional geographical imaginaries of Chilean society, ‘the south’ has always been 
associated with an (at times excessive) abundance of water in its various forms: copious and all-
year-round rains that feed into the many rivers which in turn fill the numerous lakes that 
characterise this part of the country, and that contrast starkly with the long dry seasons of the 
central region and the perpetual aridity of the Atacama Desert in the north. During the past 
several years, however, this image has been unsettled by the effects of a relentless succession 
of uncommonly dry years; what the Centre for Climate and Resilience Research (2017; see 
Garreaud et. al 2017; 2018) has called a ‘mega-drought’, affecting all of central-southern Chile, 
unprecedented in terms of both temporal persistence and geographic scale. In the case of the 
Araucanía region, these circumstances intersect with a particularly conflictive political ecology 
that bears the historical weight of both the brutal dispossession of the indigenous population in 
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the second half of the nineteenth century (see Chapter 4), and the past four decades of 
neoliberal development centred on the expansion of a heavily concentrated forestry industry 
reliant on the water-intensive monoculture of exotic tree species. This has meant that, in 
addition to the perennial land conflicts, there has been a proliferation of water conflicts between 
communities and the different industries located in the region—which are not limited to 
forestry, but also include aquaculture, and increasingly, hydropower. Events like the drying up 
of water sources has thus become a common occurrence in many places96.  
In short, a creeping, and inevitably ethnically inflected, sense of scarcity is commonly 
found in conversations about water, including in the Liucura valley. In fact, in Lefincul, a locality 
just a couple of miles downstream from Huife, water has recently been having to be supplied by 
municipal water trucks during summer months, something which “was unheard of” in years 
past. Nestor Salazar told me in his home located in Papal, on the mountain side just overlooking 
Lower Huife, that 
From here down river, water is becoming a problem, water springs are drying up and people 
are running out of water, as these past few years have come dry. They say they have but a 
tiny thread of water, almost not enough for the house. A friend had to build a tank to gather 
some water, it was not being enough. They go to gather water with barrels, he made a tank 
to have for the basics. (…) The last two years have been very, very dry, and I think it will stay 
like that. 
Of course, very far from being a simple ‘natural’ phenomenon, this scarcity is produced by the 
concatenation of a wide array of factors, and the complexity of local narratives of scarcity tend 
to reflect this. In general terms, water becomes scarce in relation not only to the irregularities 
imposed by an intensifying global climate change but also to the intensification of the demands 
placed upon the region’s waterscapes by the global capitalist economy, demands whose 
hegemony has been firmly consolidated by Chile’s four decade long experiment with 
neoliberalism. In those parts of the region where pine and eucalyptus plantations have 
expanded, scarcity has been most severe, accompanied by increasingly uncontrollable seasonal 
wildfires, and a new and militant recomposition of Mapuche historical struggles in these areas 
(Klubock 2014; González-Hidalgo et al. 2013). In the municipality where Huife is located—
characterised by a far less militant Mapuche population and a relative, if highly uneven, 
affluence derived from the growing tourist industry—it is hard to imagine that the exponential 
growth of tourism and the concomitant infrastructural development has not had a determinant 
                                               
96 See Navarro Mena n.d., https://www.sequiaenlaaraucania.cl/ 
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impact on the availability of water during the summer months, in which both the peak influx of 
people and the driest season of the year converge. Indeed, as seen in the previous chapter, in 
the downriver localities Nestor refers to the past few years have been characterized by the 
conversion and subdivision of old fundos (large plots) into summer plots generally aimed at the 
urban middle classes. 
The fact remains, however, that in localities like lower and upper Huife, as in Llancalil, 
the communities’ traditional relation to water is normally depicted as one characterized by 
relative abundance: most families have direct access to water in their own plot, and the most 
common answers to the question of what is most valued in the territory frequently involve a 
reference to the quality and quantity of water. This context has conditioned the particular socio-
cultural forms in which the waterscape is locally embedded, an issue to which I will return in a 
section further below. Here, however, it is important to note that the local waterscape is, in this 
sense, object of a complex interplay of notions of abundance and scarcity. These notions, being 
as they are relational in essence, point to the different social registers and scales in which water 
circulates as part of a complex hydrosocial cycle, in relation to which it variously acquires 
attributes of scarcity or abundance. When the local waterscape is regarded in the light of the 
contrasting and combined experience that many inhabitants have of urban and rural life—the 
role of semi-proletarianisation explored in the previous chapter, which is inscribed in the life 
history and livelihood strategies of most inhabitants, and hinges on a varying combination of 
wage labour in cities, production for subsistence, and production for the market—water in Huife 
appears characterized for the most part by its non-commodified form and direct access, both 
conditions premised in the relative abundance afforded by local ecological conditions. This is 
normally contrasted to the local experience of urban life, where, as Graciela, who lives in 
Llancalil, put it, “one needs money for everything, even water”. The relative abundance of water 
plays here the role, among others, of being one of the fundamental conditions for the 
sustainment of social and economic reproduction as it currently takes place. Moreover, not only 
the territory’s water plays an important part in the inhabitants’ present livelihoods, but also 
plays a fundamental role in local imaginations of possible futures as well, as it constitutes part 
of what is locally regarded to be the territory’s natural wealth.  
This relative abundance is however readily recognized as being fragile, and its tendential 
erosion looms large in local narratives of change. In particular, narratives around the opposition 
to the Llancalil hydropower project very commonly draw on a generalized perception of a clear 
tendency towards increasingly  less available water, which in turn stems from a vernacular sense 
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of gradual, yet far reaching, climatic transformations. In the interviews I conducted this was 
expressed firstly as a change in rain and snowfall patterns during the winter months, which 
replenish the snows in the mountains from where the Liucura and Llancalil rivers originate, and 
from which they draw most of their water during the relatively dry summer months. Osvaldo 
Ibarra, an older resident of lower Huife, explains that “now there’s much less snow. (…) Those 
of us who are older know that it rains less during the year, and there is less snowfall. This is the 
cause of there being less water, and the river flowing so shallow”. Not only the older members 
of the communities speak of these trends; for instance Osvaldo’s daughter Nery, who was 35 at 
the time of the interview, told me that "I remember when I was younger it snowed a lot in 
Llancalil, over two metres of snow. Now it doesn’t go over fifty centimetres or so. In two days it 
is gone”. Although some of the people I talked to made passing reference to media 
representations of climate change as global phenomenon (especially younger people), in all of 
the accounts of climatic change the primary reference was to concrete changes in the 
experience of local environmental conditions, rather than on more abstract notions of change 
as something occurring on a planetary scale. The notions of climate change that I encountered 
were very strongly rooted in the territorial experience, and especially in the intergenerational 
communication of the local ecological knowledge. Take for instance this conversation between 
Nestor, middle aged, and Marta Salazar, his mother, in her house in upper Huife:  
Marta: The Mountains used to have snow in midsummer. Not now, now there is too little 
snowfall. And these [the river’s] waters are snow waters. 
Nestor: They say that with the passing years this is going to be like the central region [of 
Chile], the heat is going to come this way.  
Marta: But you can see that already! In the old days, when would you see heats like these? 
Nestor: We couldn’t cultivate tomatoes before. And this past year we cultivated some 
tomatoes, and this year we are doing so again. 
In this exchange Marta draws very directly from her experience, as does Nestor, who 
nonetheless brings in the notion of changes on a broader national scale. In general terms, long 
term changes in climate and water become evident as intergenerational ecological knowledge 
is produced through these kinds of conversations.  
This vernacular sense of climatic change acquires its local relevance from the fact that it 
mostly expresses itself through tendencies in the waterscape. And it is this tendential movement 
of the waterscape in time that underlies much of the local opposition to the project, which it is 
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generally felt risks turning what is now a tendency into a full crisis, like the one experienced in 
other localities. Here are, for example, a few of the concerns expressed to me by some of the 
interviewees:   
The water here, the river, they do not know that in this time [late summer] there is almost 
no water. (…) It has changed a lot, it carries half the water it carried before. In other years 
in October there were huge flows of water, the river was deep. Now in October the river 
was really shallow this year. It is diminishing. And if they come and tube the water, it will 
dry out. Felix Salazar, Upper Huife 
How are they going to build this project when the river is carrying so little water? It almost 
carries none at all, these last few years, each year it carries less. (…) The waters is what we 
value the most, because who would like to live on dry lands? [quien va a querer un campo 
seco?] (…) Water is life. This river feeds from snow, and it has snowed so little. Marcela 
Wenzel, Upper Huife. 
In Lefincul there are people who already have no water. They will have to bring water trucks. 
Imagine with the hydroelectric [plant] drying the river for miles, those will be dried out 
fields. Imagine with the drought we are going through now, even now in April. We have a 
huge drought. And with the hydroelectric [plant] drying up the river for miles, the impact 
will be very big. Anita Goeppinger, Lefincul, born in Llancalil.    
I disagree with that project, because the river is carrying such a little amount of water that 
if they tube it, it will be left dry, the fish will all die. The river will be left without water. 
Adolfo Matus, Upper Huife.  
In all of these cases, the local experience and significance of the changing climate and its impact 
on the waterscape is at the root of the opposition to the development of the hydropower 
project. This marks an interesting contrast with some of the narratives mobilized by both 
government and company around the new wave of small-scale hydropower projects such as 
‘Llancalil’, touched upon in Chapter 3. Among these discourses, their contribution to the 
purported97 decarbonisation of the energy matrix figures with increasing prominence, a 
discourse that is underpinned by an understanding of climate change that places its main points 
of reference on atmospheric chemistry, the prospects to sustained economic growth, and the 
planetary scale (see Pacheco 2018). The different scales of climate change as a process are thus 
                                               
97 I say ‘purported’ because none of the future scenarios that underpin the government strategic 
planning on energy contemplate a reduction in overall emissions, but rather reductions in the carbon 
intensity of the economy, ie. how much emissions are implied by each point of GDP growth. See 
Ministerio de Energía 2018. 
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mobilized in narratives both for and against the project, narratives that account for the different 
cultural anchors (Hulme 2008) and class positions through which these transformations take 
place, which in the coordinates of the current conflict are expressed in different (and clashing) 
understandings of how to adapt to an uncertain future. In Huife, the sustainment of local 
communities and territories in the context of what they perceive to be a clearly changing climate 
entails first and foremost the need to protect the rivers from the threat posed by projects like 
the hydropower plant, while for the state the main adaptive challenge is that of seeking energy 
alternatives rooted on what it recognises as its ‘national resource base’ to sustain the prevailing 
patterns of economic growth. I will explore this issue with more detail in the next chapter, as it 
surfaced in different ways during the public meeting the company held with the community, and 
intersected with issues around the relative validity of differently situated knowledges. 
 
 
Figure 24. Llancalil River, a few metres from the proposed project, which shows the extremely low level 
of water at the end of the summer season. Taken by the author, March 2016. 
 
The waterscape and the moral economy in Huife 
As I pointed out before, this sense of growing scarcity in a way contrasts with the fact that in 
lower and upper Huife, as in Llancalil, the communities’ relation to water has been traditionally 
marked by its relative abundance: springs abound in the mountain slopes, and most plots have 
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at least one source they can tap into for domestic use. This is widely recognized as one of the 
territory’s main riches by its inhabitants. Indeed when Marta, who lives in upper Huife, tells me 
“what is it that we value the most here? The water. (…) Water is the most beautiful thing here, 
because no one pollutes it, there is no one living further upriver from here”, she echoes the 
widely held notion that in contrast to life in towns and cities, and whatever its shortcomings, 
living in the cordillera at least secures access to water in abundance, quality, and free of charge.  
This relative abundance has meant, for example, that in contrast to other regions, there 
has been no need for formal and/or permanent forms of collective action and organization for 
the provision of water, either for direct household use, or for small-scale subsistence 
production, such as irrigation of small orchards, or the maintenance of backyard animals. In 
general, most water needs, including the construction of whatever infrastructure has been 
needed, has traditionally been resolved at the level of the household. When the area was 
settled, most families tended to locate their houses near a spring they could easily use. Now, 
“almost all of the plots have their own water”, says Adolfo, an old inhabitant of Upper Huife; 
those who do not, normally have informal arrangements with neighbours to access sources of 
water located in other plots: “if one wants water, one only had to ask the neighbour for 
permission, take a hose, and draw water. The neighbour wouldn’t charge or anything”, explains 
Magali, who was born in Upper Huife, and recently moved back. Félix, a second generation 
settler in Upper Huife, for his part describes the general situation of water in the Huife valley in 
the following terms: 
Almost every plot has water, there is no lack of water here in the cordillera. The river serves 
the animals, the vegetation, the fish, all that. (…) Marcela [a neighbour living in the adjacent 
plot] uses a little water from a stream that flows near her place. We just have an agreement, 
nothing formal, just like that. 
The two main rivers mentioned here (the Liucura, that flows through Huife, and Llancalil, 
through the valley of the same name) are nowadays mostly used by the families’ cattle as a 
source of water. The meaning, however, that these rivers hold for the families settled in these 
valleys can hardly be reduced to their use in a narrow economic sense, as it is generally regarded 
to sustain the basic conditions of ecological wellbeing of the territory. The vernacular notions of 
the ecological importance of the rivers can be seen, for instance, in the local narratives that 
surround the potential development of the ‘Llancalil’ hydropower project. Take for example 
what Nery Ibarra, from lower Huife, says regarding the potentially catastrophic impact that the 
hydropower plant might have if it interrupts the river flow:   
161 
If they do this everything here dies. I’m going to say this very clearly. If they do this project 
all of this greenery we have here will die, all will dry out. Just like that. The water spring we 
have will dry out. There won’t be any grass left for the animals, there won’t be anything. 
(…) The people who raise cattle won’t be able to do it any longer because they will die of 
thirst, of hunger, there will be no grass, all this green area will die. Because, when one wakes 
up in the morning, (…) there’s a humid mist, a fog, (…) if they dry the river up, if they tube 
it, there won’t be anything, everything will dry out, and that’s the biggest problem there’ll 
be. 
Intervening in the rivers on the scale introduced by the project is unprecedented in this area, 
and the profound sense of uncertainty that the ‘Llancalil’ project introduces for the community 
lends itself to images of ecological catastrophe that draw from local ecological knowledge of the 
importance of the river in the maintenance of the valleys’ basic ecological conditions. Conditions 
which, although clearly recognized as a common baseline for the life of everyone in the valleys, 
had never before called for forms of collective organization, nor its explicit articulation in any 
sort of written rule. 
The arrangements and the general place of water in the relations between families has 
thus been in this sense essentially informal and unwritten. It would be an error, however, to 
mistake this absence of formal regulation and organized enforcement for a lack of any regulation 
of water use at all. As Ivan Illich noted regarding the ‘law of the commons’ that regulates things 
like “the right of way, the right to fish and to hunt, to graze, and to collect wood or medicinal 
plants in the forest”, it normally consists of a set of unwritten attitudes and expectations, which 
remained unwritten “not only because people did not care to write it down, but because what 
it protected was a reality much too complex to fit into paragraphs” (Illich 1983:2). Indeed, the 
degree to which water is in fact regulated becomes clear when one considers the extent to which 
the commodification of water use that the Water Code tries to introduce is locally regarded as 
breaking a wide range of ‘common-sense’ moral rules98. Take for instance the opinion of 
Osvaldo, an elder resident in Lower Huife: 
Before, everyone believed that the owner of the waters was the owner of the land. [If 
someone did not have any] the neighbour would share water, but not a formal thing, just 
like that. Before it was said ‘one cannot deny the neighbour neither water, nor right of way’. 
(…) If the neighbour asked for water one gave it to him, a small channel was made and a 
                                               
98 I am here using the term common-sense in the Gramscian sense of the spontaneous and largely implicit 
attitudes and conceptions of the world that arise from the everyday practical reproduction of life. These 
conceptions should not be attributed a clearly spelled out coherence however; rather, they are inherently 
fragmentary and contradictory.  
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little water went to his side. It was like a good of the whole commune [Era como un bien de 
toda la comuna no más]. It was given to whomever needed it. Not anymore. Now it’s worse. 
Now the one who has money just owns everything. 
Or that of Guillermina, who at the time of the interview was the head of the Neighbour’s Council: 
Waters used to be public, and no one worried much about this. This until outsiders started 
to covet [empezaron a echar el ojo] the neighbours’99 water, and then people had to move 
[to protect their water]. (…) For me the way it should be is like it was before, when 
everything was healthier. If the neighbour needs water, well she needs it, ‘take a little bit 
neighbour’, if other neighbour is without water, ‘of course, take some water’, because this 
[current system] lends itself to business, it lends itself to pure shamelessness. If I were to 
sell these water rights, I might earn a great deal of money, but I’m not going to. (…) For me 
it should be healthier, as in the old days when everyone used water, more informal, but 
now, everything is business, shamelessness, whoever is able to trample over the other just 
does it, who gets trampled over gets trampled over. There is no healthy coexistence 
[convivencia] between neighbours. If one is healthy, you get trampled over. For me this is 
due to the law [the Water Code]. 
Testimonies like these make explicit the normally implicit attitudes, expectations, rules, and 
moral notions in which the local waterscape has been traditionally embedded by way of contrast 
to the water politics of the Water Code, which now acquire increased salience as it is clearly 
identified as the main condition of possibility for the development of the Llancalil project. These 
rules—which underpinned all accounts of traditional water management that I encountered—
can, however inadequately, be summarized as follows: 1. that water use is a prerogative of 
whomever owns the land in which the water flows, 2. that one cannot therefore appropriate or 
use it against the landowner’s will, and 3. that, if needed, one is generally expected to grant/gain 
access to water to/from a vecino through some reasonable arrangement. These ‘common-sense’ 
rules can be clearly seen to lay behind, either implicitly or explicitly, most if not all of the 
criticisms that I encountered regarding the conditions that allowed for the Llancalil project to 
take place, specifically those related to the appropriation of water by outsiders enabled by the 
legislation. I will return to this point in a section further below. But here it is important to note 
that the attitudes conveyed by these testimonies point to the degree to which water, far from 
being ‘unregulated’, is in fact embedded in a complex, but largely unwritten, set of rules that 
delineate some of the elementary conditions of conviviality that have produced these valleys as 
a co-inhabitable space (see Chapter 4). These unwritten rules can be read as expressing certain 
                                               
99 Here the term ‘vecinos’, literally neighbours, should be read as the community as a whole.   
163 
values according to which behaviour is judged, values that can be said to have consolidated in 
local common sense as an integral part of the historical establishment of the basic relations of 
co-existence between the originally diverse groups settled in a once remote area. Relations 
which can be seen to be condensed in the word ‘vecino’ (literally, neighbour) that the inhabitants 
of the area normally apply to each other (as opposed to outsider), and which denotes the 
condition of living together, of sharing a common space, of convivial adjacency. Thus the word 
vecino, far from simply denoting location, refers above all to a moral relation. Recall here 
Feliciano Millaqueo’s recount of the conflicts between the Mapuche and Chilean settlers during 
the first generation, and how: “with the title on hand, things calmed down, and [settlers and 
Mapuche] treated each other as ‘vecinos’. They greeted each other, and did cambio de mano 
[reciprocal labour], they got married”. What constituted Mapuche and Chilean families as 
vecinos was not merely locational adjacency, but the progressive construction of the basic moral 
relations of mutual recognition and (many times forced) reciprocity, which developed in tension 
with historically evolving cleavages of ethnicity and economic stratification.  
In this sense, far from being trivial, the word vecino entails a profound importance for it 
signals the domain in which the Water Code truly operates—a fact seldom recognized in the 
literature on the subject.  
The commons that are affected by the enclosure of the waterscape should not be seen 
to be primarily ‘water’ itself, but rather the moral relations of mutual recognition that underpin 
the always unstable and tension-ridden notion of ‘community’ that emerged from the 
settlement period. Indeed, far from being the product of some abstract ‘altruism’, the relations 
of reciprocity which the word ‘vecino’ entails and the moral economy that it indexes are in fact 
emergent from the quite concrete concerns of subsistence that the communities faced during 
and after the settlement period, in the midst of which the production of a social commons 
beyond the household became consubstantial to the business of carving out a viable livelihood 
in these then remote valleys. The concerns expressed by the inhabitants of Huife and Llancalil 
are no decontextualized moralistic rhetoric, but are rooted in values emergent from the 
historical production of the fabric of relations that gives rise to the sense of community as such; 
the importance of which rests on the firm grounds of the materially disadvantaged position and 
relations of unequal exchange100 that the peasant household economy has historically endured 
in its relation to the national and international market and the wider Chilean society. It is in this 
                                               
100 For a detailed exposition of the different forms in which unequal exchange is articulated in the 
relations of the peasant economy with capitalist markets see Bartra 2006:240-280. 
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sense that the abstraction of the right to use water from the relations pertaining to land and 
community that the Water Code effects is held by many to be a source of moral corruption; as 
the then head of the Neighbour’s Council, Guillermina, emphatically puts it, “se presta para pura 
sinvergüenzura”: “It lends itself to pure shamelessness”. In the local moral economy of water, 
commodification is perceived as profoundly antisocial in its content, and dangerously alienating 
in its socio-territorial effects.  
 
Markets and enclosure in the waterscape. 
The fundamental political-ecological condition of possibility for the current expansion of the 
energy frontier upon the Andean foothills is the commodification of water rights, and the legal 
form of ‘non-consumptive’ rights in particular. Although, as I described in the first section, the 
origin of these rights date back to 1981 and have at a national scale in effect played the role of 
the legal cornerstone for the metabolic basis of the dominant strategies of accumulation 
established by the Pinochet regime and consolidated since, for inhabitants of these localities the 
Water Code held no direct local consequence until much later—indeed, for many the relevance 
of the code only became manifest with the looming possibility of the “Llancalil” project. Until 
very recently, many people did not have any sense of a pressing need for them to register their 
water usage, nor a clear understanding of the code. When, for instance, I asked Marta Salazar if 
people had registered their water rights, she told me in no uncertain terms that “here none of 
that was done. We only knew now recently that the waters were already sold”. Her husband 
Félix, on the other hand, told me that 
[The issue of regularisation has become important] Because we’ve been seeing in the news 
that waters belong to the state [son del fisco], and that we need to regularise them, 
otherwise anyone can take them, and then sell them back to you… in case one solicits them. 
That was not known before. (…) It must be around ten years when that began to be known. 
And it’s all wrong, because one is used to having one’s own water. They also say that the 
paperwork that one must do is very complicated, that’s why people don’t do it too much. 
Felix’s testimony is interesting for several reasons. What first caught my attention at the time 
was the antipodal opposition between how the changes effected by the Water Code appeared 
to Felix, and the ideological terms that underpinned and defined the purpose of the original 
design of the Water Code—ie. that state control excreted a distortive effect on the efficient 
allocation of water rights, and that therefore, if one wished for a rational use of water resources, 
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it was necessary “to remove the statist weeds” (Büchi 1993:64) that interfered with the ‘free’ 
allocation of water to its most efficient uses. In contrast, from Félix’s spontaneous perspective 
the most obvious effect of the Water Code is transferring control over water precisely to the 
state (and potentially to someone outside the territory), by way of the power it acquires of 
granting property rights over it in abstraction from land. Thus, for Felix the news he has heard 
about the Water Code boils down to the concrete experience that now “waters belong to the 
state”. This perception is further reinforced by the fact that it is through this control over water 
that the central government has been able to effectively territorialise its energy agenda over the 
mountain valleys of the region, without the need to negotiate with local communities and their 
geographies in any meaningful way.  
Relatedly, reflecting what Graeber (Graeber 2015) has called “the iron law of 
liberalism”101, and against the ideological mantras that accompanied the original design of the 
Water Code, from the perspective of those living in Huife the “removal of statist weeds” and the 
purported establishment of market rationality has been in effect the unprecedented 
bureaucratisation of the waterscape.  One of the most common images that came up in my 
conversations on the topic with people in the area was the general obscurity that surrounded 
the process for regularising water rights, which was perceived as characterised by long, 
expensive processes which as often as not could end in what for many appeared as 
unexplainable rejections of claims. Few had a clear idea of the distinctions between types of 
water rights and between the different levels of government normally involved (Municipal, the 
General Water Directorate [DGA], etc.). Those who had regularised their water rights had 
normally done so through the intermediation of government programmes aimed at supporting 
small-holding production like, for example, Prodesal. These, however, were almost invariably 
consumptive rights. As Selva told me in her home in Papal, “It’s very expensive… it is not just 
going and doing it, it is easier for those who have money. For us people in the countryside, it’s 
difficult”.  
One of the predictable effects of all of this has been that of ultimately producing yet 
another vector of dependence with lawyers and local government bureaucrats, the latter of 
                                               
101 “This apparent paradox—that government policies intending to reduce government interference in 
the economy actually end up producing more regulations, more bureaucrats, and more police—can be 
observed so regularly that I think we are justified in treating it as a general sociological law. I propose to 
call it “the iron law of liberalism”: The Iron Law of Liberalism states that any market reform, any 
government initiative intended to reduce red tape and promote market forces will have the ultimate 
effect of increasing the total number of regulations, the total amount of paperwork, and the total number 
of bureaucrats the government employs.” (Graeber 2015:7) 
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which have acquired increased power over the territory due to their privileged knowledge of 
what from the local perspective appears as an intractable bureaucratic maze, which in effect 
puts them in the position of gatekeepers. And it was through this relation—produced through 
the imposition of the commodity form upon the waterscape—that the company behind the 
Llancalil project originally came about the water rights they needed in the first place, a fact that 
is the source of one of the main issues of illegitimacy that the project faces at the local level.  
The story, known by everyone I talked to, is as follows: a known secretary of the 
Municipality, who was apparently in charge of registering water rights, registered several non-
consumptive rights in the name of she and her daughter in different river basins in the 
municipality, and later sold them to the company behind the Llancalil project for the equivalent 
of 250 million pesos, or around 370,000 USD. This, being as it was wildly out of proportion to 
the relatively meagre amounts that the company was reportedly offering as compensation to 
those directly affected—reportedly anywhere from 3000 to 7500 USD—, was widely regarded 
as completely corrupt, and was during my time there constantly brought up in different contexts 
as one of the points of illegitimacy inherent in the project. Marta Salazar, for instance, wonders 
“how is it possible that she, and outsider, can come and claim rights for this river, when one’s 
been living all life here on its banks!” This sense of dispossession is prevalent, and is directly tied 
to the local experience of the effects of the Water Code. 
In addition, the experience of difficulty and frustration that many have with the 
regularisation process contrasts sharply with the perceived ease with which the secretary, an 
outsider, manoeuvred and acquired the rights to those rivers passing through their very own 
lands. “She had the information, she knew how to do it” Selva explained, after telling me of the 
difficulties she knows local people have regularising water. Guillermina in Lower Huife, for her 
part, says 
I had a very hard time doing it [regularising her water rights], because one has to justify that 
one has several years using it, one has to prove that the water is used for drinking, animals, 
irrigation, one has to prove that. … So I had a very hard time, and she [the secretary] that 
doesn’t even live here? 
For her part, Graciela, who lives in upper Huife, and whose plot—a beautiful riverside meadow 
in Llancalil—is directly affected by the project says that 
There are some [who haven’t regularised their water] yet, they do not have an idea of how 
to do it. … That’s the bad law, that anyone can come and claim the water going through 
one’s own property, and you lose, just like that… it shouldn’t be that way, look at what this 
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lady [the secretary] did, she claimed the waters and they gave them to her, just like that, 
and one that has asked for this and that, like ‘how much you consume’, and then to verify 
it… because in our case we had applied for water from the river and they refused. … When 
my husband wanted to apply for water from the river, all quotas were exhausted. We 
wanted to apply for water for irrigation, for the animals, but there was none left, and she 
[the secretary] that had nothing to do with it came to acquire them for herself. 
Of course, the rights acquired by the secretary were of the non-consumptive kind, but in my 
conversations the abstract character of the distinction was easily lost in the concrete local 
experience of the waterscape. This distinction for most remained unclear, part of the general 
obscurity of the Water Code. After all, paraphrasing a young person told me in passing in another 
occasion in lower Huife, is it not from this perspective the mere act of living by the river a form 
of non-consumptive use? From the local experience of the waterscape the distinction, crucial 
for the expansion of hydropower in Chile over the last three decades, holds little meaning 
beyond enabling outsiders a claim to the rivers.  
All in all, there is clear sense of vulnerability effected by the Water Code, one that is 
magnified by its relative obscurity from the local perspective, and the relations of dependence 
it has enabled. This in turn feeds into a wider pattern of perceived loss of control over the region 
by those inhabiting it (see Chapter 5). 
 
On the ‘moral economy’ and social form  
I have used the term ‘moral economy’ here to describe this vernacular form of water politics, as 
the logic of the case here presented shows evident parallels with those described by historian 
E.P. Thompson in his classic analysis on the motivations behind popular resistance to the 
liberalization of food markets in eighteenth century England (Thompson 1971). In essence, 
Thompson’s argument revolves around how the practices that the new laissez-faire doctrine of 
political economy declared both natural and ultimately beneficial for the ‘common good’ where 
perceived by a range of social groups as transgressing the basic norms and obligations that held 
society together: to wit, a right to subsistence (in this case, access to affordable food), the 
guarantee of which constituted the paternalistic basis of the authorities’ claims to popular 
legitimacy. In both Thompson’s case and the one dealt with in this study, the practices that 
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constitute the ‘liberalization of market dynamics’102 within a particular sphere, are judged as 
breaking ‘common-sense’ rules and obligations that underlie a historically constituted form of 
social cohesion.  
I must however make a few qualifications to my particular usage of the term. It is critical 
to understand that, regarded in its own terms, the ‘moral economy’ of water here described is 
no ‘economy’ at all—indeed not even primarily about ‘water’ as much as the mode of 
relationality it sustains. We are here dealing with relations of mutuality between people that 
delineate an always provisional sense of community, the material and metabolic basis of which 
is cast as ‘economic’ by the fetishizing movement effected by the Water Code. What is resisted 
is precisely the reduction of water to a distinctly economic resource susceptible of being bought, 
sold, and subordinated to a narrow logic of individual utility-maximization; i.e. something 
susceptible to be alienated and abstracted from the relations between people, and between 
them and the land. This means that, in a strict sense, what I am calling ‘moral economy’ are 
precisely relations that are not primarily mediated by the economic category of exchange value 
and the commodity form—i.e. they are not ‘economic’ relations in the sense entailed in 
capitalist production. As Thompson himself points out, the moral economy consists of practices 
which “exist as a tissue of custom and usages until they are threatened by monetary 
rationalizations and are made self-conscious as a ‘moral economy’. In this sense, the moral 
economy is summoned into being in resistance to the economy of the ‘free market’” (Thompson 
1993:340). It is only in the shadow cast by the fetishizing movement of the capitalist mode of 
production that moral relations regulating the relations between people appear as moral 
                                               
102 This expression, as is so commonly the case with economic jargon, is from the point of view of the 
moral economy little more than a crude euphemism, and can therefore conceal much more than it 
reveals. What an economist may call ‘liberalizing market dynamics’ in water rights, from the point of view 
of the moral economy is variously characterized as ‘trampling over’, ‘shamelessness’, or straightforward 
theft. A closer examination of the presuppositions contained in the expression ‘liberalization of market 
dynamics’ is indeed necessary if we are not to unwittingly assume premises that are not in any way 
guaranteed to be shared by those affected by the ‘liberalized market forces’. Although doing this in depth 
of course goes beyond the scope of our subject here, it is nonetheless necessary to signal a few points 
important for our case. In the first place, the expression implies a conception of the concrete individual 
as one whose relation to any social arrangement not mediated by rational self-interest is one of ‘artificial’ 
containment. ‘Market forces’ are in this sense nothing more than the aggregated expression of individual 
acts of ‘freedom’, therefore their institution cannot be but characterized as essentially a movement of 
removal of constraints, rather than an imposition of a new set of the latter. All of these are, of course, the 
quite extraordinary claims of classical liberalism which are, at best, hardly self-evident, but continue to be 
persistently smuggled as the unexamined premises of the hegemonic language and metaphors through 
which these processes are being understood and presented in many academic and policy circles. As I have 
explored here, these terms obscure the real relations that constitute ‘liberalization’, and in particular they 
lend themselves to common mystifications between the relations of ‘markets’ and state, which end up 
blighting the analyses left and right. 
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relations constraining the ‘free’ movement of things. Thus my usage of the term here is 
dialectical: it denotes a term in a contradiction emergent from the expansion of the fetishizing 
mechanisms of capitalist production on the multiplicity of relations mediating social 
reproduction. And it is important to note that this movement effects a double reification: the 
expansion of the commodity form over the material basis of social relations is by necessity the 
transformation of the latter into relations between commodity owners, relation that in turn 
underpins the liberal state as the alienated form of the political community (Clarke 1991; 
Bonefeld 2010; 2014). Taken to its logical conclusion, the progressive erosion of reciprocal 
obligations that the code is perceived to effect entail the increased dependence in external 
authorities for the regulation of intracommunity relations. This is why, as Ivan Illich (1983:4) 
noted, “commons can exist without police, but resources cannot”. 
It is important to link the notion of the moral economy to the discussion in Chapter 2 of 
this study: what the concept is pointing to are the values mediating and orientating the relations 
of mutuality between people, values regulating certain domains of the process of social 
reproduction, and its metabolic relation to, in this case, the local waterscape. These values are 
not to be understood as uncontextualized moral discourses, but as socio-symbolic aspects of a 
unitary process of historically and geographically situated forms of practice and social 
reproduction. The establishment and/or expansion of the commodity form as mediation 
between people among themselves and to nature appears in this sense as a struggle between 
different forms of value and the differentiated light these shed on how people thread upon the 
land. 
In this sense, it is also important to emphasize that the term ‘moral economy’ is not to 
be confused with any normative judgment on the part of the analyst on the moral desirability of 
a particular set of non-commodified relations. It goes without saying that moral economies can 
be—and normally are—fields of struggles of their own. This is clearly illustrated, for instance, in 
a conversation I had with a woman from upper Huife as I gave her a ride to Pichares, in which 
she spent a good portion of the journey telling me about how annoyed she was with her 
neighbour’s behaviour, with whom she had to put up to an extent she wouldn’t if she didn’t 
have to get her water from his plot. It is easy to imagine how this sort of ‘forced reciprocity’ 
could take on much more sinister tones in cases of dearth or an absolute lack of alternative 
means of access to necessary resources.  
Nor should these local appeals to the moral economy be taken to imply that actors 
considered to be part of the community are unable or unwilling to take advantage of emergent 
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markets—in fact, much of the opposition to the commodification of water rights rests precisely 
on the extent to which, to the detriment of the community, some actually do. The extent to 
which the commodity-form of water (or land) can be used for particular families’ advantage 
causes running tensions within the community, and indeed was a perennial source of gossip, 
tensions, and fractures. In this sense, when I speak about the opposition between the ‘moral 
economy’ and commodity relations in relation to waterscape, it is important not to mistake this 
as an opposition occuring, as it were, between a dynamic ‘external’ to the community being 
imposed upon a realm of supposedly uncontaminated community relations. On the contrary, 
this opposition rather signals a dialectic that cuts across the community and its members, some 
siding more decidedly on either part, some playing a much more ambivalent role, or placing 
themselves strategically on different sides depending on the context. Indeed, this fracture and 
its systematic exploitation by the hydropower company is generally regarded to be one of the 
most insidious impacts that the hydropower project has already had on the area. 
Finally, and relatedly, my usage of the notion of the ‘moral economy’ must not be taken 
to imply, of course, that market and commodity relations—or their relation to the state—have 
not been central to the constitution of these communities as they now exist. The extent to which 
they have was explored in some depth in previous chapters. The point is, however, that hitherto 
water has been on the margins of commodification, and for good reason, as for those now 
opposing the Llancalil project it is becoming clear that control over the waterscape is one of the 
basic conditions for some modicum of territorial control. Commodification, on the other hand, 
has constituted the direct condition of possibility for interventions on the scale of the Llancalil 
project on these lands, through the dispossession of local water resources by outsiders. The 
preservation of the unity between water and land is in this sense a condition for the 
maintenance of the metabolic basis of the local economies as they exist, and can be easily seen 
as providing the basis for articulating the local experience to the political demand of recovering 
‘water as a common good’ that, as we saw in Chapter 3, continues to gain traction at a national 
level.      
 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have tried to understand the process of commodification from the point of view 
of the vernacular hydro-social relations that have developed over the socio-historical trajectory 
of the Liucura River’s upper valleys, a web of relations that can be understood as a moral 
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economy of water. A focus on these relations sheds a different light on the presuppositions 
prevalent in the scholarship around the Chilean water regime, which too often uncritically 
assume a simplistic opposition between the market and the state, in which the expansion of 
former is achieved at the expense of the regulatory capacities of the latter. As true as this may 
be on a certain level of analysis, the case presented here shows more clearly the ways in which 
it is not on other crucial ones. On the contrary, the ways in which these two social forms are co-
constitutive needs to be placed more firmly at the forefront if we are to adequately understand 
the energy frontier as it is actually taking place in Chile. From the perspective of the moral 
economy, the water code introduces a struggle not only for the control over water—which is 
certainly does—but also for the social forms that mediate social reproduction, and the relations 
to nature. 
The commodification of water rights has been, from the local point of view, a clearly 
exclusionary process, given the expenses and complexities involved in the regularisation 
process. Local use and access to water remains without official recognition—a direct effect of 
the neoliberal water regime—for an important portion of the inhabitants, and thus 
accompanied by an increased sense of vulnerability and insecurity. This sense, as we have seen, 
is in turn underpinned by the tendential changes the waterscape is locally perceived to be 
undergoing.  
The social relations produced by the commodification of the waterscape can thus be 
characterised by the several aspects. First, they have enabled new ways of territorialising the 
state’s strategic projects—linked to new geographies of rent and energy (see Chapter 3)—over 
the cordillera, in particular through enabling the appropriation of water by outside interests, 
and reinforcing the historical relation of relative subalternity of the local communities and their 
geographies. In addition, the commodification of the waterscape has in effect meant the 
deepening of the relations of dependence of the local population vis-à-vis local government 
authorities. There is a related pervading sense of dispossession and lack of respect by the central 
government for local concerns and visions of what the future of their territories should be. 
Commodification, on the other hand, is frequently characterised as further eroding local 
relations of conviviality, which are in part expressed and sustained by the relations of the 
community to the waterscape. 
An attention to these social relations produced at the local level by the water regime—
and those that are displaced by it—is of crucial analytical and political importance, as it is the 
locus of the main conflicts and obstacles now pervading the energy frontier. Although what is 
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presented here is a particular case, the historical constitution of these territories share many 
similarities with that of other mountain valleys of the region, valleys upon which the new 
geographies of energy are being cast.  
As previously mentioned, the case presented might add a more nuanced view on the 
current terms in which the neoliberal water regime is commonly understood—and thus how it 
should be potentially challenged. Thus the idea that the neoliberal order should be seen as being 
surpassed by the extent to which the “state is brought back in”, should, at the very least, be 
qualified by an understanding of the clear ways in which it never really left, and has even 
expanded its reach through its dialectical intertwinement with the unprecedented expansion of 
















7. Huife and the Llancalil project 
 
Even in its initial phases, which I was witnessing during my fieldwork, the multidimensional and 
layered nature of the conflicts the Llancalil project had brought about was evident. The ripples 
that the project casted upon the human geographies of the cordillera were as dense and 
expansive as these geographies themselves; as it unfolded across the different overlapping 
scales that implicate these valleys, the project’s significance varied and acquired different 
inflections. 
On one level the project expressed deeper tectonic shifts in the national geographies of 
energy, changes that in turn instantiated broader global transformations in the ways capital 
operates through the expansion of energy infrastructures (see Chapter 3). These shifts, however, 
only materialise as mediated by the multiple conflicting scales and territorial layers that 
converge in these valleys and rivers. This study has placed special attention on a particular set 
of values, practices, and territorial notions that have emerged in the course of the conflict as 
immediately significant and important for those whose identities and lives are attached to the 
landscape in which the Llancalil project takes place, and which the current conflict has placed at 
the forefront. These find an approximate institutional territorial representation in the 
Neighbours’ Council, which encompasses the localities of lower and upper Huife, Llancalil, and 
Papal. Nevertheless, as I have shown in previous chapters, this particular scale, and the 
community of people and identities that it expresses, are constituted through their relations to 
a much broader range of territorial dynamics. The conflict introduced by the Llancalil project in 
this sense involved, to different degrees and intensities, all of these wide range of relations, 
scales, and territorial notions that converged and were expressed in these valleys, many of which 
I had little direct access to, but which nonetheless were still manifest as I was conducting my 
fieldwork. 
The project thus held different meanings in relation to each of these scales and the 
different social groups that disputed them. It is worth, from the outset, signalling a few of the 
most evident scales that the conflict around the project brought forth. Most immediately, the 
municipal level played a central role as the prime locus in which the contradiction between the 
simultaneous economic reliance on mass tourism and the ecological values of the municipal 
territory played out (see Chapter 5). This was a specific reality which not only the project had to 
deal with, but, as we have seen, also one in which local territorialities struggled to find their 
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place. On the regional level, on the other hand, the expansion of hydropower acquired particular 
political significance in relation to the deep roots of racial dynamics of subalternization and 
dispossession that have characterised the region since its constitution; relations that the 
expansive movement of hydropower was building upon, and that, both potentially and actually, 
constituted the basis of the ongoing oppositional political composition many of the local 
conflicts these transformations were bringing about. Also, related but not restricted to the 
dynamics at municipal level, and perhaps felt with most clarity locally, much of the project’s 
local significance was to be understood in the context of the transformations faced by rural 
spaces such as Huife in their ever-deepening dimension of urban hinterlands, expressed both in 
the existential dilemmas faced by campesino communities, and the new layers of meaning and 
power casted upon these region by the rapidly evolving geographies of real estate speculation 
and tourism, which combined in a process of rural gentrification.  
These different levels and relations, although densely interconnected, were rarely if 
ever expressed simultaneously and explicitly in their relations to the proposed project, and their 
geographically dispersed nature placed them beyond my capabilities to investigate them in any 
sufficient depth. However, during the time I spent in the field, there was one instance which 
offered a particularly privileged window into how these different dimensions of the conflict 
articulated, and in which several crucial aspects of the conflict were made unusually explicit. 
This instance shed important light on the matter, both for me and for many within the local 
community. On the 9th of April, at the request from the head of the Mapuche community in 
Llancalil and organised by the Neighbours’ Council, representatives from the company behind 
the Llancalil project and the SEREMI of Energy103 had agreed to visit the locality and hold an open 
public meeting. This meeting, in principle, had the objective of “address[ing] any doubts and 
concerns that people might have about the project”, in the words of Werner Bergmann104, one 
of the partners in the company behind the project, and its main promoter. The meeting would 
also have the presence of Pucón’s Mayor, and representatives from the Unión Comunal Vecinal 
[Municipality’s Neighbour’s Union, which represented all Neighbours Councils], and the Consejo 
Ambiental de Pucón [Pucon’s Municipal Environmental Council]. It took place on the Neighbours 
Council’s gathering hall, which was a one-room cottage, located at the point where the 
meandering highway that comes from Pucón bifurcates into two unpaved roads that climb into 
                                               
103 SEREMI are the regional representations of national Ministries, in this case, the Energy Ministry. 
104 Some of the names in this chapter have been pseudonymised.  
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the Upper Huife and Llancalil valleys. The meeting, and the circumstances surrounding it, would 
cast into sharp relief several important aspects of the conflict.  
In this chapter I will explore the different dimensions of the struggles that the Llancalil 
project had introduced in these valleys, and how it articulated with existing ones. I will do this 
through close reading of this meeting, analysed in the light of the more general perspective that 
my fieldwork as a whole would give me.   
 
Prelude to the meeting 
The day before the meeting we had finally got around to painting the two coihue planks Osvaldo 
had laying around in his backyard. It had been an idea that emerged from our meeting a few 
days ago where we had had a group discussion and analysis of local livelihoods, and attempted 
to make a collective map of the territory, among other things (see Chapter 5). “No a la 
hidroeléctrica”, “Ríos Libres”105, each one read; the idea was to mount one on top of the other 
by the paved road across the river, the one that connected Pucón with the nearby hot springs—
the main tourist attraction in the area—through which most of the traffic went. After we wrote 
the message, my partner framed it with a river painted in different shades of blue. “Now that’s 
more like it” said Osvaldo, “Let’s go put them up”. Just across the bridge before getting to the 
main road there was a plot that a local resident had donated to the local catholic church years 
ago to erect a small chapel, but was now semi-abandoned. It was in this plot, on the side facing 
the highway, that Osvaldo had planned to place the sign. We then made two holes in which we 
placed two three-meter-long wooden poles. The signs firmly nailed on the poles, they were 
indeed perfectly placed to receive all those coming the next day to the meeting from Pucón.       
When the next morning we returned to the Millaqueo Millahual community’s camping 
site, “La Araucaria”, people had already started gathering around a wooden table placed right 
next to the calm flow of the Liucura River. Almost every member of the Millaqueo family seemed 
to be present, including branches of the family that lived in other places in the region, some of 
whom had made the two or three hour car drive from Lanco especially for the meeting. Sitting 
in a row of wooden chairs were the older members of the community, including Don Francisco 
Millaqueo, who, at 103 years of age, patiently waited for attendees to assemble.  
                                               
105 “No to the hydroelectric [plant]”, “Free rivers”.  
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Luis Hernán, the current president of the Millaqueo Millahual community, had called on 
everyone he had invited to gather here for a briefing before the meeting. Rodrigo Alvarez, the 
head of the Mapuche community in Llancalil who had been behind the organisation of the 
meeting, wanted to go over a few points that he thought were important, and on which he felt 
everyone should be on the same page. Cars began arriving from Pucón and other parts of the 
valley, bringing a variety of residents opposed to the project, a local leftist youth collective, and 
other friends of the Millaqueo family. Alvarez had a very specific aim in mind for the meeting. 
He started by explaining the importance of letting this meeting proceed, of letting the company 
speak, and not boycotting or disrupting it; a risk he appeared eager to contain in the midst of 
the signs and placards that many of those present were carrying. He then described the way in 
which the company had operated so far, which had mainly relied on dealing with members of 
the communities individually, in particular with those that were going to be most directly 
affected, or those who they needed to buy land or right of way from. He said that he thought it 
was crucial to expose the company to a collective discussion, “because individually the company 
wins, and will keep on winning. … So when we speak of community, we shall speak of one 
community, the human community of Huife-Llancalil”. This emphasis Alvarez made already 
highlighted how in many ways the very notion of ‘the community’ was being produced and 
composed as a necessary moment in the process of struggle the project had introduced. 
Alvarez had a clear tactical approach to the meeting. He explained that Werner 
Bergmann, one of the investors, would be presenting the project. The idea was that immediately 
after, during Q & A, someone would ask Bergmann about the acquisition of the project’s water 
rights, and in particular how much had he paid for them—information that Pablo, a Pucón-based 
mapuche activist, friends of the Millaqueo family, had investigated previously—and how that 
compared to the offers he had made to some of the affected individually. This would then give 
cue to Alvarez’s own presentation which would emphasise the comparatively vast amounts of 
money that other companies were paying for similar projects in contiguous municipalities, 
Melipeuco in particular; agreements of which he had even brought a copy. Following this, the 
representatives from the Ministry of Energy would present the mechanisms of mediation that 
the Ministry was deploying as part of their efforts to give projects like Llancalil, at the time 
proliferating in the region, what they would call “social validation”, and attenuate their historical 
tendency towards conflictivity (see Chapter 3). As I will explain with more detail later, this 
general outline of the meeting reflected Alvarez’s general outlook on the situation, which, as 
the meeting would show, diverged in many crucial respects from that of many of those that 
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would participate—a contrast that revealed important aspects of the challenges the conflict 
posed for the local community.  
At this point the motley composition of those gathered gave a glimpse into some of the 
different territorial layers that the project was mobilizing. Starting by myself—who was 
introduced by Luis Hernán at the beginning saying that I was a student researching the social 
dimensions of the conflict—who had visited seasonally the valley since my early childhood, there 
were other young adults of presumably middle-class urban origins who now lived and worked 
in the Municipality that had got word of the meeting. For many of these people, the project 
threatened what they considered to be the region’s main social and ecological values, 
particularly the rivers, which generally laid behind their decision to establish themselves there. 
Also present were, as I previously mentioned, the extended Millaqueo family, who had travelled 
from different places in the region specially for the meeting. Present as well were people born 
and raised in Pucón, some of them in representation of collectives and organisations, who also 
felt this project was at odds with the development they wanted for the Municipality, which 
hinged on the deeply ambivalent relation they had with tourism. Although many more people 
were to arrive at the meeting place directly, this gathering already gave a glimpse of the 
conflict’s complex geography. In general the attendees would broadly fall within the three 
categories already represented at this gathering: members from the localities adjacent to the 
project and their extended families, politically active people from Pucón, and people of urban 
origins whose life projects were linked with the Municipal territory in different ways and to 
different extents.  
After everyone had been briefed, we all got into the different cars and took the five 
minute ride to where the meeting was to be held. Upon arrival, the members of a Pucón leftist 
collective made up mostly of young people and local students quickly began pasting banners 
and signs outside the entrance and in the room’s walls: “No to the Llancalil hydropower project”, 
“Gloria Marcos, municipal secretary, you stole our rivers to sell them, thief”, “Water and life, 




Figure 25. Placards and posters outside meeting hall. Taken by the author. 
Many of those filling the hall where from the communities and families in the immediate vicinity. 
Nevertheless, as I mentioned above, it was clear that those that considered themselves to be 
affected in one way or another by the project greatly exceeded both categories. In addition to 
the various diasporic or mobile members of the extended families currently living in the adjacent 
localities—especially those younger members working and/or studying in nearby towns—, 
present in the room were people ranging from social activists, leaders, and just concerned 
dwellers from the town of Pucón, students working on nearby conservation projects and 
restaurants, and a number of people of urban origins that had bought small plots in the valleys.  
 
The meeting  
The room was arranged with several rows of chairs facing a table at the front. There sat the head 
of the Neighbour’s Council, Guillermina, the company representative, Werner Bergmann, the 
two representatives from the Ministry of Energy, and Alvarez. 
Guillermina briefly presented those sitting in the panel, after which Alvarez introduced 
the purpose of the meeting. He first explained that there was a pressing need to hold “an open, 
public, meeting with the company”, with the aim of dispelling any rumours, the recent 
proliferation of which did the community no good. He said that the initiative had come from a 
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discussion that Alvarez had had with Bergmann back in Temuco106, in the presence of Laura, one 
of the representatives of the Ministry of Energy, who was in charge of citizen participation 
mechanisms in the region, and sitting on the panel. Alvarez then presented the rationale behind 
holding this meeting: 
We talked about the project, and I said: you know what, the project is not being carried out 
in a correct way, you are not doing things right. It is like having someone eating at one’s 
house, and not knowing who they are, or what they want. … So I told him that the first thing 
that needs to be done is to present the project to the community as a whole, that’s what’s 
correct, whether one likes it or not. The first thing one must do, Mr. Bergmann, is say: this 
is who I am, these are my intentions, this is what I want to do here, this is my proposal. … 
The project is being advanced, it is intervening in the families and houses of each one of us. 
But we don’t know, and that has generated a series of rumours, of differences, of situations. 
‘It is a project that has no impact’, Mr. Bergmann told me. And I told him immediately... the 
project has not even started and it is already having an impact, because it has us all divided, 
rumoured, and interpellated. That this one compromised here, that that one dealt there, 
that this one didn’t… that is an impact, here and anywhere. … So I invite you all neighbours 
of this community, the community of Huife-Llancalil—which is one community, all of us who 
are part of the waters—to listen to Mr. Bergmann’s presentation, to get to know the 
project, to meet him, I ask for your respect. … This is done with the presence of the SEREMI 
of Energy, which tells of the changes that have been done within that Ministry. Before it 
was just coming and grabbing. Now there are certain standards, certain minimum 
requirements for investment projects. And it is in that context that the Ministry is 
participating, and we are talking about getting the project to meet those minimum 
requirements.   
Alvarez’s reference to basic norms of recognition— “Like having someone eating at one’s house, 
and not knowing who they are”—framed the conflict from the outset as one emerging from the 
complete neglect and lack of recognition the company had so far shown had for the communal 
dimension of the territory in which they had been operating, ie. the lack of any concern for the 
waterscape as a commons, and of families as constituting a community. Issue which far from 
having being resolved by the company’s method of negotiating private arrangements with 
isolated families, had been in fact been aggravated by it, as it had introduced rumours, mistrust, 
and misinformation. Indeed, one of the very first impacts I had encountered in my fieldwork had 
been the reported squabbles among family members as the company apparently played them 
against each other, by, for instance, saying that one of them had come to an agreement, when 
                                               
106 The region’s capital, where Alvarez resided.  
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this was not the case. This had apparently happened all too frequently, which also told of the 
lack of effective spaces locally available for collective communication and deliberation. The 
problem introduced by the company’s operations in the territory revealed thus that while 
communal relations existed—indeed where being severely impacted—, they lacked effective 
political form. In this sense, for Alvarez, the meeting was crucial for going beyond the current 
situation of atomization that the company was exploiting, and creating the conditions for 
representing and negotiating the community’s interests, which were not only not represented 
in the sort private dealings that had been carried out, but in fact directly undermined by them. 
This understanding would open into several cleavages as the meeting progressed.    
After Alvarez’s introduction Werner Bergmann started his presentation. In a fluent yet 
heavily accented Spanish, he said that his main concern was to clear up any doubts that there 
might be about the project. He briefly described the project, how it would work, its location, 
where it would extract water, and where it would release it. He then turned to several particular 
concerns he had heard about the project,  
One concern I have heard is that of the flooding of large areas. This is not the case with this 
project. There will be small areas where the water will be captured, where the level will rise 
probably a meter or a meter and a half at most, inundating something like half a football 
field.. … Another issue we had heard, was about the fish and the river fauna. … What 
happens there is that there is a process of environmental assessment of the rivers, where it 
is determined how much water must remain in the river... so the river will never go dry … 
Another concern was that the springs might dry up, that water will run out, all of this is not 
the case. First, all of the water taken by the project will be returned to the river, and second, 
… the springs are from underground waters, while the river’s waters are in the surface. … 
Regarding the visual impact, …. the mayor point where this will be an issue is on the machine 
room, which will be up there in Huife, in front of where the school was, the one that was 
closed last year. We are proposing there a visual barrier. Another concern was the noise. 
We made several studies … the noise is within the room, outside if you are further than a 
hundred meters, there will be no noise, only the normal environment noise. Another 
concern we heard is that the fields might get obstructed, that animals will not be able to 
pass, or people won’t be able to walk through. This is why we made the decision to lay the 
pipes underground. … So these are the concerns we have heard from the neighbours, and 
how we have incorporated them in the design that is now under evaluation. …  
He finally explained that the project is currently under evaluation, and that although they 
“wanted to design a project that has the least impact as it is possible … This is not to say that it 
will not have an impact”. Bergmann’s intervention ended as the tension of the piling imminent 
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questions was noticeable among those present. The first evident difference with Alvarez’s 
framing of the meeting, was that there was no sense of Bergmann presenting a proposal to a 
community that actually had the possibility of making a consequential decision over the matter. 
This would, of course, have implied explaining what benefits the project might potentially have 
for the community, an issue conspicuously and completely absent from Bergmann’s 
intervention. In contrast, Bergmann limited his presentation to assuring the community that the 
project would have no significant impact—a hard pitch, to say the least.  
The first one to speak was Guillermina, who said that she didn’t understand how the 
river was not to dry if they took water from it, considering the very low level it has during 
summer months. Bergmann responded that the ecological flow—ie. the amount of water to be 
left on the river without doing any serious environmental or social damage—had been 
established in the design. This led Pablo, the Mapuche activist from Pucón, to ask whether there 
were any real historical studies behind the determination of the ecological flow of the river, 
“because the concern raised by the neighbour here, who has lived her whole life in this territory, 
is a very valid concern. And here most of the older neighbours know which is the history of the 
river”.  
Guillermina then compounded Pablo’s observation,  
Many years ago, in front of my house … during the floods, the river reached the very same 
street you came through to get here. … Now you can see the stones in the riverbed, that 
says it all. Because a person that has never lived here cannot come and tell us [that the river 
is not carrying increasingly less water] to those of us that have lived our whole lives here, 
and like me, all the neighbours here present. 
To this Bergmann responded that one of the good things about this river is that it happens to 
have a measuring station some miles downriver, which has been in place for several decades. 
This station, according to Bergmann, shows that from the early seventies onwards, on average, 
there has been no clear trend towards less water in the river. This, he said, excluding the last 
few years, which have been extraordinarily dry. For Bergmann this meant that there were no 
real grounds for making any predictions regarding the river flow in the future. 
Luis Hernán, the president of the Millaqueo Millahual community, questioned the 
validity of this data on the grounds that the station is located several miles downriver from the 
community, it receives water from other sub-catchments, and that it contradicts the local 
knowledge of the rivers, the affirmation of which had become the underlying theme of the 
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interventions so far. “These are the numbers from the DGA, I am not making this up”, Bergmann 
responded, to the general expressions of scepticism from those present. “There’s no more water 
upriver, you can be sure of that, because those are snow-melt waters, and now there is no snow 
on the mountains”, heckled Marta, an elder female resident of upper Huife.  
Scepticism that, as it turns out, was well placed. Although apparently no one present at 
the meeting had consulted this at the time, data from the Liucura station is publicly available, 
and upon some simple analysis it clearly shows a downward tendency in the Liucura’s river flow 
over the last decades (see Image 1); tendency that validates local perceptions on the matter, 
and casts doubt on either the good faith with which the company was engaging the community 
at the time, or the quality of the information it was operating with.  
 
Figure 26. This chart shows the annual average flow of all of those years for which there 
are more than eight months of data, until 2016, when the fieldwork took place. As it is 
clear, the Liucura river flow has indeed been tendentially diminishing since there is data 
available, trend that has only intensified during the past few years of the ‘super-drought’. 
Made by author with data taken from the DGA (Dirección General de Aguas n.d.), 
available at: http://www.dga.cl/servicioshidrometeorologicos/Paginas/default.aspx 
This clash between what Bergmann presented as fact and what was held by the community to 
be incontrovertible established a sense of mistrust and generalised uncertainty. This was further 
illustrated, for instance, when, after the exchange related above, I asked a question about 
whether the project had incorporated into its design projections of climate change and its 
impacts on the river. In response to this Bergmann reiterated that there are no grounds to make 
claims of any certainty about the future degradation of the river’s flow, and that, if anything, the 
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available information he had cited of the monitoring station on the river suggests no reason to 
think upper watersheds such as these would show very significant modifications. Before I could 
question further this claim—which seemed for me bizarre, to say the least—Bergmann was 
again cut off by heckles insisting on the fact that for the inhabitants they were clear about the 
tendencies of the river, while others said that it was precisely the many uncertainties that were 
emerging which constituted more than enough grounds for the project’s rejection. As the 
meeting progressed, this sort of clashes led to an increasing polarisation and entrenchment, as 
people tended to question the validity of the data presented by Bergmann, highlighting that it 
was the company who had paid for the studies in the first place. For Bergmann, uncertainties 
about the future were wielded as reasons against opposing the project, while for many of his 
interlocutors these were interpreted in the precise inverse sense.  
All of this expressed a deeper dynamic that would resurface in various ways throughout 
the meeting. Up to this point the discussion had remained within the framework set up by 
Bergmann at the outset. For him, this meeting was primarily about “solving any doubts or 
misconceptions about the project”, an idea he would remark more than once. Of course, this 
understanding of the situation implied a couple of important assumptions. At one level, it 
posited from the outset a hierarchical ordering knowledge: the concerns of his interlocutors 
were, in Bergmann’s understanding, reduced to misconceptions and lack of correct 
information—in a word, ignorance—which he was there to resolve. Consequently, interventions 
had been primarily structured either as questions for Bergmann, or as contestations over what 
were presented as matters of fact. On another, perhaps deeper level, this understanding 
expressed the terms in which these sorts of conflicts tend to be processed within the current 
institutional framework—namely, how, from the outset, the discussion was framed around an 
understanding of matters of fact that precluded any substantive discussion over issues of value 
in relation to which any transformations effected upon the landscape were to be judged as being 
acceptable or not. The question around which Bergmann had placed the conversation seemed 
to be what the precise impact of the project would be—a question inherently surrounded by 
uncertainty, and under the current conditions, mistrust—rather than a conversation about what 
exactly was to constitute an unacceptable impact, and the desirability of the project, a 
conversation that, although implied in Alvarez’s presentation, seemed to be foreclosed up to 
that point. And it were these the issues that, as most of the interventions would make manifest, 
were really at the heart of the matter, and to which those present at the meeting would shift 
the discussion.  
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Territory, and the affirmation of value as fact 
After these exchanges, some well-known persons from the community made their 
interventions. First was Ruth, a seasoned nun that at the time lived in Pichare, but who had 
grown up in upper Huife, and whose voice was locally held in very high esteem.  
I am old already … but think of your children, what are they going to live off tomorrow, are 
they going to migrate too to the big cities, and leave our territories abandoned? No sir. We 
old folks and young have to wake up and become aware that this is our heritage, that our 
forebears settled these lands, a long time back, I’m talking around 1914, that the old folks 
came here. So, we need to defend tooth and nail [con uñas y carne], this most beautiful 
thing in the municipality of Pucón, and I give thanks to the Mayor here present, because 
he’s always supporting us on this, because he knows that his people here in the municipality 
and whatever projections they have of a quality of life is because of tourism. And look, I 
worked in the hot springs just over here, and one day I carried out a poll myself, from 6pm 
to midnight, asking from which countries people were coming, and there were 47 countries! 
So, dear citizens of Pucón, we say no to these run-of-the-river plants, let’s defend our 
resources, in the name of the future, our children, and our grandchildren. 
Ruth’s words were received with cheers by most of those present. Notably, her intervention 
stepped out of the dynamic that the meeting had followed until then: she didn’t address any 
question to Bergmann, a form of engagement that was reproducing the hierarchical ordering of 
knowledge related above. She instead stated a clear position and a value judgement that 
managed to skillfully and succinctly capture many of the anxieties surrounding the general 
historical movement of rural territorialities such as Huife’s—the migration to the cities of 
younger generations facing lack of a viable future on their lands, an erosion of the community’s 
future that is experienced at the same time as an erosion of the relation to its past—and 
connected this directly to what was a play in the meeting. She referenced possible alternative 
futures that connected these values rooted in the community’s relation to the land, to those 
that the territory had acquired within the global geographies of tourism that the municipality as 
a whole lived from107. Her public gesture to the Mayor, on the other hand, seemed to me to bear 
a clear strategic intent: she put him on the spot by placing him from the outset on the side of 
what she had already presented as the unambiguous interest of the community (and indeed the 
whole Municipality), thus forcing him out of any neutrality or ambivalence he might had 
                                               
107 A relation that is, of course, marked by deep ambivalences. See Chapter 5. 
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intended to maintain throughout the meeting. This was at the time all the more evident for me, 
as in conversations I had previously had with her and others, the position of the Mayor was 
considered to be more than a little ambiguous, in particular due to the role played in the whole 
problem of water rights by the municipal secretary; an issue that would resurface later on.  
Ruth’s intervention opened up this different mode of engagement of the community 
with the meeting; one in which the point became the articulation and assertion of a collective 
position and judgement of the project. After her, Osvaldo Ibarra, the well-known and respected 
84-year-old second generation Chilean settler, who had married into the Millaqueo family in 
lower Huife, addressed the meeting. He, like Ruth, did not address Bergmann, but the meeting 
as a whole:  
I, in representation of the La Araucaria agro-camping, have been talking about this with the 
many people that visit these parts. And the foreigners, they all encourage us to stand 
together, be united and defend our lands and our waters. Because here we have forests 
absent in other regions, we still have waters to wash our feet campesino style [lavarnos las 
patas al estilo campesino], clean waters to bathe ourselves. And with the hydropower plant 
even the rivers are going to dry up, the hummingbirds will have to die, because they nest 
where there is water, and like them all sorts of species, birds and fish, and native insects. 
And Chile’s history, here there are indigenous communities that have come fleeing from 
around Padre Las Casas, Temuco, el Manzanal [voice cracks], and all those peoples came 
running here. And I say this because my family is Mapuche, and I work with a camping on 
the banks of the Liucura River, and with a hydropower plant, farewell to the camping, and 
all neighbours who have a riverside plot, they are going to see it dry up. And that is what I 
can declare. 
Osvaldo’s voice had almost broken down by the end of his intervention, which was ultimately 
drowned in the afafan108 of those present. He managed to convey as few others the emotional 
and affective layers at stake in the discussion; the cracking of his voice as he told the story of 
what had become his Mapuche family brought forth a dimension of the situation in which the 
kind of argumentative move previously deployed by Bergmann—through which value 
judgments were interpreted as factual misinformation—was difficult to sustain. In a similar 
fashion to Ruth’s, his intervention placed emphasis on the ecological and historical value of 
these lands, and the value of the campesino way of life. He stressed how these human 
dimensions of the territory were also valued by the ‘foreigners’ who visited these lands, relation 
that for many in the community constitutes a viable basis for an alternative projection of their 
                                               
108 Afafan is a characteristic mapuche cheer/battle cry.  
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territorialities into the future through locally managed tourism, exemplified here by his camping 
site. The hydropower plant for him implied the risk of destroying all that, and dishonoring what 
people felt the past—or more precisely, their relation to their forebears—compelled (see 
Chapter 4), and precluding the possibilities their lands might still hold in the context of an 
otherwise adverse future.  
After these two interventions, Bergmann assumed a more cautious tone in his 
responses. In response to Osvaldo, he reiterated that his worries, although comprehensible, 
were misplaced, as “the river will not be affected… and the whole idea is to generate local 
development”—to which Osvaldo interjected, “I have a hard time believing that sir, I am eighty-
four years old, and know that story. … development for the company you mean”. Here Osvaldo 
made evident the crucial aspect of the situation that the framing Bergmann had previously 
established was obfuscating. At stake was not a simple factual dispute over the precise extent 
of the affectation of the river, but rather precisely an issue of standpoint—development for 
whom, destruction for whom, what constitutes an ‘acceptable’ impact—expressed through the 
different registers of value mediating the relation to the land and the projected infrastructure. 
What the conception of fact divorced from value Bergmann had tried to establish failed to grasp, 
is how humans relations of value, as simultaneously material—ie. practical—and symbolic 
forms, are inextricable from the ecological facticity of the landscape (see Chapter 2). Local 
valuations were not being recognized by Bergmann as practical, and therefore ecological, 
relations, but as ideal misconceptions bearing no constitutive relation to the local ecological 
reality. The force of Ruth and Osvaldo’s interventions rested precisely on the extent to which 
they muddled the distinction. 
 
Water, legitimacy, and the Municipality 
At this point Alvarez intervened to redirect the conversation towards the issue of the acquisition 
of water rights. He began by reiterating that what people expect here is for things to be done in 
a correct way, “like a person” [como la gente], which the company had so far failed to do. “Why 
is the project being done here? Why not in Germany? After all, none of us are going to Germany 
to make a hydropower plant”, Alvarez asked Bergmann, who limited his response to a reference 
to the physical geography of the valleys, and how plants like these depend on places where there 
are both “water and gradient” [agua y caída], and that Germany apparently lacked those 
suitable conditions.  
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“Water and gradient then”, Alvarez continued, now addressing the meeting generally, 
“The waters and the gradient of Llancalil-Huife, of the people, of all of you here. Someone from 
outside comes here and grabs that water and gradient, what about that? Why is that? How?” 
The way in which water rights had been acquired was known by most of those present, and was 
widely considered by local residents to be illegitimate, even bordering on theft (see Chapter 6). 
Nevertheless, up until then there had been no local instances in which this general feeling could 
be surfaced and explicitly articulated collectively; even less in presence of the Mayor, who many 
held accountable as well. Now that this simmering issue had been brought forth, many of the 
present smelled blood. Interventions would become more intense and relentless, if still orderly. 
— “Who gives you the right over those waters?”, asked Nery, Osvaldo’s daughter.  
— “The Mayor must know!” a voice from the back commented. 
— “What happens is that water is a public good…” Bergmann replied, and immediately 
provoqued a wave of boos and derisive laughter, “Look, that’s what the law establishes... The 
state gives the rights to use water. And that’s a right we have now, to do this”.  
— “We understand that you negotiated with a private person”, said Luis Hernán, the head of 
the Millaqueo Millahual community.    
— “We bought the waters from someone—” 
— “Who!”, several voices interjected in disorganized unison.  
— “Someone with the surname of Marcos”. 
— “And who is she?”, asked Pablo disingenuously, turning to the meeting, “Does anyone know 
them? Did you buy those rights from someone from here?” 
Up to this point, Alvarez plan—which he had previously explained in La Araucaria camping site—
to corner Bergmann on the issue of water rights was proceeding smoothly. Before Bergmann 
could answer, however, Jorge, a resident of upper Huife who had not been at the previous 
meeting in La Araucaria, suddenly intervened in forceful and loud voice: 
— “What happened is that those rights were acquired by Gloria Marcos, the Mayor’s secretary, 
and the Mayor turned a blind eye so that all of this could happen”.  
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The comment immediately filled the hall with a general murmur, quickly followed by wave of 
applause by most of those present. Before the applause was over, the Mayor had stood up, and 
said, in an outraged tone, 
— “But how can you say such a stupidity, please! Measure your words. She’s the Municipal 
secretary, not mine. And how could I turn a blind eye if she did this who knows how many years 
back”. 
— “Here everything is known Mayor”, interjected a woman from upper Huife.  
— “Now with this you touched the friendship we have, I cannot answer for other people. 
Because they are citizens and have the same rights as anyone else, and I didn’t help her sign or 
solicit anything”.  
— “You had said at some point that this municipality had the waters secured”, replied Jorge, 
“how did you let this happen?” 
— “How am I going to let anything happen, water rights are not given by the municipality, it is 
not I who gives them, it is the DGA”. 
— “But you could have done something else, say, you know what, I am going to put you 
somewhere else, bye-bye secretary.” 
— “But what do you mean bye-bye secretary, public functionaries—look, I’m not going to accept 
this, it's thoroughly wrong, I respect you, but you are wrong Jorge, do not involve me on this 
matter. I will tell you the story”. 
— “How could you not know what the secretary is doing?”—asked another woman from upper 
Huife.  
— “You know”, the Mayor started, “what was my responsibility during my first years as Mayor, 
I envisioned, say I support tourism, Mr. Osvaldo here, when he was just setting up his camping 
site. What did I say to him? Let’s do this here … lets see how we can get that bridge done [the 
one connecting lower Huife to the main road on the south side of the Liucura river], the river 
walls built. … Because the Municipality applied for all of the water rights that hadn’t been 
allocated, to be used for tourism”.  
— “To deal in them”, Osvaldo interjected, followed by some laughter.  
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At this point Alvarez intervened, saying that the discussion was deviating from the main topic at 
hand. Drawing on a popular saying, Alvarez said that “muddled waters only benefit fishermen, 
and we all know who’s the one doing the fishing here”, and insisted that people should avoid 
quick judgement. Nevertheless, many voices insisted in that it was important to address these 
things, even if only to make the Mayor’s position on the project clear. To this the Mayor swiftly 
answered that his position, in representation of the Municipality, had already been established 
in a public council meeting, and was that of a clear rejection of all hydropower plants in the 
Municipality. The hall cheered, and the Mayor continued, “that is my position. But I can’t be 
looking into other people’s brains, who might be getting water rights who knows how”. 
Of course, the initial aim of Alvarez in introducing the discussion on water rights was to 
force Bergmann to make his dealings explicit, in particular forcing him to disclose the 
presumably large amounts of money paid to someone from outside of the community for the 
rights over the waters that flowed through the community’s lands, and in this way position the 
community on a better standing for any discussion on compensation. Alvarez’s opening 
question—“the waters and the gradient of Llancalil-Huife, of the people, of all of you here. 
Someone from outside comes here and grabs that water and gradient, what about that? Why is 
that? How?”—is framing the issue in what in the previous chapter I called the moral economy 
in which the waterscape is embedded, and placing the discussion of Bergmann’s acquisition of 
rights against that backdrop of illegitimacy. Bergmann, of course, tries to reduce the issue of 
legitimacy to that of legality by immediately referring to the law; interestingly, justifying and 
grounding his private appropriation of the rivers in the legal definition of waters as ‘a public 
good’—ie. the ultimate authority of the state in the granting of water rights.  
Bergmann’s reference here alluded this crucial condition, explored in more detail in the 
previous chapter, the significance of which was made even more explicit in the ensuing direction 
the conversation had taken—namely, how the commodification of water rights had been a 
process mediated by the community’s relations to the state, and the local municipal government 
in particular. This is a relation characterised, as in many rural communities in Chile and Latin 
America, by a strong component of clientelism by which public resources and/or services are 
accessed in exchange for political support to a patron positioned within the structure of political 
power (Landini 2013). In a way similar to the case of water explored in the previous chapter, at 
the municipal level—the most immediate and important interface through which the local 
community relates to the state—this is a relation that takes place through networks of personal 
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acquaintance ultimately regulated by and rooted in local moral conceptions of reciprocity; a fact 
long noted by anthropologists looking at clientelist political forms in similar settings (Ibid.).  
This dimension of the local articulation of state power, and how it had been impacted 
by the whole conflict, was clearly brought forth in this exchange. By that time, I had consistently 
run into all sort of rumours around this issue that expressed the uncertainty—many times 
infused with a good dose of cynicism—that many had regarding the Mayor’s position on the 
project, and the extent into which he had been involved in dealing with the river’s water rights. 
This occasion was in all probability the first time in which this long-brewing underground local 
sentiment—what Scott (1990) famously called a hidden transcript—had been openly and 
publicly expressed, a fact that gave Jorge’s intervention much of its force and resonance among 
those present. Interestingly, and in sharp contrast to Bergmann, the Mayor had a very clear 
understanding that his local political standing depended not on whether the whole issue of 
water rights was ‘legal’, but how the situation beared upon the moral underpinnings that 
sustained his clientelist network of support. This was what Jorge’s accusation was putting into 
question. This is why, when defending himself, the Mayor was quick to reference how he had 
supported Osvaldo and the Millaqueo Millahual community, by securing access to public funds 
for the camping site and infrastructure—something not directly related to his knowledge or 
involvement in the dealings of the municipal secretary of which he was being accused, but which 
nonetheless seeked to reassert his commitment to the implicit expectations that underpin the 
clientelist basis of municipal power.  
After this exchange, representatives from two of the main official municipal 
organisations, the Neighbours Comunal Union [Union Comunal Vecinal]—which represented the 
totality of the Municipality’s Neighbours Councils—, and the Environmental Comunal Union 
[Union Comunal Ambiental]—a Municipal institution in which citizens’ concerns around 
environmental issues are represented—, addressed the meeting, interventions that further 
expressed the way the project was relating to the Municipal scale. The head of the Neighbours 
Comunal Union said that he had met with the company once before, and that he had made the 
opposition of the Comunal Union and of the community he represented very clear. He turned 
to the meeting and asked, “who is in favour [of the project], please raise your hands”, which no 
one did. He proceeded,  
Ok, so if no one is in favour, I suspect we are losing our time here. But what do we have to 
do now? … We represent 24 Neighbours Councils ... and Huife’s Council asked us to come 
and support them. I was thinking before I arrived that if there was any division within the 
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community in this regard I wouldn’t even speak. … But there seems to be unanimity: no to 
the run-of-the-river plant. … I want to say here before the neighbours that the state has a 
huge responsibility in this, it opens the door for this, does all these tricks, and leaves the 
conflict to the neighbours. The Mr. here, who might have his money, and saw an 
opportunity to invest, does not have much of a responsibility in this sense. Unfortunately, 
this will not be possible here. … I know for a fact, because I was in the meetings …, that the 
Municipality had promised to oppose all [hydropower] plants. Independently of all these 
tricks they use, saying that the river won’t dry up, no. I am very clear on this, eleven years 
ago … there was a drought and there was no water anywhere. … When here it is lightly said 
that nothing will happen, no, it will. Now in Caburgua there are no floods, there are no big 
winds. There a none, not any more, none. The water that you see is what is left. … We can 
see it in the Caburgua Lake, before that lake filled up with water, now it doesn’t, and the 
rivers even worse yet. … So, if there is an opposition of the whole community, plus we who 
come to support as Comunal Union representing the whole Municipality, that we are seeing 
this problem elsewhere, here it will not be possible to build the plant, no more tricks. I asked 
before, yes or no, and I for my part say, no. Neighbours, no. 
Immediately the hall filled with voices repeating “no!”, followed by applauses. The president of 
the Environmental Comunal Union, then very briefly intervened placing this project alongside 
other sorts of projects the Union had opposed in the past, “like other plants, fish farms, and all 
of that”. 
The concerns that both interventions expressed around the tendential erosion of the 
waterscape at the municipal scale echoed those at the local level, described in the previous 
chapter, and reasserted the local perceptions Bergmann had repeatedly dismissed. Indeed, 
these tendencies were at the time being dramatically illustrated by the unprecedentedly low 
water levels of the Caburgua lake—one of the Municipality’s main tourist attractions—, which 
had not yet reverted even as the autumn was settling in109. These tendencies of ecological 
degradation and the anxieties they caused expressed for local inhabitants not only 
overpowering shifts in the climate, but also very clearly what is perhaps the crucial 
socioecological contradiction shaping environmental politics at the Municipal level: namely, its 
overbearing reliance on mass tourism, which simultaneously depended on and eroded the 
Municipality’s ecological conditions. The interventions brought to the fore how the project 
                                               
109 This situation has not changed to the date, and the Municipality has called for research to be done 
on the causes. See: (Tele13 2017) http://www.t13.cl/videos/nacional/video-misterio-sequia-lago-
caburga 
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related to this crucial condition, and why it was unlikely to gather any collective support at the 
Municipal level.   
 
Compensation, value, and territory 
After these interventions, Pablo, the mapuche activist from Pucón, took the floor and picked up 
once more the discussion on water rights, which he said was fundamental because “without 
those rights the project would not be possible”. Pablo questioned the legitimacy of the legal 
conditions that had allowed Bergmann to acquire the water rights without the community 
having any say on it: “That’s allowed by the law, which is the Water Code, that was passed in the 
eighties, when we were under the dictatorship. Therefore none of us had even the possibility of 
opposing to how something so vital to life, water, is to be had”. He then asked Bergmann how 
much had the rights costed.  
— “I don’t have an exact number at the moment. But if you want to see, it is there in the real 
estate register, there are all the titles, I’ll look for that information if you like”, Bergmann 
responded. 
— “Excuse me Mr. Bergmann”, said Pablo, turning to the meeting, “does any of the neighbours 
here, who work in the countryside, when you sell an animal, don’t know how much you were 
paid?”, laughter filled the room, as Pablo turned back to Bergmann, “… Why aren’t you able to 
tell the community how much did you pay for the water rights?”  
— “To gather some coins ourselves, and buy them back”, interjected Ruth, again prompting 
general laughter.  
— “That is not hidden information, it is public”. 
— “Then say it!”, several voices in the room replied.   
— “I don’t want to say something inexact”. 
— “I am sorry neighbours, but it is my understanding that we’re talking about 2 to 4 billion pesos. 
Has any of you, of that money, received a single peso for these waters?” 
— “No one!”, came the quick general reply. 
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— “Someone from outside this territory, that comes here, appropriates your waters, and gets 
paid over two billion pesos. Over two billion pesos! … this situation we are living today, and that 
we will keep on living, because we have lived it already, we have lived it in the Bio-Bío110, just go 
see what the hydropower plant has produced in the Bio-Bío”. 
— “Death! Only death!”, a couple of voices shouted. 
— “Is this the development we want for Pucón?”, Pablo asked, facing the meeting.  
— “No!”, the answer came. 
— “We are living in peace here, and we will keep on living this way and paying attention to our 
future generations. So Mr. Bergmann ... we do not want this life nor this development, this is 
not development, this is growth. Development is something integral… where I can develop as a 
human being. But this is growth, in which one person pockets all the money and the rest of us 
suffer the consequences. … So neighbours, no one has received one peso of the billions 
Bergmann gave to just one person”.  
This exchange is worth reproducing as it foregrounded two important aspects at play in 
the situation. Pablo here not only made Bergmann look dishonest as he failed to immediately 
answer the question about the cost of the water rights, but also introduced the regional 
dimension when he framed the project within the broader regional memory of similar processes 
in which there had been a complete dispossession of communities. This was in turn the basis for 
contesting the conceptions of development the project hinged upon. Nevertheless, by turning 
the conversation onto the amount of money—which, upon checking, Bergmann confirmed to 
be 250 million pesos, which although still a large sum, was considerably less than the number 
given by Pablo—Pablo would open up an issue that would reveal some of the important tensions 
the situation introduced for the community. Indeed, just as Pablo finished his intervention by 
saying that no one had received one peso of the money Bergmann had paid, a young female 
student who at the time worked in a restaurant and conservation project in Pichares interjected: 
“Ok, but money is not what is important here”. This would be the crucial aspect that would 
become even more salient in the ensuing presentation by Alvarez, and dominate the meeting 
thereafter. 
                                               
110 Pablo here is referencing the emblematic Ralco dam, that was the focus of a very high-profile conflict 
between the Pehuenche people and the central government, which can be said to have established many 
of the basic parameters for similar conflicts between indigenous communities and the Chilean state during 
the post-dictatorship period. See Chapter 3. 
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After this exchange, it was turn for Alvarez to give the presentation he had prepared. He 
opened by asking the question, “what is a [hydropower] plant?”, and letting it linger for a brief 
moment. He continued, “we arrived at the conclusion that a plant is a money factory. … What 
gets installed is a machine that makes money, and it will get installed here”, Alvarez said pointing 
to a PowerPoint slide showing a pile of cash. He continued, “how does this generate cash? By 
making use of water”. Alvarez then proceeded to describe the project, how it draws water from 
the river, entubes it, and puts it into the generator—“to generate what? Money”. Many nodded 
as Alvarez stressed the point: “There is no other reason behind the installation of this central, it 
is cash. Do you think he needs to light his home, or yours for that matter, or Pucón? This is the 
purpose, this is honesty, this is transparency. This is what you should have said”, Alvarez said 
turning to Bergmann, “‘I come here to make money’”. As Alvarez completed this sentence, a 
loud applause followed by an afafan filled the room.  
When the cheers subsided, Alvarez proceeded, "... And this is what is going on with all 
the projects in this region, and all the investors have had different ways of behaving and relating 
to people. Some arrive right away talking to people, from the first day. And there are some that 
talk about compensation measures, and they pay, and here I have a contract showing how much 
they pay.” He went to the desk in the front of the room and picked up the document, “I will do 
the comparison to how much you are receiving”. Alvarez then asked, ”So, what comes next?” as 
he clicked on the computer keyboard to show a powerpoint slide with a cartoon of someone 
carrying a huge bag of money while others watched and scratched their heads in disorientation. 
As laughter filled the room, he continued,” that is what comes next … that money generated 
here with the water of the Llancalil and Huife rivers, that’s how it gets distributed. Mr Bergmann 
and his associate, strength fails them to carry so much”, Alvarez quipped, “... And those others 
are the peñis111 in Huife, and all of us up here, wondering, well what the hell happened? ... And 
people will be left wondering, when was it that we got screwed? When was it that we didn’t 
open our eyes?” 
After a brief pause, Alvarez asked rhetorically, in a comical tone, “the question is the 
following: what do you make of this project? Do you think it is a fair deal?” The whole room then 
shouted in unison “No!”. Alvarez continued,  
— “Should this kind of business be done?” 
                                               
111 Term meaning ‘brother’ in mapuzungun, commonly used among Mapuche people as a way of 
acknowledging mutual ethnic belonging.  
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— “No!” everyone shouted again. 
— “Is correct and fair the distribution of the money that would be produced in Huife and 
Llancalil?” 
— “No!” 
— “In case this project is built, how do you think the money generated by it should be 
distributed?” 
Here, a general murmur followed. One person quickly replied, “It should not be built at all!”, 
which was rapidly followed by others saying, “we don’t want your money!”, “we are not 
interested in his money!”. Here the main point of division within what had up to that point 
appeared as the homogenous block of ‘the community’ surfaced, and would be soon become 
increasingly evident as Alvarez approached his conclusions. 
Alvarez proceeded, “It is true, there is talk of energy and the like, but what’s going on is 
this: they take the water, they build their money factory, and what is generated in money. And 
that money goes away.” Alvarez turned to the Mayor, in an emphatic tone, “Mr. Mayor, that 
money goes away. It doesn’t stay in the municipality, it is not taxed here, nothing. … Brothers, 
sisters, this is the problem, this is the point”. Alvarez then turned to Bergmann, and said, “I want 
you to understand Mr. Bergmann... you could have done things transparently and honestly, that 
is why people do not want this project. If you came here with a different culture … who knows, 
maybe things would change. Right? Because, as I told you before, the territory and the waters 
belong to the Huife community as a whole, independently of this legal subterfuge. … And it is on 
them that all the damage and the effects of the project will fall. We don’t know how much it will 
be, but it will be suffered by the people here, not by the person who received the two-hundred 
and fifty million pesos. She will not face any damage”.  
Up to this point Alvarez’s presentation had successfully interpreted the general outlook 
of those present—namely, that this project was a money-making operation that was taking place 
at everyone else’s expense. Nevertheless as Alvarez proceeded considerable discomfort was 
building up among many in the audience. Alvarez moved towards his conclusion, “so when you 
come, and you start talking individually to each person … offering two, three million… that is 
why we did this, because the amount of money that this generates is not for you to offer some 
family one or four million. This is not the first nor the only company, there are other companies 
operating in the region that have different ways of doing these projects. There are companies 
that are proposing associativity, there are companies that are offering percentages, and there 
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are companies that are paying too. And I brought a contract to show to you that I am not lying. 
Because as he said, the information is public…”.  
Before Alvarez delved into the details, Guillermina, the head of the Neighbours Council, 
suddenly interrupted, and said “Let’s not get excited with this stack of bills we see here”, 
pointing at the powerpoint slide Alvarez had left hanging from his presentation, “because they 
are not ours, they are not of this land, they are not from the people that have been born and 
raised here”.  
Alvarez continued, showing the contract, “look, before a notary, here are the signatures—”  
“Not even one peso”, Guillermina resumed, “even if they offer, let’s not sell ourselves out, dear 
neighbours”.  
Alvarez picked up again, “I can show you, because there are some that have already received 
money, so that you know. Here it says, … ‘the company will pay … the sum total of 180 million 
pesos. Plus two million and a half, to each of the families during five consecutive years’. In 
exchange for what? … Right of way, almost 500 million pesos… and here to you, you have been 
offered two million pesos.” Alvarez scoffed, and finished addressing Bergmann, “Please, there 
are different ways”.  
The same student that had previously interjected, repeated her point once more: “Yes, 
but this is not about money”. As many murmured in approval of this, a middle aged doctor 
originary from Santiago, who had bought land nearby, compounded these remarks and 
intervened. “Yes, but you know what? I think it is important to make a declaration of principles 
here. … It seems to me that we cannot shift sides, we either have one consciousness or we have 
the other, and it doesn't matter if they leave here more money or they don’t. We are not 
interested in money”, he said as others commented in support, “we have to line up with one 
thing, and on top of that, when money is offered the communities are divided. Which is what is 
happening. … We shouldn't even be asking questions like, ‘so where will this transmission line 
go through?’, no, we must not give that space”. The intervention ended in applause, as hands 
raised up to intervene; most of which reiterated and emphasized the idea that the point of this 
meeting was to make it clear the collective opposition to the project and nothing else.  
Bergmann then took the floor, trying to, hopelessly, reframe the situation back in the 
terms he had initially explained: “Like we said before, this meeting is not for these purposes. 
This meeting is to clear up doubts, so that you can make up your own mind.” The reply, in the 
voice of Fernando, a young man who lived in Pichares and was descended from the Goeppinger 
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family in Llanclail, was quick: “Our minds are made up, this meeting is to tell you ‘No’, that’s the 
truth. … and we are going to use whatever means necessary to say no”; to which a young woman 
also from Pichares quickly compounded, “and we are many”. 
This exchange revealed one of the central cleavages that the project had opened within 
the community; namely, whether the struggle was to be confronted as being primarily an issue 
of the distribution of the rents the project would generate, or whether it was about asserting 
the non-monetary values of the territory through which, as previous interventions had made 
clear, the community's relation to both its past and its future were articulated. In the terms 
developed in Chapter 2 of this study, what surfaced here was the choice that opened up for the 
community of whether it was to accept the primacy of field of value that the project expressed—
ie. the one cast upon these lands by the shifting geographies of energy rent—and thus 
understand this as a struggle over the appropriate distribution of value (costs and benefits), or 
whether, on the contrary, the struggle was precisely about what sort of value should prevail in 
mediating the community’s relation to the land and its waters.  
It is important to understand however, that the conditions in which this choice 
presented itself were far from even among those opposing the project in the room. On the one 
hand, while local families had a deeper relation to the territory, they had also felt the sharp edge 
of the protracted marginalisation of rural economies, expressed most clearly in the constant 
outmigration of younger generations to the cities. This differed markedly from the situation of 
people like the doctor, or other urban newcomers, who had arrived to these lands on a vastly 
different economic and historical lane.  
Thus the question of the local material and political capacities for asserting these 
territorialities and non-monetary was not an idle one. Indeed, the political realities around the 
development of projects such as these further tipped these balances, a fact that lay behind 
Alvarez’s approach, who probably knew these better that most of those present. Alvarez was a 
seasoned activist and researcher, and at the time worked for one of the most important human 
rights organisations in the region, an organisation whose work is primarily focused on 
Indigenous rights. This gave him a comparatively vast experience and fluency on the legal, 
institutional, and political realities of conflicts such as this one—far beyond that held by anyone 
locally—, but also a very important network of relations in Temuco, the region’s capital. This had 
positioned him as a central node in the at the time ongoing negotiations with the company, and 
someone who could facilitate any possible mediation by the government. On the one hand the 
company had recognised that one of the main obstacles for the project was likely to be found in 
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the opposition by the mapuche community that Alvarez represented—whose lands were 
immediately adjacent to the river in Llancalil—, and on the other, Alvarez was, for people in 
these localities, an authoritative voice on the institutional, legal, and political complexities 
involved in the conflict, as well as one of the main sources of ‘insider’ information.  
Alvarez, however, had a noticeably different approach to the conflict than many of the 
local residents I talked to. This was already apparent in his intervention at the meeting, where 
his emphasis was on the meagre amounts the company was willing to compensate the local 
community with, and the imagery covering his main PowerPoint slides, dominated by 
representations of money and cash. This message—which at its core consisted in foregrounding 
the value dimension of the project (ie. the project is all about generating rent), studiously 
conflated by the company with the use-value dimension (ie. Bergmann’s presentation of the 
project as one about generating electricity)—was received with marked ambivalence by those 
present. It resonated and was cheered to the extent it undermined Bergmann’s rather 
implausible claim that it brought ‘local development’, to reveal it as that which everyone knew 
it was: Bergmann’s business, in which they would, collectively, only harvest losses. On the other 
hand, it did not go well to the extent Alvarez took this argument into one about fair distribution, 
which clearly most of the present saw as giving up on the fundamental point: the rivers were 
not for sale. As the meeting had made clear up to that point, many of the local residents that 
opposed to the project—including the head of the Neighbour’s Council, and the Millaqueo 
Millahual community—doggedly refused to engage the discussion on that level. As most 
interventions showed, uprooting the waterscape from the values it had acquired through the 
historical constitution of these communities already constituted an unacceptable concession. 
Plausibly, on the other hand, as relative newcomers, it was perhaps the comparative lack of 
historical density the land held for Alvarez and the community he represented that underpinned 
this divergence. Nevertheless, one should here consider that many rebuttals to the narrative 
that Alvarez tried to establish also came from other relative ‘outsiders’, who however came from 
a markedly different ethnic and class background. 
In any case, as he would later explain to me, Alvarez had no shortage of reasons behind 
his approach. Drawing from his experience of other processes of resistance to similar projects in 
the region since the emblematic Ralco dam in the upper Bio-Bío river, he was apparently 
convinced that it was virtually impossible to stop these projects once they had been decided by 
the government. An intransigent resistance would, in all probability, only have the effect of 
leaving the affected community not only without its river, but also without any appropriate 
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compensation. Under these circumstances, the best possible strategy was to demand from very 
early on the biggest chunk out of the potential rents generated by the project. This would not 
only give some measure of compensation for the communities in case the project were to take 
place, but also had the best chance of actually stopping it, by increasing the costs of the project, 
and therefore reducing the company’s margins of profitability. This was, in Alvarez’s mind, the 
only language that both government and company ultimately understood.    
For all the pragmatic realism of Alvarez’s approach, it was evidently not one that at the 
time the majority within the local community was willing to openly accept. Indeed, many 
comments I encountered seemed to see this sort of pragmatism advocated by Alvarez as a 
source of a relative mistrust. For all the respect and appreciation Alvarez commanded locally, in 
my conversations with other residents the notion that he didn’t hold a deeply rooted relation to 
these lands and therefore might eventually look for an arrangement with the company surfaced 
more than once.   
 
The state and ‘social validation’ 
The next and final section of the meeting was to be dedicated to the presentations of the 
representatives of the Energy Ministry, a young woman and man, who had been asked by 
Alvarez to explain the new policies that the Ministry was introducing to promote, in their words, 
the ‘social validation’ of projects such as the one under discussion. The discussion was, in any 
case, drifting naturally towards that, as after the exchange related above, Pablo commented 
that 
More than saying ‘no’ to Mr. Bergmann, we have to say it to the government 
representatives sitting here. … We have tell the Energy Ministry enough with trampling over 
the rights of the people and citizens of Chile. We chose you, and you have to be responsible 
for respecting us as it should be. When you are authorities you think yourselves as having 
the right to trample over us without consulting anything. And that is what we disagree with.  
After a brief introduction by Alvarez, Laura, the female representative, stepped up and began 
her presentation of the new policies of participation the Energy Ministry was deploying as part 
of its new Energy Agenda, called ‘Energía 2050’ (see Chapter 3). She said that she represented 
the new Unit of Participation and Social Dialogue, the purpose of which was to “act as an 
intermediary between companies, communities, local authorities, environmental organisations, 
so that all actors can participate from day one”. She said that in the region there were many 
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projects at different stages of development, many of which had been “very bad experiences”, 
and that that was why this unit was born. She then gave the example of Neltume—in the region 
immediately south of Araucanía—, where a project had been suspended due to the resistance 
of the community. The idea was that the project would be able to be “reworked through this 
participation guidelines with the community, so that they can decide and take a leading role in 
regards to some of the technical aspects of the project”. 
She then began explaining the necessity for this shift in policy. She explained that before, 
projects where simply deployed over a territory, without much regard to what people thought. 
As examples, she referenced the already mentioned Ralco dam in upper Bio-Bío, just north of 
the Araucanía region, and HidroAysén in Patagonia. “We saw the problem in all of this, that there 
was no early participation of the community, and besides that, there has been no local 
development where these projects are installed… we are not going to ignore that there are 
things that have been done very badly”. She said that, although the Ministry cannot go back and 
right what had been done wrongly, it was interested in looking for solutions, and do things the 
right way. “We as state, we want to act as an intermediary, and we have the example of Neltume 
… we want to introduce associativity in energy projects, so that the community takes part of a 
percentage …”. In this sense, she explained, the government wanted to introduce new standards 
for projects, where participation is encouraged from the outset of any new projects. Here the 
role of the state would transition from its purported absence—a situation in which “companies 
operated by themselves”—to an active mediating role: 
There are a lot of opinions, we all have different positions around energy projects, but we 
as the state have to prevail in the face of the different opinions of all citizens. There are 
citizens that might want to benefit, or that if there are projects, they might also win. There 
are other citizens that do not want anything, and yet others that want to be informed so as 
to make a decision. In front of all these position we as the state want to generate these 
instruments and guides for participation, so that everyone can be heard.  
Even in projects at more advanced stages of development, the guidelines Laura was presenting 
could organise fora such as this one, in which the concerns of the community could be heard 
and people could get informed. In broad terms, she said, what the Ministry aimed at were 
“projects with better social and environmental validation”. She said that while it was of course 
true that the Ministry supported energy generation projects, the idea was that these projects 
were “good projects, not only in technical terms, but also in social terms”. 
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If Alvarez’s presentation—with its framing of the conflict as one about the necessity of 
negotiating better distributional terms with the company—was meant to give a cue to Laura’s 
presentation of the Ministry’s mediation mechanisms, the mood in the meeting had turn out to 
be decidedly unreceptive to this possibility. The first to respond was again Pablo, who picked up 
on Laura’s reference to the case of Neltume: 
There was talk about Neltume. I want to say to the community that the ones who struggled 
for fifteen or twenty years was the indigenous community, and I know the leaders, I’ve met 
them, and it hasn’t been the government or the state who have supported [the movement] 
so that this project was stopped, on the contrary, they are the ones that have put all the 
obstacles so that the community, their position, wouldn't take place. Finally, today, as an 
outcome of the struggle, there are fruits. That is what we need to value... 
In this sense, from Pablo’s point of view, it was very clear that the government, far from shifting 
from an absent role to one of neutral mediation, as it came across in Laura’s presentation, had 
always operated decidedly in favour of energy projects, which made this pretension to play a 
mediating role suspicious. He then went on to say that he found strange that the state was 
congratulating itself for being respectful towards the will of indigenous communities, that it 
should “first ... apply the agreement, the 169 [of the ILO], which says indigenous communities 
have the right to choose their ways of life”, given that the continuous imposition of projects the 
communities do not want shows no respect for these agreements. 
After Pablo, I asked a question on whether within this framework the collective decisions 
of the community had any binding character, to which Laura responded that while that was their 
aim, these policies are still new and that currently they were not binding. My response was that, 
if that was the case, since there are no guarantees, the community had every reason to be 
cautious in approaching this as a tool to protect their interests. In particular, I proceeded, 
considering that the State is no neutral mediator in this, as her presentation seemed to imply; 
just a few months ago the Energy Minister had announced their plans to build one hundred small 
hydropower projects, many in the region112, a statement that far from reflecting a process of 
‘respectful dialogue’, expressed the traditional geographies of political power—centralism, as it 
is called in Chile—in which all the core questions about the region’s development were settled 
in Santiago. Laura responded that “while it is true that the Ministry has a project portfolio, the 
                                               
112 See Paúl 2015, Chapter 3.  
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idea is to do them with social validation. … while the minister did say he wanted a hundred mini-
hydro, he also said he wanted the communities to participate in the process”.  
What this response made clear, of course, was how the space opened by these 
participation mechanisms implied at the same time a clear delimitation of the political capacities 
of the community over their lands, of what was within their purview to discuss and decide: they 
could participate in the plans the government had for the region in relation to the national 
geographies of energy, but not in defining what those plans were in the first place.  
And it was precisely this problem that laid behind Pablo’s comments, who immediately 
intervened once more. He said that he had in fact attended many of the regional meetings linked 
to the elaboration of the Energía 2050 agenda, as many social organisations and leaders from 
all over the region had, to tell the Ministry that they did not want hydropower plants. 
That word is there, we do not want them. So if you are talking about whether it is binding, 
it does not exist. We already told you a year ago. And the minister keeps insisting, two 
months ago, saying that they will install so many hydropower plants in this territory, when 
social leaders and communities have already given their opinion on the matter. We live here 
from tourism, from nature, we don't want these resources to be destroyed. 
Pablo said that in this sense he was more than sceptical about the extent into which the Ministry 
would respect local opinions, no matter how clear they are stated. In particular he referenced 
the recent case of the Doña Alicia project, in the north of the region, which upon being rejected 
by a large majority in the Regional Commission for the Environment, was nevertheless approved 
by a Ministerial Committee operating at the level of the central government, disregarding not 
only the overwhelming local opinion, but also the government’s own institutionality at a regional 
level113. As the widespread regional political gossip had it at the time, this conflict laid behind 
the then recent removal of what had been the, admittedly notoriously moderate, first Mapuche 
Regional Governor [Intendente] in the region’s history.  Pablo concluded, “so we oppose here, 
and a group of people in Santiago approve it. What is it then, do you respect us? These are all 
just words for me, with all the experience I have as a leader, all the meetings I’ve been at. These 
are all just words, in reality there is no respect”.  
 
                                               
113 A few months after, an investigation commissioned by the Congress on this case found that the 
Energy Ministry had directly intervened and pressured to get the project approved. See Chapter 3. 
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Conclusions 
After this last exchange, Guillermina finally called the end of the meeting, as people chanted “no 
a la central!” [No to the plant] and “Huife sin hidroelectrica!” [Huife without plants]. Although 
there were no concrete agreements made between the different parties, and the future of the 
project remained undefined and out of the direct control of the community, most of us present 
seemed to feel uplifted in a way I had not really expected. If anything, the meeting had provided 
an unprecedented space for the articulation of a collective position, for the explicit self-
recognition of the community in a common stance: “we do not want this”. In a sense, the 
company’s complete disregard for the communal dimension of the valley’s waterscape was not 
surprising: as I mentioned before, ‘the community’ was a notion that—although firmly rooted 
in a common dependency upon the waterscape, a common history, identities, and moral 
relations—had no institutional expression beyond the Neighbour’s Council; an instance that was 
mostly a function of the common relationship to the state, through which public resources were 
negotiated. This lack of political articulation of what during the course of the struggle had 
emerged as a fundamental aspect of the political ecology of these localities—the way in which 
the waterscape interweaved with a common substratum of identities and relations—was 
highlighted by how the meeting had effectively functioned as a platform for the expression and 
collective articulation of long simmering positions, which in many cases found strong common 
purchase and collective resonance. It felt like a long overdue collective event in which individual 
valuations that had been long brewing mostly in everyday conversations encountered their 
social grounds on an open forum. This was what, I would venture, was behind the many lifted 
spirits I encountered when we stepped out of the small hall, as people got into their cars and 
onto their horses. The meeting in this sense not only expressed through many voices the 
existence of a constitutive commons—brought to the fore precisely by their negation in the 
multiple conditions that had made operations of the company in the territory possible—but also 
made manifest the necessity, imposed by the situation, of giving them political form.  
Nevertheless, what the meeting and its composition had also made evident was that the 
geography of the conflicts associated with the project was not isomorphic to the geographies of 
the commons it was affecting in these particular valleys. On the contrary, it was clear that the 
latter constituted but one of the different dimensions of a conflict that spread across a range of 
geographical scales and their respective contradictions. The ambivalence that characterised the 
relations between these different dimensions and scales was made unusually explicit as they 
converged and articulated in the course of this conflict. For instance, the contradictions of 
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tourism as an economic strategy—namely, its reliance on the very ecological values it eroded—
mainly played out at the Municipal scale, and the way the project beared upon this condition 
was one of the main hurdles the company had to contend with. Tourism appeared for many in 
the local community, on the one hand, as an opportunity for the future economic viability of the 
territory, and even as a source of alliances, visibility, and external validation, while on the other 
it was the cause of the intensifying alienation many felt with regards to the dynamics of 
ecological and territorial change—as expressed for instance in the then ongoing processes of 
real estate speculation rife across the lower Liucura valley and the Municipality more broadly 
(Chapter 5). The very presence of many of those of urban origins in the hall—myself included—
was probably one more expression of this process through which rural spaces are subsumed 
into the geographies of the urban middle classes. Geographies which, nevertheless, local 
residents consistently used for the establishment of alliances to oppose the project.  
Another important geographical layer of the situation was the way in which the project 
was part of a conflict that took place on a regional scale, at which the project found both its 
precedents, and its most contentious political meaning. As it was repeatedly recalled during the 
meeting’s exchanges, the project was part of a region-wide intervention that touched upon the 
deep rooted grievances of the Mapuche people—who in many cases, such as Huife, lived in 
these remote valleys already as a consequence of previous dispossessions, as Osvaldo’s 
intervention reminded everyone—grievances that over the last decades have proved to be one 
of the main sources of resistance to the place the region has been assigned within the 
metabolism of the Chilean neoliberal experiment—expressed, inter alia, in the form of 
hydropower and exotic tree plantations. This was an unavoidable political context that surfaced 
constantly during the meeting, a layer of meaning that not only weighed heavily on the 
government's policy shifts, and the mea culpas that surrounded their presentation in the 
meeting, but also constitute perhaps the main grounds for the oppositional articulation with 
similar struggles across the region; something at that time had still only been fragmentarily 
pursued by those leading the struggle at the local level114.  
By the time the government representatives made their pitch, the meeting had taken a 
direction that rendered it somewhat misplaced. The evident need established by that point in 
the meeting was not that of an effective instance of mediation with the company—although this 
was also clearly needed—but rather the need, first, of an instance in which a collective position 
could be articulated (which in turn implied the elucidation of what and who actually constituted 
                                               
114 This changed noticeably during the 2018 the renewed project. See Conclusions. 
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the ‘community’, something that was, as we have seen, far from self-evident115), and, second, 
the recognition of and respect for these decisions; something for which there were no 
guarantees in the schemes the government was proposing. In other words, the issue of power, 
of who gets to decide over the territory, was not only not really addressed, but perhaps further 
obfuscated: the fact that the project was not being proposed but imposed—which ultimately 
laid at the core of the sense of anger that surrounded the whole situation—was not remedied 
by an increased scope of participation in what was considered to be imposed in the first place.   
Of course, and as it surfaced many times during the meeting, the most obvious means 
through which this imposition was carried out was the legal-institutional framework that 
enabled the company’s control over the local waterscape. Nevertheless, as the course of the 
meeting would make abundantly clear, the whole process was also embedded in old cultural 
forms of subalternization through which dispossession has been naturalised throughout the 
history of capitalist development in the region. This was expressed with particular clarity in 
Bergmann’s dismissal of local knowledge, and the exclusion of local valuations from what he 
considered the meeting to be about. This was, generally, not an explicit dismissal, but rather a 
social relation already implied in the discursive frame in which several of the crucial aspects of 
the situation were being discussed. The material alienation of the community from its hydric 
commons was culturally articulated in a strict dichotomy between matters of fact—established 
in this case by the studies that the company had paid for, and which Bergmann was to clarify for 
the community—and those regarding the local valuation of the project; which, as Bergmann 
repeatedly insisted, were for him concerns outside the scope of the meeting. In his view, he was 
there to resolve local ‘doubts’ and ‘misconceptions’ about the purportedly ‘real’ impacts of the 
project. This framework was not only ultimately sustained by the above-mentioned political 
condition of domination—ie. the fact that the local community had very little say in what would 
ultimately happen on their lands, a ball that was squarely placed in the SEA’s court—, but also 
construed local values as an essentially subjective phenomenon with no bearing on the objective 
ecological reality described by the company-commissioned studies. On the contrary, as I have 
explored in this study, the local (use) value relations to the territory, and therefore to the project 
that was to be implemented in it, expressed an irreducibly intersubjective (ie. social) and 
material (ie. practical) process by which local identities found their social arenas of meaning. 
The notion of territory, which emerged several times in the meeting, gave not only geographical, 
                                               
115 In this sense, it is worth asking to what extent the mechanisms of mediation described being 
deployed at the time by the Energy Ministry predefine what the ‘community scale’ is. If anything, the 
meeting showed that the area of impact of the project was far from straightforward.   
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but also historical, form to this process. The conception of nature the company operated with 
throughout this whole process, shared in this sense “[t]he chief defect of all hitherto existing 
materialism” Marx already denounced in 1845 (Marx 2002): that of being an object of 
contemplation devoid of human practical activity, which found its necessary counterpart on the 
confinement of the complex local imbrication of knowledge and values to an ideal sphere of 
‘culture’, from which they could then be easily interpreted as factual misconceptions. What this 
case suggests however, is that this dyad of abstract materialism/idealism, far from being 
confined to nineteenth century debates within German philosophy, continues to be reproduced 
as the necessary cultural articulation of the shifting geographies of capitalist rent, as expressed 
in this case by the Llancalil project.   
Nevertheless, this framework was far from being uncontested, and indeed ended up 
hardly containing the discussion. As I have shown, the conversation constantly strayed from it 
as people’s rejection of the project, the relation between their history and their future, the 
knowledge of their lands, all interweaved seamlessly in many of the crucial interventions, which 
ended up not really addressing Bergmann at all, but the collectivity present there as a whole. 
The rejection of the project and the oppositional assertion of the values the territory held at 
different scales gradually became the centre of gravity of the discussion.  
All of this created a clear friction with what seemed to be Alvarez’s original plan for the 
meeting: making explicit the meagre amounts the company was offering in compensation in 
relation to similar projects in the region, exposing him to the local sense of illegitimacy that 
surrounded his acquisition of the water rights, and finally forcing Bergmann to negotiate better 
terms with the community. At that point, the presentation by the representatives from the 
Energy Ministry would set new parameters for the company’s operations in the area, which 
would hopefully put the community in a better position to negotiate, and perhaps even oppose, 
the project. As it turned out, the conversation revealed a decidedly different disposition among 
those present. Alvarez’s presentation was resonant precisely to the extent it foregrounded the 
value dimension of the project—ie. that it was first and foremost a “money factory”—, but found 
much less purchase when, once this was established, it remained on this dimension and centred 
the discussion on the distribution of rents. Notwithstanding the realpolitik that underpinned 
Alvarez’s approach, this went very clearly against the grain of the terms in which the struggle 
had taken place up until then: at its core the struggle was about the refusal of subsuming the 
rivers under the value regime that the new geographies of energy and rent where casting upon 
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them. As Guillermina would tell me in another occasion, this was a struggle that was lost the 
moment one started to talk about prices. 
Still, inextricably implicated in this refusal, laid a much broader question, one as pressing 
as it was unclear. This was the question of futurity, a question that converged with that of the 























This thesis has explored the frontier-making processes entailed in the ongoing transformations 
of energy infrastructures in Chile, as processes in which the contested (re)production of socio-
natures occurs through the clash, interweaving, and negotiation of the multiple layers of value 
and practice that mediate and give socio-ecological relations their particular cultural forms. 
These contesting valuations not only call into question the social meaning of, in this case, 
hydropower infrastructure projects, but in so doing constitute the cultural grounds for the 
political composition of the evolving antagonisms entailed by contemporary strategies of 
accumulation and their adaptation to intensifying socio-ecological transformations. It is my hope 
that this study, through the development of a distinct approach and analysis, has contributed to 
the still incipient literature on the social relations and processes that are entailed in the rapidly 
changing energy frontier in Chile, and beyond. In particular, the study has sought to contribute 
to ongoing discussions within Marxian ecological thought, in order to develop a value-
theoretical framework that can give an account on contemporary socio-ecological conflicts in all 
their cultural depth, and allows to connect these dimensions to the broader dynamics of capital 
accumulation. This has allowed me to contribute to the literature on contemporary 
transformations of energy infrastructures with an empirically rooted account of an instance of 
these transformations, their complexities, and the sort of contestations they entail. 
I started by developing ‘value’ as a political-ecological category, building on Neil Smith’s 
thesis on the production of nature. My main argument is that Smith’s formulation neglects the 
crucial importance of use-value in Marx’s theory, the incorporation of which delivers us a very 
different picture and understanding of capitalism as an ecological project. As outlined in Chapter 
2, far from a utilitarian reductionist reading, I follow Echeverría in understanding use-value as a 
complex and variegated field of signification through which social reproduction gives itself 
cultural form, a process that under capitalist relations is marked by the uneven and contested 
subsumption of social reproduction to the demands of valorisation. Capitalist ecologies, rather 
than unilaterally expressing these demands, express this constitutive struggle in which socio-
ecological reproduction is subsumed under its own inversion in the form of an expanding and 
alienated economic reality. This process ultimately implies a struggle over the social form of 
socio-ecological reproduction—in the case presented here, a struggle over whether nature is to 
be produced as abstract ‘energy’, or as a site for the reproduction of the multiple vernacular 
use-values it sustains.  
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To approach this field of use-value, I draw on what I consider to be key theoretical and 
methodological aspects underpinning Marx’s development of the category of ‘value’, which, 
drawing inspiration from Terence Turner, I argue can help us delineate a ‘symbolic materialist’ 
theory of social/cultural form. In Marx’s value theory, the capitalist form-determination of social 
reproduction is described in the following terms: as a consequence of the fragmentation of 
socio-ecological relations through primitive accumulation, the irreducible social character of 
human practice comes to exist as ‘abstract labour’ and is expressed through a symbolic attribute 
of the commodity—its value. This attribute can in turn only be realised and defined in relation 
to the social totality constituted by the (world) market. In Marx’s account one can discern three 
internally related aspects or moments of social reproduction that are organised in the historical 
form of ‘value’: meaning (as value), practice (as labour), and sociality (as market). In other words, 
Marx’s theory of value as a theory of social form implies positing 1. the social and symbolic 
nature of human practice, 2. the practical and social nature of symbolic meaning, and 3. the 
symbolic and practical nature of human social relations. The conception of social reproduction 
entailed by Marx’s materialist analysis is therefore one in which human subjective practice is 
irreducibly linked to a socially defined telos/purpose/meaning/value116, meaning constituted 
through the integration of subjective practice into a particular social/relational field, and these 
social fields or totalities are consequently constituted and defined by a set of meaningfully 
concatenated practices.  
This understanding of the co-constitutive relation between socio-ecological practices 
and the different social fields in which their meaning is negotiated is what lies behind my analysis 
of the different values that mediate socio-ecological reproduction in Huife, and how these are 
mobilised as oppositional forces in the context of the expansion of energy infrastructure in these 
valleys. I have tried to identify and explore the different social fields—which have both historical 
and spatial dimensions—in relation to which current transformations are evaluated and 
contested. Here the first one, the force driving the expansion of the energy frontier, is of course 
that of the geographies emergent from the strategic challenges posited by the national 
sustaining of planetary circuits of extractive valorisation I analysed in Chapter 3. Regarded from 
the perspective of this globally defined regime of value, the hydrological conditions of valleys 
such as Huife appear as the locus of potential energy and energy rent. The concrete unfolding 
of these logics however, is at every point determined by how it articulates with the various social 
fields in which the vernacular values that mediate socio-ecological reproduction in these spaces 
                                               
116 Here I take all of these terms to be distinct aspects of a general semiotic process of signification.  
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are constituted, and the relative capacities for political articulation that these social fields 
possess.  
In this sense, it is clear that at the local level one of the crucial aspects around which 
oppositional forces gravitate is the historical value that these lands hold for present inhabitants, 
which is closely linked to the reproduction of multifaceted collective identities. This was one of 
the most conspicuous values mediating people’s relation to the land, and emerges from the 
social field constituted by the relations symbolically established by present inhabitants with 
previous generations, which is expressed and reproduced by means of collective memory and 
local historical consciousness. As many of the testimonies presented expressed, these relations 
to people’s forebears constitute a central piece in the frame through which the multiple 
transformations these communities are undergoing are interpreted and evaluated, and imply a 
range of expectations regarding individual behaviour towards the landscape—expectations that 
are, to be sure, not always followed, but nevertheless always present. These relations not only 
bear upon the reproduction of collective identities in relation to the land, but also have a clear 
weight in the conceptions of what a desirable future might look like.   
This process of historical and geographical constitution of the communities is also 
present in other, related, social fields. One is that described in Chapter 6 around the vernacular 
hydrosocial relations that I referred to as the moral economy of water. As the chapter showed, 
these notions and values mediating water access developed as a function of the needs of social 
reproduction during the settlement period, in which relations of mutual recognition were an 
integral part of consolidating the material viability of territory’s settlement by families of widely 
diverse origins. This moral economy represents an arguably receding social commons, which 
nevertheless constitutes a fundamental backdrop against which the operations of the company 
and the enclosure of the waterscape appears as illegitimate. It is also in relation to this backdrop 
that the extent of the relationship between commodification and the state’s hydrosocial power 
can be more clearly identified. 
Another layer of the conflict closely related to the historical relations described above 
has been that of the way in which Mapuche identity has surfaced as a crucial element in the 
context of the struggle, especially in the case of lower Huife. This situates the conflict in an 
enormously complex and politically charged social field, with deep historical roots and national 
geographical dimensions. In this field, many aspects of local memory and local territory have 
acquired new value, as seen in Chapter 5, and appear with increasing salience in local narratives 
of opposition. The reinterpretation of local memory from the revaluation of indigenous identity 
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has also introduced new political elements—the notions of autonomy, of territory, of the 
contemporary relevance of historical grievance—that have been developed through the process 
of political recomposition undertaken by the Mapuche people over the past decades in the 
country as a whole. Indigenous identity has thus reshaped the relation to the state in ambivalent 
ways, as it posits both new forms in which state power is exercised and new terms through 
which this relation is put into question. This aspect of the conflict constitutes a serious political 
problem for the hydropower project, in so far as it places the local conflict in one of the most 
problematic fronts faced by the neoliberal state at the regional level, makes it navigate a trickier 
legal arena, and it constitutes a potential basis for circulating Huife’s struggle on broader scales.  
An additional set of relations from which local territorial values emerge is that entailed 
in the condition of semi-proletarianisation, and its concomitant geographies and temporal 
cycles. Local livelihood strategies combine and traverse urban and rural spaces, a geographical 
relation through which these different spaces acquire differentiated values; values that are in 
turn heavily modulated across the different life phases of community members. If urban spaces 
normally offer enhanced possibilities for self-creation—and are thus very important for younger 
members of the community—rural spaces are linked to a sense of identity, and to the possibility 
for a relative autonomy from wage-labour and its discipline. Regarding the waterscape, it is in 
this relation that the territory appears marked by the relative value of ‘abundance’ as well, which 
according to many constitutes one of the territory’s main riches. This relation is thus crucially 
important in understanding the fact that the impacts of potential hydropower infrastructure are 
not confined to those who are now permanent residents, but indeed ripple through a complex 
human geography that stretches far beyond the confines of these valleys, which has also allowed 
Huife’s struggle to circulate in different spaces.      
Relatedly, the complicated set of values emergent from the tourist economy has been a 
decisive factor in the context of the conflict. Mass tourism has entailed the enrollment of the 
region into a wide range of scales—regional, national, international—and has been driven by 
dynamics of marketisation and accumulation that are universally perceived to be threatening 
and out of the control of the Municipality’s inhabitants. Nevertheless, the incorporation of the 
territory into this social field has also projected on it a wide range of use-values—closely linked 
to socio-ecological conditions such as forests, hot springs, rivers, and the campesino way of life—
that are not only locally felt to hold future possibilities for the reproduction of local 
territorialities, but have also entailed the possibility of crafting alliances with a range of other 
social sectors interested in preserving some or all of these values. To the extent that the whole 
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of the Municipal economic strategy pivots on these issues, this is likely to present the most 
serious challenge for the hydropower project at the municipal scale at least.   
These are some of the main cultural and social forms that mediate socio-ecological 
reproduction in Huife, specifically those that over the course of the struggle have constituted 
themselves as oppositional forces and hold the possibility of articulating the antagonisms the 
energy frontier is generating across different scales. In this sense, what this study has focused 
upon has been the contested process in which the energy frontier operates not by simply 
effecting material transformations in nature for the production of energy, but rather by the 
contested displacement and/or subordination of the multiple social form(s) that these ecologies 
sustain, (re)produce, and nurture. In other words, this refers to the ongoing disciplining of the 
multiple social forms of energy, under the rule of the abstract energy and abstract labour.  
  
Huife, and the challenge of ‘jumping scales’  
This study has sought to understand the social relations in which the vernacular meanings and 
values that fuel resistance to hydropower in Chile are constituted, and the ways in which they 
converge in the formation of oppositional subjectivities. Visibilising the cultural relations and 
values in which resistance is grounded, and the sort of geographies in which these are 
reproduced, is, in my opinion, fundamental to move beyond all too common understandings of 
socio-ecological conflicts as being disputes over the distribution of costs and benefits, to an 
understanding of the multiple ways in which these conflicts call into question the very 
hegemonic value regime in which issues of distribution are ideologically framed (see Chapter 3 
and 7). In this sense, this thesis seeks to contribute to a more complex understanding of the 
current conflictivity at the energy frontier in Chile, through an analysis of the energy frontier as 
a socio-ecological process. Such an understanding seems fundamental in the difficult task of 
thinking through the challenge of decarbonisation in all its political, social, and cultural 
complexity, as a fundamental part of any potential emancipatory political program. Relatedly, 
awareness and attention to these relations is fundamental for movements trying to find 
openings for political mobilization: it is only by bridging and building on these points of 
contradiction that a movement can find a firm foothold on existing forms of consciousness, and 
politically compose common grounds beyond the atomised landscape of struggles that has 
characterised the large-scale deployment of multiple small-scale hydropower projects (Chapter 
3). In this sense, the question of the conditions of possibility for ‘scaling up’ the proliferating 
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local resistances is a crucial one, since it will be through this process of political composition that 
alternative narratives and practices of adaptation to a changing climate can emerge—ones that 
might both have the potential to command mass support, and foreground the necessities of 
social reproduction rather than those of sustained accumulation and compounding growth. The 
process of production of this multiscalar space in which counter-values converge and are 
mobilised, the sort of alternative narratives and practices that cohere in them, are in my view a 
crucial area for future research. 
In this sense, it is important to make some observations on the ways in which the 
situation analysed in this study was evolving at the time of writing. When I finished my fieldwork, 
Huife Inversiones was still in the process of responding to the observations made to the project 
by different government dependencies as a part of the process of environmental assessment. 
After a few months, perhaps to avoid a possible rejection, the company withdrew the project; 
something greeted with great happiness by people in Huife, although tempered by caution as 
they suspected the company would be back at some point. Indeed, in April 2018, the company 
resubmitted the project, perhaps expecting a more favourable regional political context entailed 
by the incoming right-wing administration headed by multimillionaire Sebastián Piñera, who had 
made the ‘reactivation of economic growth’ and ‘getting rid of obstacles for investment’ his 
main campaign promises. An expectation that would have been rapidly confirmed, as one of the 
main local operators of the Llancalil project—the person in charge of lobbying people in Huife 
and Pucón—rapidly assumed the position of regional representative of the Energy Ministry 
(Seremi). Nevertheless, the resubmission of the project sparked in Pucón an even stronger 
backlash than the previous time, showing the decidedly complicated social and political barriers 
that the project would have to overcome to be realised. Professionally made videos of the valley, 
its people, and the menace entailed by the project circulated in the internet, and a new 
organisation coordinating the multiple resistances and socio-environmental conflicts at the scale 
of the Trancura river basin—which encompasses the territories of both Pucón and Curarrehue, 
and includes the Liucura basin—emerged: the Movimiento Ambiental Intercultural Cuenca del 
Trancura [Intercultural Environmental Movement of the Trancura Basin]. The movement now 
has its own space on local radio, and has organised demonstrations against environmental 
degradation of the territory’s lakes and rivers in Pucón117, denouncing, in addition to 
hydropower projects, uncontrolled real estate development, fish farms, and pollution linked to 
tourism. The movement’s name foregrounds both the role of rivers as defining the geographical 
                                               
117 See their webpage: https://www.facebook.com/maictrancura/ 
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scale of political composition—thus reflecting the strategic character of water and the nature of 
the modes of accumulation they are confronting—and the multicultural nature of the territory 
it attempts to organise, thus pushing back on the forms of racial oppression that, as we saw, are 
entailed as a condition for the profitable deployment of many of these accumulation strategies. 
In this movement it thus appears that both the moral economy of water and the issue of 
indigenous identity continue to play an important role as grounds for political articulation. 
This important role is certainly the case for organisations that coordinate struggles at 
broader scales, which I had the opportunity to get to know more directly during my time in the 
region. A significant number of struggles that exist in many of the mountain valleys in the 
cordillera, and in the Araucanía region more generally, have been able to articulate themselves 
in regional networks. Perhaps the most important one is the Red en Defensa de los Territorios 
[Territorial Defense Network], with whom I was able to participate in a meeting in Curarrehue, 
and in demonstrations in Temuco. Networks such as these play a very important role as they 
provide legal, technical, and political support to otherwise very isolated localities (see Figures 3 
and 4 below). And, perhaps even more significantly, these networks are sites where dialogues 
between different experiences converge in broader political narratives, narratives through 
which concrete conflicts are reinterpreted in terms that permit their composition and circulation 
at broader scales, and help them constitute and reinterpret local experiences as being part of a 
single emerging struggle for reclaiming control over water, and the respect of indigenous 
rights118. During the early autumn when I was there, this network also hosted a national two-
day event in Temuco, organised by the Movimiento por el Agua y los Territorios [Movement for 
Water and Territories], a national network the Red en Defensa de los Territorios is part of. This 
event was a clear instance in which these common perspectives were being constructed, rooted 
in the dialogue and convergence of multiple struggles up and down the national territory. Again, 
the recuperation of water as a common good emerged as a central theme in the event, and 
various discussion groups talked about the different visions around this—for instance, whether 
we meant by recuperation of community control, whether we meant control by the state, and 
how these forms of control would be organised, what political strategy should be pursued, etc. 
The question of plurinationality was another central concern in these discussions, highlighting 
the cultural politics that have become part and parcel of socio-environmental struggles in Chile, 
a fact that illustrates the central role played by colonial and racial domination in the form of 
capitalist accumulation developed through the Chilean neoliberal experiment. On the second 
                                               
118 For examples of the network’s actions see:  Mapuexpress n.d. 
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day of the event, we moved to Melipeuco, a municipality immediately north of Pucón, where 
multiple hydropower projects are either in operation, under construction, or projected. There a 
ceremony was held by the Mapuche community on the Truful-Truful falls, a site at the time 
threatened by a hydropower project. From there, about two hundred people—representing 
organisations from all over the country—marched all the way across the forests and fields 






Figure 27. Photograph taken by the author of the Marcha Plurinacional por el Agua y los Territorios, 
demonstration held on April 2016 in Temuco.  
216 
 
Figure 28. Photograph from the same demonstration. Banner reads: “Justice, sovereignty, and dignity, 
water and power to the community!” 
 




Figure 30. March from the river towards the town of Melipeuco. April 2016 
 
This event provided much needed support to the organisations resisting the projects in 
Melipeuco. According to a personal friend who lives in the area and has been involved, the 
resistance had recently encountered problems related to the deep divisions sown by 
hydropower companies within the communities, and among families. The presence of all these 
people and organisations talking about similar experiences had made the local organisations feel 
supported and vindicated in what had become an uphill battle119. Solidarity was being built, and 
through this, political narratives that helped make common sense out of these struggles, and 
identify strategic paths forward for their territories.  
In this sense, what kind of perspectives did I see emerging from networks such as these, 
which articulate the existential necessity—faced by those communities that find themselves at 
the extractive frontier—of asserting the worth and dignity of their spaces of life? The most 
salient elements in these networks’ discussions were critiques of economic growth and 
hegemonic notions of development—sometimes, though not always, articulated as a critique of 
capitalism. There was a strong element of reasserting indigenous identities, cultures, and 
territories, especially as constituting a cultural and political bulwark to the commodified relation 
                                               
119 A battle they would ultimately win, as this particular project was eventually rejected in January 2018. 
See UFRO Medios 2018. 
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to the land and water these struggles invariably confronted, and as an important cultural 
resource for crafting conceptions of the future that might break the narrow confines imposed 
by capital and the state as forms of human community. In general, indigenous traditions and 
ways of life were seen as constituting valuable perspectives and sites from which to approach 
the struggle to repair what was perceived as society’s broken relationship to the earth.  
Indeed, it is worth noting that across Latin America it has been from these experiences—
the experiences of communities dealing with the extractive end of the global capitalist system—
that some of the most radical critiques of hegemonic notions of development have emerged. So 
far, however, the experience and visions emergent from the extractive frontier have only began 
to more solidly articulate with those emerging from other fronts of contradiction—say, with the 
experience of mass indebtedness in cities, precarious work, or with the misery inflicted by 
privatised public services—in what would hopefully be a more encompassing vision of the future 
that resonates across the complex geography of globalised capital accumulation. This—the 
political composition of the enormous geographical fragmentation of the different and uneven 
moments of contemporary capitalism—remains an open and ongoing task, one to which future 
research must contribute.  
It is worth saying that during the time I was in the field, the community of Huife was still 
only very incipiently ‘jumping scales’ beyond the strictly local; and no one from the community 
attended the events described above. As explained above, this has been less the case this time 
around with the project’s resubmission, and the links of the local struggle to nearby towns, local 
networks, and other sectors continue to grow in density. An open question is how the local 
experience and the values that motivate local opposition would articulate with the political 
narratives meitoned above. Would these find purchase in interpreting Huife’s experience and 
common sense? To what extent is this common sense itself being transformed by the frontier? 
What sort of vision capable of contesting the inevitable process of adaptation to a changing 
planet would emerge from places like Huife, its history, and its social and cultural composition?   
These days, it seems evident that the terms imposed by an adaptation led by the 
capitalist class and its strategic interests can only be shadowed by struggles everywhere, as the 
sustainment of expanded accumulation in a warming planet will continue to intensify—and 
ideally profit from—dispossession and the production of vulnerability. The issue, that this 
dissertation has tried to remain focused on, is in this sense not that of the deployment of 
particular technological forms, but rather of the social relations that these technologies and 
infrastructures are built to instantiate and reproduce. If our current planetary circumstance has 
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been brought about by the historical hegemony of a particular social relation—that of capital—
it can only be engaged by problematising and confronting this relation, rather than, say, its 
atmospheric symptom. And this problematisation can only begin and end in the human stories 
that inhabit this planet, the ways in which these makes sense of its becoming, and from which 
the dreams that breathe life into the ever uncertain future will continue to emerge.  
 
Future directions of research 
As signalled before, this study opens several avenues for further research. One question, 
suggested above, is that of the relation between the cultural and historical grounds of 
resistances—such as the ones explored by this thesis—and the spaces produced by the networks 
and organisations that attempt to organise and unify these struggles. What sort of convergent 
values are created in these networks, and how do these relate and feedback into local 
experiences and subjectivity? What sort of contradictions and challenges emerge from this 
process? What future perspectives are produced by this convergence? 
The question of the cultural grounds of resistance and struggles over value is particularly 
relevant to current discussion around water, and its recuperation as a common good. The 
complexity of the water issue is rooted in the fact that, as described at different points in this 
thesis, water’s status as private property is so central to the functioning of the Chilean economy 
as it is currently organised, that its transformation in to a form of commons—whatever form 
this might take—can only be conceived of as part of a much more general and encompassing 
process of transformation. As with many other fronts of reform, neoliberalism in Chile has been 
organised and institutionally consolidated in such a way that even minor reforms—in this case 
the not-so-minor modification of the status of water as private property—imply transformations 
on the constitutional level, and perhaps more substantially in the case of water, transformations 
in the economic structure and strategy of the country. Abstracted from a political project of 
broader transformations in economic strategy, the recuperation of water as a commons would 
simply render an economic model premised on water-intensive extraction by export-oriented 
capitalist corporations dysfunctional. In other words, the question of water strikes at the heart 
of the question of extraction and neoliberal accumulation in Chile, and poses questions that go 
way beyond the frontier spaces in which water conflicts are most explicit. The findings of this 
thesis would suggest that these discussions must be rooted in the moral economies that water 
flows through all across the hydrosocial cycle, such as those described in Chapter 6. Further 
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research into this dimension of the hydrosocial cycle would shed much light on the possible 
cultural grounds for the political composition of the demand of water as a commons, and would 
help demystify the prevailing view of the Chilean hydrosocial cycle as one dominated by 
‘markets’, question addressed on Chapter 3 and 6.  
Another, related, issue is that of how the geographies of semi-proletarianisation discussed on 
Chapter 5 might hold certain potential in linking struggles at the extractive frontier with those 
contradictions experienced in cities. How are these different contradictions made sense of by 
those who’s life geographies stretch across these spaces? What sort of subjectivities does this 
condition engender? What are the possibilities for solidarity across putatively ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ 
spaces, what are the common grounds? What sorts of potentials does this geography of semi-
proletarianisation—in many ways a product of the neoliberal experiment—hold from the 
perspective of the political composition of different fronts of contradiction in the fragmented 
geographies of capital accumulation in Chile?  
In more general terms, this study has touched upon the notion of ‘energy transition’ and the 
process of transformation of energy systems as a field of contestation, which, far from simply 
being technical in nature, brings to bear inherently political-ideological projects of what the 
future should look like, and who’s interests should guide the inevitable process of adaptation to 
a changing planet. The notion that this transition will be able to be undertaken without a 
significant departure from the basic parameters of the contemporary capitalist order—ie. it will 
be market- and profit-driven, structurally reliant in colonial relations to indigenous territories, 
and one in which the interests of the capitalist class remain identified with those of society—, 
while still dominant in Chile, and well represented in agendas like Energía 2050, grows less 
tenable with each passing day of stubbornly growing global emissions, profilerating socio-
ecological conflicts, and the looming shadow of catastrophe these cast upon the future. To date, 
green capitalism has failed to make its entrance on stage, and the audience grows impatient—
not only with the dismal show in offer, but with our very confinement to play the passive 
audience of our own history; a role inherent to a social metabolism subsumed under the 
alienated dynamics of capital accumulation. As alienation and its ecological consequences pile 
on and accelerate, earstwhile solid claims to legitimacy and credibility of political elites erode, 
and alternative forms of climate and ecological politics, visions, and movements begin to be 
pushed into the mainstream, in different, unexpected, and often problematic, forms. How might 
these alternatives look like in Chile—who’s concerns and experiences would they mobilise, how 
would they articulate with the contradictions bequeathed by four decades of neoliberal rule, 
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what alternative visions of the future might emerge from these—is still an open question, one 
to be explored in future reasearch. How would a process of transformation and adaptation 
unconstrained by the imperative of compounding accumulation look like, and what would it take 
to even open a conversation in these terms? What would the social, cultural, and political 
grounds for this conversation be? What sort of coalition will be able to articulate its terms? What 
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